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ABSTRACT
Understanding the fiscal behavior of subnational governments is increasingly important as 
fiscal responsibilities are devolved. In order to get a  clearer picture of subnational government 
behavior, we employ a median voter model and local government data to perform tests of the 
fragmentation, decentralization, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses. A key 
theoretical result is that estimating horizontal effects of the leviathan and fiscal illusion models 
without accounting for the interdependent demands for the services of overlapping jurisdictions will 
result in upwardly biased estimates. We find that controlling for the overlapping jurisdictions 
relationship is important This dissertation estimates each model using corresponding municipalities 
and counties. Our data set includes the both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan local governments in 
the West, Midwest, and South.
We find support for both the decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses in each 
municipal region. We find more evidence of behavior consistent with a leviathan at the county layer 
rather than at the municipal layer. Our main fiscal illusion finding is the difference in the extent of the 
flypaper effects across municipal and county samples. Municipal samples display a flypaper effect 
while the flypaper effect is much less prevalent at the county layer. In all but one case, we find 
symmetry in the overlapping jurisdictions relationships, i. e„ changes in county expenditures affect 
municipal expenditures in the same way that changes in municipal expenditures affect county 
expenditures. We find a symmetric, complementary strategic relationship in nonmetropolitan West, 
metropolitan Midwest, and metropolitan Southern samples.
A related line of literature posits that the specific type of organizational form that a 
government takes affects the level of public expenditures. Our results support the existing public 
finance literature that the organizational form of government has no effect on expenditures. Our 
analysis, however, does find differences across types of governments with respect to the leviathan, 
fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions variables.
viii
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The topic of this dissertation is the size of local government Government growth is a 
familiar topic within public finance, yet the consistent attention it receives attests to its continuing 
importance. The national government receives most of the attention. However, the current age of 
devolution makes subnational governments an equally important avenue of research. In an essay 
entitled “The State of Federalism, 1995-1996,” Weissert and Schram (1996) define the term 
“devolution revolution” to be the power shill from Washington to the states which is currently 
underway. They state the following: “Many questions remain about what states would do with the 
increased discretion, including how local officials will be involved” (7). They further report that 
several governors endorsed the idea of devolving authority to counties or other local units.
What will the outcome be as the national government devolves it responsibilities to state and 
local governments? This research seeks a clearer understanding of the behavior of local governments 
in order to gain insight into these questions. Specifically, what are the effects of the following on the 
size of the local public sector competition among governments, the fiscal structure hierarchy, 
budgetary complexity, and the organizational form of a government? Using a median voter model, 
this dissertation empirically merges three separate models of local government growth: leviathan, 
fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions. It is natural to merge these models of government 
because each seeks to explain the differences in the size of the local public sector across jurisdictions. 
Each has been shown to explain local government behavior individually, however, combining the 
models is necessary in order to obtain a more complete empirical model of local government behavior. 
In doing so. we ascertain the extent to which any of the separate effects reinforce or offset each other.
The leviathan hypothesis includes the propositions that lower public expenditures arise as the 
fiscal structure becomes more decentralized and more highly fragmented. Fiscal illusion posits that 
individuals do not know the true marginal costs and benefits o f public activity and therefore support a 
different level of public service than each would if he were hilly informed. The model of overlapping
1
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jurisdictions studies the relationship between municipal and county spending. If overlapping 
jurisdictions have a complementary relationship, then the local public sector will be larger than if a 
substitute relationship exists. Additionally, we present a theoretical rationale for empirically merging 
the models. A key theoretical result is that estimating the parameters of the leviathan and fiscal 
illusion models without accounting for interdependent demands of the services of overlapping 
jurisdictions results in upwardly biased estimates.
This is the first analysis to examine regional differences in a national data set. This exercise 
proves to be a significant contribution due to the differences in expenditure behavior across the regions 
o f the United States. Previous papers use either a national data set or only one region o f the country. 
Our analysis finds that pooling the regional samples is not always appropriate, even when employing 
dummy variables. Additionally, it is the first study to test the hypotheses employing data for 
corresponding municipalities and counties. Previous papers look at only one government layer, 
municipality or county, or aggregate all local government spending.
Empirically implementing two-stage least squares methodology is another innovation of this 
research. Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) show that possible endogeneity may arise due to the 
overlapping jurisdictions parameters. However, due to the empirical problem o f having more than one 
municipality existing within a county, we have an unequal number of observations in our municipal 
and county metropolitan samples. Therefore, employing a system estimator like three-stage least 
squares precludes us from using all the information in our municipal sample. In order to keep as 
much information as possible and still eliminate the effects of the possible endogeneity, we employ 
two-stage least squares to our unbalanced sample. Additionally, based on the two-stage least squares 
estimates of the overlapping jurisdictions parameters, application of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
shows that ordinary least squares estimates are consistent and efficient for most models.
The organization of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter H presents a  literature 
review of local government tests of the leviathan, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions 
hypotheses. Chapter in explains the median voter model, describes the data, and presents the results
2
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of botli F-tests of pooling regional samples and Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for the effects of 
endogeneity of the overlapping jurisdictions parameters. Chapter IV presents the results of a cross- 
section empirical study using metropolitan expenditure data to test the leviathan, fiscal illusion, and 
overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses separately and simultaneously. Our analysis is the first to test the 
leviathan hypothesis using both decentralization and fragmentation defined over the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area. Chapter V explores the differences in local government expenditure behavior across 
relatively highly competitive (metropolitan) and relatively less competitive (nonmetropolitan) areas.
Chapter VI extends the analysis in another direction, exploring the extent to which specific 
organizational forms of government affect local government expenditures. The existing empirical 
evidence ignores the expenditure behavior of the leviathan, fiscal illusion, or overlapping jurisdictions 
hypotheses. This dissertation tests the hypothesis that the organizational form of government affects 
expenditures controlling for these effects for municipalities and counties. This research presents the 
first empirical analysis of this nature for the county layer of local government and adds to the 
relatively small number of contradicting municipal studies. Finally, Chapter VII presents conclusions.
3
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CHAPTER H 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of tills section is to review the relevant literature on the leviathan, fiscal illusion, 
and overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses. Each model provides insight on why one local government 
may be relatively smaller or larger than another. The leviathan hypothesis includes the propositions 
that a more decentralized fiscal structure and more governments in an area lead to lower public 
expenditures. Fiscal illusion posits that individuals do not know the true marginal costs and benefits 
of public activity and therefore support a different level of public service than each would if he were 
fully informed. Finally, the model of overlapping jurisdictions studies the relationship between 
municipal and county spending. If the overlapping jurisdictions have a  complementary relationship, 
then the local public sector will be larger than if  a subsitutc relationship exists.
LEVIATHAN MODEL OF GOVERNMENT
In The Power to Tax, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that constraints must be imposed 
at the constitutional stage because, by itself, the political process cannot adequately constrain the 
natural proclivity of government to grow. The constitutional stage establishes the "rules of the game,” 
i.e., the social institutions shaping incentive structures and boundaries for individual interaction. 
Following Rawls (1971), individuals choose the constitution under a “veil of ignorance" regarding 
their future position in society. Rational individuals choose a constitution establishing order through a 
government rather titan the alternative of no collective enforcement of property rights and the resultant 
anarchy. However, once individuals solve the problem of anarchy by collectively giving an institution 
the power to enforce property rights, the government has a monopoly on the use of coercive power.
It is at this point that the work of Brennan and Buchanan diverges from that of orthodox 
public finance analysis. From this point of departure, orthodox public finance economists view 
government behavior as that of a benevolent despot, whereas Brennan and Buchanan view the despot 
as indifferent or even malevolent Orthodox public finance economists believe the government can be 
controlled via the political process of elections and seek to offer advice to politicians and bureaucrats
4
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on the optimal size of government and how governments should behave if revenues are to be raised 
efficiently and equitably. On the other hand, Brennan and Buchanan believe the government cannot 
be controlled via the political process o f elections alone and seek to Gnd ways to constrain the 
government at the constitutional stage: “We assume that the political process, as it operates 
postconstitutionally, is not effectively constrained by electoral competition as such, and that the 
electoral process can appropriately constrain the natural proclivities of governments only when it is 
accompanied by additional constraints and rules imposed at the constitutional Ievel”(15).
The leviathan hypothesis is the proposition that indirect, postconstitutional constraints, e.g., 
electoral competition, are not effective constraints on the growth of government. In other words, 
effectively inhibiting the natural tendency of government growth requires direct constraints like 
expenditure limits to be imposed at the constitutional stage. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) believe 
postconstitutional constraints, i.e., indirect constraints such as electoral competition, arc no match for 
the leviathan which constantly seeks new ways to exercise its power to tax. Electoral competition acts 
ineffectively because of rational ignorance, uncertainties inherent in majority rule cycling, and outright 
collusion among elected officials (Mueller 1989 268).
The leviathan hypothesis includes several propositions on constitutional constraints which 
will restrict leviathan postconstitutionally. For example, Brennan and Buchanan encourage the use of 
the following restrictions: restricting the number o f tax bases, restricting the comprehensiveness of 
tax bases, restricting the ability of governments to debt finance, restricting tax rate structures and 
restricting expenditure levels. However, Brennan and Buchanan present two cases where the need for 
constitutional constraints may be diminished. They posit that fiscal constraints imposed at the 
constitutional stage may be substituted by a public sector that is (1) decentralized and (2) fragmented. 
This research examines these two aspects o f the structure of local governments.
DECENTRAL IZTION HYPOTHESIS
Decentralization is the dispersion of political authority. In a decentralized system, fiscal 
powers are assigned to “lower” government tiers, e.g., municipal governments rather than county
5
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governments. Traditional fiscal federalism theory1 recognizes the benefits of a decentralized public 
sector, allocation is more responsive to the tastes o f consumers. If nonconformity exists in the 
provision of public goods, each jurisdiction’s demand for public services determines, in part, the 
jurisdiction’s level of expenditures. Through the Tiebout effect (discussed below), each constituent 
“votes with his feet” by choosing a jurisdiction with the fiscal package best satisfying his tastes. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) go further than traditional fiscal federalism economists in describing 
the benefits of a  decentralized system: they argue that the size of the public sector will be smaller, 
stating, “Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater 
the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized,. . .” (183). Decentralization produces 
greater competition and. hence, lower expenditures.
FRAGMENTATION HYPOTHESIS
A second benefit of decentralization posited by the traditional theory of fiscal federalism is 
the existence of competitive pressures which arise from a large number of producers. Competition 
encourages greater experimentation and innovation in the production of public goods as competitors 
are forced to adopt the most efficient techniques of production or lose constituents to neighboring 
jurisdictions.
The Tiebout hypothesis plays an important role in constraining government growth in a 
federalist structure. Tiebout’s (1936) model assumes that the benefits of public goods do not spill over 
to other jurisdictions and that migration across boundaries is costless. It is the combination o f voter 
mobility, or the ability to “vote with one’s feet,” and fiscal competition between governments which 
enables a person to locate in a community that matches his preferences for public goods. Tiebout 
states, “The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer 
the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position" (418). As the number and variety of 
communities and fiscal structures rises, competition between governments increases.
1 The theory of fiscal federalism is the traditional public finance economist’s approach to the 
assignment of government responsibilities in order to optimally achieve the three conditions of
6
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Making two additional assumptions: no personal preferences and no locational rents exist for 
specific jurisdictions, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) state that “ ...migration among separate 
governmental units acts as a substitute for oven fiscal constraints” (172). In this case, the highly 
fragmented government structure acts as an indirect constraint on leviathan. Once the appropriate 
jurisdiction provides the public good and economies of scale in administration are accounted for, 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that leviathan's ability for fiscal exploitation decreases when the 
number of jurisdictions increases for two reasons. First, increasing the number of jurisdictions 
increases the potential for individuals to move out of a particular jurisdiction which decreases the 
leviathan's monopoly power. Second, the potential for collusion among politician/bureaucrats 
decreases when the number of possible colluders increases (180). However, when personal preferences 
and locational rents do exist, the leviathan has a new source with which to exploit its citizenry, 
reinforcing the need for constitutional fiscal constraints. The stronger the preferences and the higher 
the rents, the greater die need for constitutional fiscal constraints.
In a federal structure, local governmental fragmentadon, i.e., compeddon, takes place along 
several dimensions. “Horizontal compeddon" or “inteijurisdicuonal compeddon" occurs when 
governments on die same der, e.g., municipality v. municipality or county v. county, compete with 
each odier for mobile residents. “Vertical compeddon” or “intrajurisdicdonal compeddon" occurs 
when governments on different tiers compete, e.g., municipality v. county. Finally, fragmentadon, in 
a broad sense, includes compeddon among all of the governments (coundes, municipalides, 
townships, and special districts) in an area.
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE LEVIATHAN MODEL OF GOVERNMENT
Up to this point we have discussed the dieoredcal arguments of the decentralizadon and 
fragmentadon hypodieses. We now shift direcdons and proceed with a review of the empirical 
findings. An empirical measure of decentralizadon accounts for the structure of a local government 
hierarchy and intends to capture which government der spends or collects relatively more. A measure
resource efficiency, equitable income distribudon, and high levels o f employment with reasonable
7
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of centralization, for example, is the share of the size of a jurisdiction which is “closer” in type to the 
federal government (state over county, county over municipality) in relation to a measure of the total 
government size. A measure of decentralization takes a measure of the size of a jurisdiction “furthest” 
from the federal level and then is divided by a measure of the total government size. A measure of 
fragmentation captures the number of governments competing in an area and may take population or 
land area into account.
Empirical tests using measures of fragmentation attempt to answer the question, “Does 
fragmentation constrain die size of government?” Similarly, empirical tests of the decentralization 
hypothesis attempt to answer the question, “Does decentralization constrain the size of government. 
Negative coefficients tell us that either decentralization or fragmentation reduces the size of 
government. If the coefficients are negative, then either decentralization or fragmentation acts as a 
constraint. Therefore, a negative coefficient is consistent with the assumptions of a leviathan 
government—one that is constantly seeking out new ways to expand.
Previous research performs tests of the decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses in 
many different ways. Table 2.1 summarizes the findings of many of these tests. The following review 
will only consider the tests performed using local government data: Sjoquist (1982), Schneider (1986), 
Zax (1989), Forbes and Zampetli (1989), and Eberts and Gronberg (1990). Sjoquist (1982) uses a 
median voter model and central city data from 48 Southern metropolitan areas to test the 
fragmentation hypothesis. He finds a significantly negative relationship between the size of the public 
sector, measured by general expenditures per capita, and fragmentation. His finding supports the 
proposition that fragmentation restrains leviathan.
Schneider’s (1986) test uses municipal suburban expenditure data from metropolitan areas 
across the country and five measures o f the size of the public sector: total expenditures, common 
expenditures, service expenditures, a common index, and a service index. “Common” expenditures 
refers to functions that are prevalent among municipalities, e.g., police and fire protection, parks and
price stability (Oates 1972 3).
8
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TABLE 2.1. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL TESTS OF DECENTRALIZATION AND
FRAGMENTATION HYPOTHESES
SUPPORT Reported for Decentralization or Fragmentation Hypotheses
PAPER________ TYPE1_________ UNIT__________ DATA_________MEASURE
Sjoquist
1982
Lowery & 
Beny
1983
Nelson
1986
Schneider
1986
Nelson
1987
Marlow
1988
Bell
1988
Zax
1989
Joulfaian & 
Marlow
1990
Eberts & 
Gronbcrg 
1990
Nelson
1992
Grossman &
West
1994
CS 1972 SMSA
TS/1948-I979 national
CS 1976
CS 1977
CS 1977
state
local
state
TS/1946-1985 total
TS-CS
1971/1981
CS 1982
state
county
CS 1981 & state 
1984
expenditure
expenditure
revenues
taxes
expenditure
taxes 
fire exp
expenditure
expenditure
revenue
expenditure
CS 1977 suburbs revenue
central cities expenditure
special districts
TS 1942-1987 municipalities expenditure
(Swiss) > 2000 pop
TS/1958-1987 federal 
(Canadian)
fragmentation
centralization
fragmentation
fragmentation
fragmentation
centralization
fragmentation
centralization
centralization & 
fragmentation
fragmentation
fragmentation
expenditure centralization
(table con't.)
9
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AMBIGUITY Reported for Decentralization or Fragmentation Hypotheses
PAPER________ TYPE1_________ UNIT__________DATA_________MEASURE
Oates
1985
Oates
1985
Raimondo
1989
Heil
1991
Grossman &
West
1994
CS 1982
CS 1982
national
state
TS-CS state + local
1960,1970,1980
CS 1985 national
TS/1958-1987 provincial 
(Canadian) local
revenue
revenue
centralization
centralization & 
fragmentation
hospital, centralization
highway, & 
other expenditure
revenue centralization
expenditure centralization
REFUTATION Reported for Decentralization or Fragmentation Hypotheses
PAPER________ TYPE1 UNIT__________DATA_________MEASURE
Raimondo
1989
Forbes & 
Zampelli 
1989
Nelson
1992
TS-CS state + local
1960,1970,1980
CS 1977 county
education
expenditure
taxes
revenue
TS 1942-1987 municipalities expenditure 
(Swiss) < 2000 pop
centralization
fragmentation
fragmentation
Notes: 'CS is cross section. TS is time series, and TS-CS is time series-cross section
10
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recreation, sanitation, highways, control and administration. “Service" expenditures include 
expenditures on education, welfare, hospitals, and housing. The common index refers to the number 
of common expenditure categories each jurisdiction makes and, likewise, the service index is the 
number of service expenditure categories each jurisdiction makes. Schneider’s measure of 
fragmentation is the number of suburban municipalities in the metropolitan area divided by the 
suburban population (which is measured in 100,000). He finds that the relationships between 
fragmentation and total expenditures, common expenditures, and the service index are each negative 
and statistically significant. Schneider’s results support the claim that greater fragmentation 
attenuates leviathan.
Zax (1989) presents a model of intragovemmental competition within the county. His 
dependent variable is the sum of own-source revenues of all types of governments in the county 
(county, municipality, township, and special district) divided by total county personal income. He 
measures the structure of the local government hierarchy by using a centralization measure defined to 
be the share o f total county revenue in the total revenues of all types of governments in the county. He 
reports a positive and significant coefficient on the centralization variable. This finding supports the 
Brennan and Buchanan claim that as the fiscal structure becomes more centralized, the public sector 
becomes larger. In other words, a decentralized fiscal structure restrains leviathan. Additionally, Zax 
tests the fragmentation hypothesis. He measures the effects of competition among general-purpose 
(municipalities and townships), single-purpose (special districts and independent school districts), and 
total governments in the county (general- and single-purpose). He defines each measure of 
fragmentation in two ways: per county population and per square mile of the county. He concludes 
that single-purpose and general-purpose governments affect the size of aggregate government revenues 
in the county differently. Specifically, increases in single-purpose governments lead to increases in 
aggregate government revenues in the county while increases in general-purpose government lead to 
decreases in aggregate government revenues in the county.
11
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Forbes and Zampeili (19S9) present a model o f inteijurisdictional competition within the 
county. They sum all of the taxes (own-revenues) for all counties in a metropolitan area to proxy the 
size of government. They use four different measures of the dependent variable: taxes per county total 
income, taxes per capita own-revenues per county total income, and own-revenues per capita They 
use a  measure of fragmentation (the number of counties in the metropolitan area) to capture the 
structure of the metropolitan area. They find significantly positive coefficients for both revenue the 
regression and the per capita income regression. Therefore, the work of Forbes and Zampeili (1989) 
docs not support the proposition that fragmentation constrains leviathan.
Eberts and Gronberg (1990) use the seemingly unrelated regression technique to estimate 
their model of the local public sector. They split the local government into three layers: suburbs, 
central cities, and the combination of special districts and counties. Two measures for each layer proxy 
the size of the public sector: the sum of expenditures on fire, police, parks, and sanitation divided by 
personal income and own-source revenues divided by personal income. They use two measures of 
fragmentation to test the leviathan hypothesis: (1) “municipal fragmentation” which is the number of 
suburbs and central cities divided by the population of the metropolitan area and (2) “other jurisdiction 
fragmentation” which is the number of counties, townships, and special districts divided by the 
population of the metropolitan area. They find significantly negative coefficients for the “municipal 
fragmentation” variable for all three levels of local government and both dependent variables, which 
supports the proposition that increased fragmentation constrains leviathan. On the other hand, the 
“oilier jurisdiction fragmentation” variable yields positive and significant coefficients in the own- 
source revenues sample for the county and special district layer of local government. This means that 
an increase in the number o f counties, townships, and special districts leads to increases in the size of 
the county and special district layer of local government, which does not support the proposition that 
increased fragmentation constrains leviathan.
The bulk of the empirical evidence supports the proposition that fragmentation and 
decentralization do constrain leviathan. In light of this, the findings of Forbes and Zampeili (1989)
12
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appear curious at first glance. Forbes and Zampeili find greater horizontal competition does not 
constrain leviathan, but significantly promotes its growth while Schneider (1986) and Eberts and 
Gronberg (1990) find greater horizontal competition does constrain leviathan. Though Forbes and 
Zampeili use county data while Schneider and Eberts and Gronberg use municipal data, we believe the 
inconsistency transcends specific government tiers. Consumers locate in communities based on their 
preferences for revenue and expenditure patterns. Therefore, governments compete for residents 
through both tax competition (leading to smaller governments) and benefits competition (leading to 
larger governments). It is not surprising, then, that reduced form parameters from different samples 
give rise to different conclusions on the fragmentation hypothesis. We now turn to a discussion of the 
second hypothesis considered in this research: fiscal illusion.
FISCAL ILLUSION
The original work on fiscal illusion is credited to Puviani, an Italian public finance political 
economist writing at the turn of the century. Puviani explains government behavior using the 
following hypothesis: the government always acts to hide the burden of taxes from the public and acts 
to magnify the benefits of public expenditures (Buchanan 1960, 60). Buchanan and Wagner (1977) 
posit that complex and indirect tax structures will create fiscal illusion that systematically results in 
higher levels of public expenditures than would be found under simple and direct tax structures (129). 
A complex and indirect tax structure is one which extracts payments from citizens in ways that 
individuals will “sense" them less. Examples include taxing many different sources rather than just a 
few and withholding taxes from earnings. In addition, taxing individuals over time prevents the 
aggregation of the entire tax burden, making it more difficult for an individual to easily ascertain his 
marginal tax price associated with public spending.
On the other hand, Galbraith and Downs both argue that the benefits o f public output are not 
obvious, leading to underestimation of public benefits. Downs suggests that indirect taxation is more 
apparent than many remote government benefits, which encourages systematic underestimation of 
benefits and lower levels of public expenditure (Oates 1988). Puviani maintains that the consumer is
13
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made to believe he is getting more service than he actually does, which implies an overestimation o f 
benefits (Buchanan 1960 63). Turnbull (1998) is the first to model fiscal illusion over the benefits o f 
government services.
It is important to note that fiscal illusion, though it is systematic misperception, does not
imply that individuals are irrational. Buchanan (1967) explains that the differences between behavior
under ignorance and/or uncertainty and illusion are subtle. He says that a  person facing inadequate
information and uncertainty will imperfectly “conceptualize alternatives,” and one facing illusion will
falsely “conceptualize alternatives” (126). He goes on to say that an irrational individual makes
inconsistent choices while an individual under an illusion will act consistently, so that we are able to
meaningfully study choices made by individuals under illusion (127). Oates (1988) agrees with
Buchanan and says that fiscal illusion does not mean imperfect information. He suggests that
imperfect information is necessary, but not sufficient for the existence of fiscal illusion. Oates says,
“More specifically, fiscal illusion refers to a  systematic misperception of fiscal 
parameters -  a recurring propensity, for example, to underestimate one’s tax liability 
associated with certain public programs. Imperfect information alone might well 
give rise to a random pattern of over- and underestimation of such tax liabilities.
Fiscal illusion, in contrast, implies persistent and consistent behavior. As such, it 
will give rise to recurring, and presumably predictable, biases in budgetary 
decisions” (67).
How can we assume the consumer misperceives his tax burden in each time period given the 
modem notion of rational expectations, where individuals learn from their mistakes and, on average, 
perceive accurately? The first explanation of continued misperception of the tax price is found in 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977). They give two reasons why consistent misperception exists. First, in 
the public sector, unlike the private sector, “There is no process through which the taxpayer who has 
operated under fiscal misperceptions can be led to correct his estimates” (132). They use an analogy 
of an individual who uses a credit card to make ordinary purchases. This individual may be initially 
unaware of his costs, but he eventually gets his bill and realizes his charges and therefore has the 
opportunity to learn and change his future behavior. In the case of government services, however, 
there is no external entity which plays the role of the creditor. Secondly, they argue that the costs o f
14
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making an accurate prediction outweigh the benefits; the taxpayer does not have an incentive to make 
accurate predictions. He realizes that he is just one in many and even if he is able to make an accurate 
prediction, the potential effects on public or political outcomes may be small. Therefore, he remains 
rationally ignorant of his tax price (132 -133).
TRADITIONAL FISCAL ILLUSION
Oates’ (1979) fiscal illusion hypothesis states that individuals underestimate their marginal 
tax price due to the complicated budget process which leaves them unaware of intergovernmental 
grants, giving the government monopoly power to increase its size. The introduction of 
intergovernmental grants leads to the phenomenon called the flypaper effect The flypaper effect 
suggests that “money sticks where it hits,” i.e., an increase in the median voter's share of 
intergovernmental aid which is given directly to the government is more stimulative on government 
expenditures than an equivalent increase in the median voter’s income.
The traditional fiscal illusion hypothesis o f government growth is made clearer by a graphical 
explanation. Figure 2.1 describes the pivotal voter’s choice between a private good, x , and a public 
good. G . The budget line AA serves as a reference budget line, where there is no intergovernmental 
aid and therefore no illusion at the median voter’s utility maximization point, a . The introduction of 
aid. A , shifts the median voter’s actual budget line out to B B , where p would be the point of utility 
maximization under complete knowledge of the intergovernmental aid. We know that the slope of the 
perceived budget line, A D , is flatter than the slope of the actual budget line B B , because in 
equilibrium, the perceived tax bill, x G , equals the actual tax bill s(G -  A ) where x is the perceived 
tax price and 5 is the true tax price:
xG = s(G — A),
dividing by G gives,
x = s ( l -  A/ a ),
where the level of aid, A , is less than the level of the jurisdiction’s expenditures, G . Therefore, x  
is equal to s multiplied by something less than one. Though the median voter incorrectly perceives
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his marginal tax price to be his average tax price, he accurately perceives his total tax bill. The utility 
maximizing median voter point of tangency under fiscal illusion, 5 ,  occurs where the perceived
budget line intersects the actual budget line. Comparing G p with G 8 we observe the output effect of 
fiscal illusion: the output maximizing public sector is able to increase the expenditures on public 
services beyond what the fully informed voter would support AD  represents a complete fiscal 
illusion, or absolutely no knowledge of intergovernmental grants. The analysis can also be performed 
with partial knowledge of the grant or incomplete fiscal illusion where the median voter has some 
knowledge of the intergovernmental grants.
Figure 2.1. TRADITITONAL FISCAL ILLUSION
UNCERTAINTY FISCAL ILLUSION
Turnbull (1997) models fiscal illusion using uncertainty theory and extends the theoretical 
analysis of fiscal illusion to include the benefits of public services. His notion of fiscal illusion is 
broader than Buchanan (1967) and Oates (1983). He uses the following notion of fiscal illusion: “fiscal 
illusion as voter imperfect information perse, the specific form of which may vary by application.”
As discussed above, Oates (1988) explicitly differentiates the traditional notion of fiscal illusion from 
imperfect information. Oates says that imperfect information (which is Turnbull’s notion of fiscal
16
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illusion) will result in a random pattern of over- and underestimation of tax price, where traditional 
fiscal illusion implies consistent underestimation of tax price. However, Turnbull asks, if imperfect 
information is a necessary condition for fiscal illusion, shouldn’t imperfect information be an 
important part of the story? Turnbull’s notion of fiscal illusion would not result from an institutionally 
induced bias as does the traditional notion of fiscal illusion (Buchanan and Wagner 1977 129) but 
arises simply out of the asymmetric information between bureaucrats and voters.3 Because Turnbull’s 
notion o f fiscal illusion is that of imperfect information, he uses an uncertainty model. In this case, 
risk averse voters know they do not have all o f the information and therefore choose a lower quantity 
of government services when faced with greater uncertainty on the tax price and benefits of public 
services. The important implications of this model include: an increase in tax price uncertainty 
reduces government spending, and the flypaper eflect exists even when the voter does not 
systematically underestimate his true tax price.
Additionally, Turnbull extends uncertainty fiscal illusion to the perceptions of benefits of 
public expenditure. Therefore, his notion of fiscal illusion of the benefits is also different from the 
traditional notion of McCulloch, Mill, Galbraith, and Downs. Turnbull names imperfect information 
of benefits, “public consumption uncertainty,” or “consumption risk.” He shows that public 
consumption uncertainty induces risk adverse voters to support less government spending and does not 
result in a flypaper efTect.
EMPRICAL TESTS OF THE FISCAL ILLUSION HYPOTHESIS
Table 2.2 summarizes the fiscal illusion empirical tests. The following discussion focuses on 
only the local government tests. Wagner (1976) was the first to empirically test the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis. He assumes that the more complicated a tax structure is, the lower are the individual’s 
perceptions of the tax price, which leads to an increase in the quantity demanded of government 
services. Wagner computes a Herfindahl index to capture the degree of complexity/simplicity of the
3 Turnbull’s analysis can be extended to include the traditional consistent underestimation of the tax 
price. In this case, the estimation that occurs each period will be distributed around a tax price that is 
lower than the true tax price.
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tax structure, a construct which all other empirical tests of budgetary complexity employ. Wagner's 
measure is equal to the sum of the squared shares of the different revenue sources for four different 
sources of revenue: property tax, general sales tax, selective excise tax, and charges and fees 
(excluding utility revenue). He uses expenditure data on the fiffy largest cities in 1967 and he finds a 
significant and inverse relationship between the simplicity of the revenue structure and total 
expenditures, which supports the traditional fiscal illusion hypothesis: as the tax structure becomes 
more complicated, government expenditures rise.
Munley and Greene (1978) criticize Wagner’s (1976) model specification. They suggest that 
Wagner chose certain independent variables because they had been shown to be significant in prior 
testing, and point out that Wagner did not use population as an independent variable. Munley and 
Greene redo Wagner’s (1976) analysis using per capita expenditures as the dependent variable and 
include population as an independent variable. They find the tax simplicity measure to be 
insignificant, though still negative.
Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) use Swiss municipal expenditure data from 1970. They 
modify the measure of tax structure by multiplying each municipality’s index number by a computed 
median tax price in order to get a proxy for the perceived tax price in each jurisdiction. They suggest 
that each revenue source in the Herfindahl index should have a special weight according to its relative 
visibility to the median voter. Therefore, they calculate two additional measures of concentration. The 
first measure is a Herfindahl index calculated with the two most visible tax sources: personal income 
taxes and wealth taxes. They posit that the impact of this measure should be stronger than the original 
Herfindahl index measure. The second measure is a  Herfindahl index calculated with the three most 
invisible tax sources: public utility taxes, taxes on interest revenue on capital, rents and leases, and the 
net proceeds from the sale of public property. They posit that impact of this measure should be weaker 
than the original Herfindahl index. They report negative and significant coefficients on each of the 
Herfindahl measures of tax structure, supporting the notion that a more complex revenue structure will
18
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TABLE 2.2. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL TESTS OF FISCAL ILLUSION
PAPER________ TYPE1_________ UNIT_________ DATA_________ RESULT
Wagner
1976
Clotfelter
1976
CS 1967
CS 1970
Pommerehne & CS 1970
Schneider
1978
Munley &
Greene
1978
Baker
1983
Breeden &
Hunter
1985
Garand 
1988, 1989
CS 1967
CS 1975
CS 1975
TS-CS
1945-1984
municipal expenditure finds support
state
municipal
state
municipal
state
expenditure finds support
revenue
expenditure finds support
municipal expenditure ambiguous
revenue
revenue
Turnbull
1997
finds support 
finds support
expenditure ambiguous
expenditure finds supportCS 1980 municipal
Notes: ‘CS is cross section, TS is time series, and TS-CS is time series-cross section
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lead to greater government expenditures. Additionally, they report that the other two measures o f the 
Herfindahl index accounting for visibility of the tax source have the predicted impacts.
Breeden and Hunter (198S) test the fiscal illusion hypothesis using 1975 municipal tax 
revenues o f 37 cities with a population over 200,000. Using a Herfindahl index, they find a negative 
and significant relationship between simplicity and government revenues, supporting traditional fiscal 
illusion.
Turnbull (1998) empirically estimates his model, though he points out there is no direct way 
to measure the degree of voter uncertainty with the type of expenditure data typically available. He 
uses 1980 municipal data to explore the relationship between the complexity of the revenue system and 
the complexity of the expenditure system with the level of government expenditures. He measures 
fiscal complexity with two Herfindahl indexes-one using revenue sources and another using 
expenditure categories. The joint effect of the parameters and the presence of the flypaper effect 
determine which type of fiscal illusion is present in the data. Turnbull reports that the combined effect 
of the Herfindahls is significantly positive, supporting his notion of tax price risk and consumption 
risk.
As in the empirical results for the decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses, the fiscal 
illusion empirical results are inconsistent. This research intends to sort out some of these 
inconsistencies. We now turn to the tliird hypothesis considered in this research.
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS
As defined by Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993), strategic relationships exist between 
overlapping jurisdictions. If increases in spending of one tier leads to increases in spending of the 
other tier, then the demands for county and municipal services have a strategic complementary 
relationship. On the other hand, if increases in spending of one tier lead to decreases in spending of 
the other tier, then the demands for county and municipal services exhibit a strategic substitute 
relationship.
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Breton (1987) states that a federal structure adds competition to that already present in a party 
government (273). Therefore, if spending at one tier is a substitute for spending at another tier, then 
government growth is naturally constrained by the federal system and vertical competition exists. 
However, Breton argues that politicians working together to achieve a particular end can easily 
degenerate into “collusion, conspiracy, and connivance (274).” Therefore, if spending at one tier is a 
complement to spending at another tier, the growth of government is encouraged by the federal 
structure.
Suppose Figure 2.2 is a map of a county that is made up of two municipal governments, A  
and B . The points a and b represent the median voter o f each municipality, respectively, and c 
represents the median voter of the county. All o f the analysis assumes that the county median voter is 
not the municipality median voter. In the case where the county median voter is the same person as the 
municipality median voter, i.e., a or b equals c , the analysis takes the form of a  joint demand 
function and not interdependent demand functions and is therefore not within the scope o f this paper.
County C
Municipality B
Figure 2.2. MAP OF COUNTY
There are two cases to consider when analyzing the interdependent demands of county and 
municipal spending. The first case is when the municipal median voter takes county spending as
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given, i.e., the county spending level is exogenous to the municipal median voter b. The second case 
is when the municipal median voter’s demand for municipal spending is set simultaneously with the 
county median voter’s demand for county spending. For example, the county spending level is 
endogenous to the municipal median voter a  because the county median voter lives in the same 
municipality. The following analysis will consider both cases in turn and will extend the work of 
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993). Appendix I contains the comparative statics and the derivation of 
the best response functions discussed below.
Municipality B  maximizes the utility o f its median voter, U b , subject to his income constraint:
max U b = U b(x b,E b ,E b) s.t. mb = x b + Tb +Tb (2.1)
{ E bm }
where xb is his private consumption, £* is his municipal public good consumption, E b is his 
county public good consumption, mb is the median voter’s income, Tb is the tax bill he pays to the 
municipality, and Tb is the tax bill he pays to the county. Solving the maximization problem for the 
median voter’s demand for municipal public spending yields the municipal best response function:
E b„' = $b(Sbm,m b,A lT c b 'E bc ) (2.2)
The second case is when the municipal median voter’s demand for municipal spending is set 
endogenously with the county median voter’s demand for county spending because the county median 
voter lives in the same jurisdiction as the municipal median voter. Therefore, there are two median 
voters, one for the municipality and one for the county. For example, the municipality median voter 
a  and the county median voter c both live in municipality A . The problem is now one of 
simultaneous maximization. At the same time the county selects the equilibrium county expenditures 
to maximize the county median voter’s utility, the municipality selects the equilibrium municipal 
expenditures to maximize the municipal median voter’s utility. Municipality A ’s problem is the same 
as municipality B ’s, except that it occurs at the same time the county is solving its problem. The 
county’s problem is to maximize the utility of the county median voter
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max Ue(x e ,E bm,E ec ) s.t me = x c + C + r /  
{ x e ,E c }
(2.3)
where x c is the county median voter’s private consumption, E l  is his county public good 
consumption, E l  is his municipal public good consumption, mc is his income, 7^ is his municipal 
tax bill, and 7 /  is his county tax bill. Solving for the county median voter’s demand for county 
spending yields the county best response function,
The relationship between municipal and county public spending can be analyzed using best 
response functions. On a graph of county expenditures versus municipal expenditures, strategic 
complementary best response functions are upward sloping and strategic substitutionary best response 
functions are downward sloping (Tirole 1988). Figure 2.3 demonstrates the relationship between 
municipal and county spending when they are strategic complements. The point A represents the
Nash equilibrium. We observe only the points where the two functions intersect (Tirole 1988 208). 
Therefore, when there is a decrease in municipal spending, e.g. due to a decrease in the municipal 
median voter a ’s income, the municipal reaction function shifts left and the new Nash equilibrium
(2.4)
Figure 2.3. STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTS
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point we observe is C , where there is a lower level of both municipal and county spending. The 
reduction in municipal spending leads to a reduction in county spending due to the strategic 
complements relationship. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the relationship between municipal and county 
spending when they are strategic substitutes. Again, point A represents the Nash equilibrium and we 
only observe points of intersection. In this case, a decrease in municipal spending shifts the municipal 
reaction function left giving the new equilibrium C with a higher level of county expenditures.
Tire type of relationship, whether substitute or complement, is important in tire discussion of 
tire relative size of government If a substitute relationship exists, spending by one tier reduces 
spending of tire other tier, constraining leviathan. Alternately, a complementary relationship, 
spending by one tier increases spending by tire other, gives leviathan another way to grow.
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) estimate tire relationship between 139 municipalities in 
the Midwest and tire corresponding counties. They report that there is a strong, positive relationship
Figure 2.4. STRATEGIC SUBSTITUTES
between county spending and municipal spending using general purpose expenditures. This finding 
supports the conclusion of a strategic complementary relationship for the Midwestern municipalities. 
The same is not found using specific services.
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RATIONALE FOR MERGING MODELS 
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT GROWTH
Traditionally researched separately, we appropriately merge fiscal illusion and overlapping 
jurisdictions hypotheses with the leviathan hypothesis. Fiscal illusion and collusion of government 
officials across tiers are two mechanisms the leviathan uses to exploit its citizenry. Brennan and 
Buchanan state that politicians/bureaucrats can use the information asymmetry that exists between the 
electorate and the politicians/bureaucrats to mislead the electorate (1980 20). Brennan and 
Buchanan’s argument is the basis of the fiscal illusion hypothesis. Brennan and Buchanan also view 
collusion as another of leviathan’s methods (185). In merging the models, we allow for the possibility 
of collusion via tire overlapping jurisdictions hypothesis.
The vertical relationship has direct implications for measuring the effects of leviathan and 
fiscal illusion. In Figure 2.3, suppose an increase in horizontal competition among municipalities 
reduces the municipal reaction function. The increase in the number of municipalities serves to reduce 
the expenditures in each municipality shifting the municipal reaction function to the left The actual 
reduction in equilibrium municipal spending is caused by both the increased fragmentation and the 
complementary relationship between municipal and county spending demands. The effect of only 
horizontal competition is the movement from A  to B and the corresponding reduction in municipal
expenditures is from E xm to £ * .  The complementarity between municipal and county expenditures
results in the movement from B  to C  and a further reduction in municipal expenditures £* to E * . 
Therefore, because we only observe points A  and C , estimating fragmentation, without accounting 
for vertical competition, will result in an overestimation of the effect of horizontal competition. This 
result generalizes to all of the different influences on spending, which is an important reason for 
merging the three literatures.
Figure 2.4 demonstrates the relationship between municipal and county spending when they 
are strategic substitutes. The point A  represents a Nash equilibrium, when there is a decrease in 
municipal spending the municipal reaction function shifts left and the new Nash equilibrium point we
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observe is C . The new point C represents a lower level of municipal equilibrium spending and a 
higher level of county equilibrium spending. The reduction in municipal spending leads to an increase 
in county spending due to the strategic substitute relationship. If the reduction in the municipal 
reaction function is due to an increase in fragmentation, for example, it is important to note that the 
actual reduction in equilibrium municipal spending is caused by both the fragmentation and the 
substitute relationship between municipal and county spending demands. The effect of only horizontal 
competition is the movement from A  to B  and the corresponding reduction in municipal
I *  2expenditures is from E„ to E „ . The substitutability between municipal and county expenditures
2  2 *results in the movement from B to C  and a further reduction in municipal expenditures E„ to E„ .
Again, because we only observe points A  and C , estimation of fragmentation, without accounting for 
vertical competition, will result in an overestimation of the effect of horizontal competition
CONCLUSION
Integrating the leviathan model of government and fiscal illusion hypothesis into a system of 
overlapping jurisdictions is the focus of this research. Each model provides insight as to why one local 
government may be relatively smaller or larger than another. Merging the models enables us to 
determine whether any of the separate effects reinforce or offset each other. Moreover, controlling for 
the overlapping jurisdictions parameters allows us to avoid the overestimation of fragmentation, 
decentralization, budgetary complexity and flypaper effects common in previous papers. Additionally, 
this research seeks to understand the inconsistency in empirical findings on the leviathan and fiscal 
illusion hypotheses. We now turn to a discussion of the empirical methodology and data collection.
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CHAPTER HI 
THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY
MEDIAN VOTER MODEL
In order to isolate the relative effects of decentralization, fragmentation, fiscal illusion, and 
overlapping jurisdictions, we must first control for heterogeneity in preferences for public services 
across jurisdictions. The median voter model (MVM) is the most popular method for aggregating 
preferences of individuals’ demand for public goods within a jurisdiction. In the MVM, the median 
voter’s preferences emerge as the jurisdictions preferences.1 The MVM is not a complete model o f the 
public sector equilibrium, because it only represents the demand side. Holcombe (1989) points out that 
the MVM serves in much the same way that the summing of individual demand curves results in a 
market demand curve. The MVM provides a way of controlling for different demands for public goods 
across jurisdictions. We will add “supply-side” variables to account for the effects of decentralization 
and fragmentation of the fiscal structure, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions to complete our 
empirical models.
The individual with the median income in the jurisdiction represents the median voter when 
estimating the demand for public goods. Inman (1979) reviews five sufficient conditions laid out by 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) ensuring that the quantity of public goods demanded by the voter 
with the median income always equals the median quantity of public goods demanded in each 
community.2 Bergstrom and Goodman (1973 286) suggest that if there were “frequent and substantial 
variations” in these conditions, the median voter model could not be expected to give reasonable 
estimates o f income or tax share elasticity. Other problems of the MVM include accounting for the 
variation in the cost of public spending across observations due to the difference in factor prices, the
1 As Holcombe (1989) points out, the median voter model (MVM) should not be confused with the 
median voter hypothesis (MVH). The MVH implies that the public sector actually provides the 
quantity demanded by the median voter, while the MVM does no t
2 income distributions are proportional across the communities; each household’s tax share s  is a 
constant elasticity function of household incomem, s = am* ; all households have identical log-linear
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degree of publicness, and economies or diseconomies of scale in production o f the public good. 
Regardless, there is no widely accepted alternative model of individual preference aggregation. 
Additionally, there is surprisingly strong empirical support for the MVM, in general (Turnbull and 
Djoundourian 1994).
IMPLEMENTING THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL
We obtain the median voter’s demand by maximizing his utility subject to his income 
constraint. The following represents the median voter’s simple budget constraint when all 
intergovernmental aid is lump-sum:
PgG = tBT +A  (3.1)
where Pg is the price of the public good, G is the amount of the public good, t is the property tax 
rate, BT is the total tax base of the jurisdiction, and A is lump-sum intergovernmental aid received 
by the jurisdiction. Under a balanced-budget, setting the level of expenditure determines the tax rate: 
t = ( / Br)(PgO -A ) .
The median voter’s tax bill is the tax rate multiplied by the value of his property, Bm:
tBm = (B/ BjX P gG - A ) .
Let s  represent the median voter’s share of taxes, (b"/bt ) . s ° 11,31
tBm =s{PgG - A ) .  (3.2)
The median voter’s utility is a function of a private good x  and the public good G and the median
voter’s demand is the solution to the problem:
Max U(x,G) s.t. m = x  + tBm (3.3)
{ x ,G }
where the price of the private good is assumed to be one and the voter’s tax bill is (3.2). Substituting 
(3.2) into the voter’s budget constraint and collecting the income terms gives
demand for public services as a function only of income and tax shares, g  = Zmasp ; the relevant 
elasticities do not violate the condition a  +f3e * 0 ;  and all households vote sincerely.
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(m+sA) = x  + sPgG.
We introduce congestion of the public good following Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973):
g  = G n "  (3.4)
where g  is the median voter’s consumption of the public good which depends upon the extent of the 
congestion of the public good. The value of rc must lie between zero and one. If it is equal to one, 
then the publicly provided good is a purely private good where one individual’s consumption precludes 
all other individual's consumption possibilities by the original reduction. However, if it equals zero, 
then it is a Samuelsonian pure public good where one individual’s consumption does not reduce the 
level of consumption possibilities available to all other individuals.
Substituting (3.4) into the voter’s budget constraint gives,
(m + s^) = x + sPs gn’' (3.5)
Simplifying (3.5),
m = x  + rg (3.6 )
where m = (m+sA) and t  = sPgn n . Revising the problem gives,
Max U (x,gnn) s.t. m = x  + xg (3.7)
}
Solving (3.7) gives the median voter’s demand for the public good as a function of his income in 
addition to his shares of aid and his tax price:
g* = = f{ m  +&4, sPgrtn ). (3.8)
In order to make (3.8) operational, we employ a constant elasticity form with a multiplicative 
error (Judge, et al. 1985) giving the following reduced form function:
g  = a(m +(&4)a ' (sPgn K)a' exp{e} (3.9)
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In order to empirically test the fiscal illusion theoretical prediction of the flypaper effect, we separate 
median income and share of aid in order to capture the differences in the marginal effects (Turnbull 
1995):
g  = a(m) p| (&4)Pl (sPgn n )Pj exp{e} (3.10)
Unfortunately, the level of g  is not observable. However, we do observe the level of government 
expenditures. If we multiply (3.9) by population n, we arrive at the following:
G* = a(m)9' (s4 )Pl (sPgn K)9> n* exp{s} (3.11)
Further, if  we multiply (3.10) by the price of the public good, Pg , we obtain the level of expenditures, 
E X P , wliich is observable:
EXP* =a(m)p'(sA )h (sPgn*')p>n'Pg exp{e}. (3.12)
Taking the natural logs and collecting terms gives the following:
In(£YP) = ln(a) + Pi ln(/«) + ln(&4) + p 3 In(.s) + 7i(P3 + l)ln(/t)+(P3 + l)ln (/,J )+e. (3.13)
Under constant returns to scale, the unit cost of the public good, Pg , merges with the constant term
and we now have the following way to estimate a jurisdiction’s spending behavior:
InlEVP) = P0 +P, ln(/w)+p2 ln ( i4 )+ p 3 ln(jr)+7t(P3 + l)ln (n )+s. (3.14)
In per capita terms:
ln(EX% ) =  P0 + p 1 ln(m) + P2 ln(sl4)+P3ln(s)+ [ii(P3 + l)-l] ln (n )+ E . (3.15)
or simply:
ln( ° % )  = Po + P i ln(m) + p j  ln(i4) + p3 ln( j )  + p4 ln(n) + e. (3.16)
We assume the errors are distributed with mean zero and heteroskedastic variance of an unknown 
form.
The median voter model gives us a way to control for differing demands for public goods 
across jurisdictions. Using (3.16) as a point of departure, we want to explain differences in 
expenditure levels across jurisdictions due to different fiscal structures described by the fragmentation,
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decentralization, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdiction hypotheses. The following questions 
summarize each hypothesis:
i.) The fragmentation hypothesis seeks to answer the question:
Does having more jurisdictions in an area lead to lower expenditures?
ii.) The decentralization hypothesis seeks to answer the question:
Does having a fiscal structure that spends relatively more at a lower tier of 
government lead to lower expenditures?
iii.) The fiscal illusion hypothesis seeks to answer the question
Does the simplicity/complexity of the budgetary structure affect expenditures?
iv.) The overlapping jurisdictions hypothesis seeks to answer the question:
Is there a strategic relationship between municipal and county expenditures and 
how does this relationship affect expenditures at either level?
In Chapter IV, we begin by pursuing i.) and ii.), iii.), and iv.) separately, as is typical in the 
literature. We then extend the empirical analysis to address the three effects simultaneously. Chapter 
V attempts to answer the question, “Does being located inside (or outside) of an Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA)significantly affect expenditures?” Additionally, we extend the analysis to 
include a discussion of the specific organizational type of government. Chapter VI attempts to answer 
the question, “Does the organizational form of government significantly affect expenditures?" 
TAXONOMY OF MODELS
We use the following taxonomy of models in each chapter Model 1 is the basic median voter 
model which aggregates preferences for public services in each jurisdiction. Model 2 tests the 
fragmentation and decentralization hypotheses. Model 3 allows the data to reveal which type o f fiscal 
illusion is present Model 4 tests the overlapping jurisdictions hypothesis. Model 5 combines the 
fragmentation and decentralization hypotheses and the fiscal illusion hypothesis, Model 6 combines 
the fragmentation and decentralization hypotheses and the overlapping jurisdictions hypothesis, and 
model 7 combines the fiscal illusion and overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses. Finally, model 8
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merges all three hypotheses. We append an “a" or a “b” to the model number in order to emphasize 
differences in the measures used to test the fragmentation hypothesis (explained in Chapter V).
DESCRIPTION O F THE DATA 
This is the first research using corresponding municipal and county data. Additionally, this is 
the first research employing both Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) and nonmctropolitan 
(nonMSA) data. We use local data, i.e., municipal and county, rather than state or national, to provide 
the best possible test of the fragmentation hypothesis. The MSA samples come from the fifty most 
highly populated MSAs in the West, Midwest, and South.3 We exclude the Northeast because o f its 
unique definitions of “municipality” and “county” relative to definitions used elsewhere.4 Within 
these MSAs, data on total municipal property value were available for 530 municipalities. Therefore, 
we have 530 observations in our MSA regionally pooled municipal sample. These municipalities lie 
inside o f 166 counties. Therefore, we have 166 observations in our MSA regionally pooled county 
sample. The nonmetropolitan samples include areas not classified as an “MSA” and not classified as 
“rural.” These municipalities and counties are drawn from the nonmetropolitan areas in states 
corresponding to the states in the MSA samples. Within these nonmetropolitan areas, data on total 
municipal property value were available for 178 municipalities and the corresponding 178 counties. 
Appendix V contains summary statistics for these samples.
3 The MSAs included in the sample are the following: Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside, CA; 
Chicago-Gary, IL; San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA; Detroit-Ann Arbor, MI; Washington, DC, 
Dallas-Ft. Worth, TX; Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX; Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, FL; Atlanta, 
Cleveland-Akron-Lorain, OH; Seattle-Tacoma, WA; San Diego, CA; Minneapolis-SLPaul, MN; St. 
Louis, MO; Baltimore, MD; Phoenix, AZ; Tampa-StPetersburg-Clearwaler, FL; Denver-Boulder, CO; 
Cincinnati-Hamiltion, OH; Milwakee-Racine, WI; Kansas City, MOKS; Sacramento, CA; Portland* 
Vancouver, OR-WA; Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, VA; Columbus, OH; San Antonio, TX; 
Indianapolis, IN; New Orleans, LA; Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC; Orlando, Salt Lake City, 
UT; Nashville. TN; Memphis, TN-AR-MS; Oklahoma City, OK; Louisville, KY-IN; Dayton- 
Springfield, OH; Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point, NC; Birmingham, AL; Jacksonville, FL; 
Riclimond-Petersburgh. VA; W. Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Delray Beach, FL; Austin, TX; Las Vegas, 
NV; Raleigh-Durham, NC; Tulsa, OK; Grand Rapids, MI; Fresno, CA; Tucson, AZ; Greenville- 
Spartanburg, SC; and Omaha, NE-LA.
4 Additionally, we exclude any city that is coterminous with its county (geographically or effectively 
due to consolidated local governments).
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EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES
In the context of municipalities, the median voter model takes the following form:
ln(EXPX . )  = P0 + P, l* /» w) + P2 K ^ - )  + P3 1 * 0  + Pa hi(nm) + e m
where EXP” is municipal common expenditures, the sum of expenditures on highways, police, fire, 
and park and recreation; nm is municipal population; mm is the municipal median voter’s household 
income; s " A m is the municipal median voter’s share of intergovernmental aid received by the 
municipality, and s™ is the municipal median voter’s tax share. For counties, the median voter model 
takes the following form:
ht(SXFZ ^  = Po + Pi In('” c) + P2 lnO£/lc ) + P3 ln(Sc) + P4 ln(nc) + e c
where EXPC is county common expenditures, the sum of expenditures on highways, police, 
corrections, and park and recreation; nc is county population; s 'A c is the county median voter’s share 
of intergovernmental aid received by the county; se is the county median voter’s county tax share. See 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for a summary of the above explanations.
The measure of income is median household income. The median voter’s tax share is the 
median house value divided by the jurisdiction’s total property tax base. Median income and median 
house value arc taken from 19S0 census data while municipal total property tax base comes from 1983 
Moody's Municipal and Government M anual. All other data were collected from the 1982 Census of 
Governments. See Table 3.3 for a more complete list o f the data sources.
METHODOLOGY
In all but a few cases (which are discussed below), we use ordinary least squares (OLS) to 
obtain our empirical results. In using OLS, we assume the following: the errors have some 
distribution such that the expected value of each error is zero and the variances are constant across all 
observations; each independent variable is not correlated with the error, so that the X  matrix is 
nonstochastic; and the same expenditure process holds for each observation.
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Table 3.1. Summary of Variables for Municipal Equation
E xp* Municipal Common Exp = Highways + Police + Fire +
Park and Rec Expenditures
nm = Municipal population
n,m = Municipal median voter’s household income
£ = Municipal median voter’s municipal tax price
sZ A m = Municipal median voter’s share of intergovernmental aid
Table 3.2. Summary of Variables for County Equation
Highway + Police + Correa 
Park and Rec Expenditures
EXPe — County Common Exp =
ne = County population
me = County median voter’s 1
s i = County median voter’s c
s eA c = County median voter’s s
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Table 3.3. Summary of Data Sources
Variable Jurisdiction Source
Median Household Income M, Cl Characteristics o f  the Population, General
Social and Economic Characteristics 
1980 Census of Population. PC80-l-by 
state, Table 57
Median House Value M, C Characteristics o f  Housing Units, General
Total Property Value M
Total Property Value C
Types of Tax Revenue M, C
Intergovernmental aid, M
Population,
Total Tax Revenue,
Expenditures
Intergovernmental aid, C
Population,
Total Tax Revenue,
Expenditures
Number of Governments in M, C
the County
Housing Characteristics,
1980 Census of Housing, HC80-l-by state, 
Municipal: Tables 20, 31, and 37;
County: Table 48
Moody's Municipal and Government 
Manual, 1983 Vol. 1 and Vol. 2
Taxable Property Values and Assessment-Sales 
Price Ratios, 1982 Census of 
Governments, GC82(2) Table 20 Vol. 2
Finance Summary Statistics, 1982 Censusof 
Governments, Inter-University Consortium for 
Political and Social Research, Series 83942
Finances o f  Municipalities 1982 Census of 
Governments, GC82(4)-4 Table 18 Vol. 4 No. 4
Finances o f  Counties 1982 Census of 
Governments, GC82(4)-3 Table 13 Vol. 4 No. 3
Governmental Organization 1982 Census of 
Governments, GC82(1) Vol.l, Table 16
1 M = municipality, C = county.
2 We obtained these data through a file-transfer from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Socal Research. Neither the collectors of the original data (1982 Census of Governments) nor the 
Consortium bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here.
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W HITE'S HETEROSKEDASTIC CONSISTENT STANDARD ERRORS
We suspect that heteroskedasticity is present because we are using cross sectional 
data, however, we have not yet constructed a model for i t  Therefore, we use the consistent 
estimator of the standard errors suggested by White (1980). The estimated covariance matrix 
becomes (.V AX1 X 'D X(X 'X)~ ' where D  is a diagonal matrix containing the squares of the 
OLS estimated errors and X  is the usual design matrix. This covariance matrix is preferred 
over the standard OLS covariance matrix which is inappropriate when heteroskedasticity is 
thought to be present but is not accounted for in estimation. Therefore we base our 
conclusions on White’s errors.
F-TESTS O F STRUCTURAL BREAKS
Our sample consists of three regions of the United States. We perform F-tests in 
order to determine whether or not we can pool these regions. Large F-statistics, relative to the 
F-critical values, signal rejection of the null hypothesis of equal regressions or no structural 
breaks across regions. The municipal and county results for the MSA, nonMSA, and the 
pooled MSA and nonMSA (termed “complete”) are in Tables 3.4 and 3.3, respectively. We 
conclude that for each sample there is at least one region that cannot be pooled with the 
otliers. However, some of the differences lie only in the intercept and not in the slopes.3 
When this is Lite case, we can pool the regions and use a  dummy variable to allow the 
intercepts to differ. We can regionally pool models 1, 2, 2a, 3 ,4 , and S for the municipal 
MSA sample, models 1 ,2 ,2a, 3, and 5a for the municipal nonmetropolitan sample, and 
models 1, 2a, 3, and 5a for the county MSA sample when allowing the intercepts for each 
region to differ. We will limit our discussion of regionally pooled samples to these models. 
DURBIN-WU-HAUSMAN TESTS FOR ENDOGENEITY
The theory of overlapping jurisdictions, as discussed in Chapter II, posits county and 
municipal expenditures may be simultaneously determined. If this is the case, the OLS
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Tabic 3.4. Municipal F-tests of Pooling West, Midwest, and South Regions
n=
Model
Complete
708
MSA
530
nonMSA
178
1 9.533**
.000
7.608**1
.000
3.153**'
.001
2 - 4.660**'
.000
•
2a 8.535**
.000
6.927**'
.000
2.475**'
.005
3 6.434**
.000
4.676**1
.000
2.572**'
.002
4 4.431**
.000
3.053***
.000
2.913**
.000
5 - 3.155**'
.000
-
5a 6.035**
.000
4.365**
.000
2.182**'
.008
6 - 2.643**
.000
-
6a 4.732**
.000
3.541**
.000
3.450**
.000
1 3.867**
.000
2.597**
.000
2.355**
.001
8 - 2.359**
.000
-
8a 4.008**
.000
2.915**
.000
2.764**
.000
Notes: 1 F-test shows the difference only to be in the intercept.
- variable not defined over nonMSA.
Probability values follow F-statistics.* p < .05.** p < .01.
5 Johnston (1991) discusses the F-test with the null hypothesis of equivalent slopes allowing the 
intercepts to differ.
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Table 3.5. County F-tests of Pooling West, Midwest, and South Regions
n=
Complete
344
MSA
166
nonMSA
178
Model
1 9.166**
.000
3.637**'
.000
7.671**
.000
2 - 3.436**
.000
-
2b 8.112**
.000
3.156**'
.000
6.061**
.000
3 7.453**
.000
2.936**'
.001
6.289**
.000
4 4.106**
.000
2.586**
.001
3.142**
.000
5 - 2.783**
.000
-
5b 6.976**
.000
2.680**'
.001
5.323**
.000
6 - 2.638**
.000
-
6b 3.721**
.000
2.175**
.005
2.846**
.000
7 3.927**
.000
2.306**
.002
2.821**
.000
8 - 2.252**
.002
-
8b 3.700**
.000
1.984**'
.008
2.606**
.000
Notes: 1 F-test shows the difference only to be in the intercept
• variable not defined over MSA.
Probability values follow F-statistics.* p < .05.** p < .01.
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assumption that each independent variable is not correlated with die error may be violated 
and using OLS would be inappropriate. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test provides a 
way to determine whether the effects of any endogeneity' are serious and therefore would 
result in biased OLS estimates (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). The DWH test determines 
whether the parameters of interest have been estimated consistently, i.e., we can ascertain 
whether the variable of interest and the error are orthogonal. When explaining municipal per 
capita expenditures, for example, the DWH null hypothesis is that county per capita 
expenditures and Lite error are uncorrelated, so that, both OLS and 2SLS estimates arc 
consistent. The DWH alternative hypothesis is that county expenditures and the error are 
correlated, making OLS estimates inconsistent while 2SLS estimates remain consistent If 
there is a  significant difference between the two sets of estimates, the test statistic will be 
large. If  the test statistic is larger duui the -squared critical value, we reject the null in 
favor of die altemadve hypothesis. If we reject the null we conclude the OLS esdmates are 
biased and inconsistent and use 2SLS esdmates which arc consistent, diough not efficient. If 
we do not reject die null, we conclude that the OLS esdmates are consistent, and proceed 
using diese esdmates because they are efficient. Appendix II presents die innovadon of using 
2SLS with unbalanced samples while Appendix III presents die formuladon of the DWH tesl
Table 3.6 presents the results of the DWH tests for die municipal samples when county per 
capita expenditure is the variable of interest Table 3.7 presents the results of the DWH tests for the 
county samples when municipal per capita expenditure is the variable of interest. In most cases, we 
find die OLS estimates to be superior. However, the 2SLS esdmates are superior in the municipal and 
county nonmetropolitan Midwestern samples, and in all o f the pooled MSA and nonMSA “complete” 
Soudiem county models. Therefore, in the following chapters we report the 2SLS esdmates for these 
models and OLS estimates for all other models.
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Table 3.6. Municipal Durbin-Wu-Hausman Teats
Model: 4 6 6a 7 8 8a
Complete
MSA .000 .000
.999 .999
nonMSA
West .000 .000 .000 .000
.999 .999 .999 .999
MSA .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.999 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999
nonMSA .000 - .000 .000 - .000
.999 .999 .999 .999
Midwest .000 .000 .000 .000
.999 .999 .999 .999
MSA .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.999 .998 .999 .999 .999 .999
nonMSA 6.685* - 4.467* .311 - 21.228**
.012 .039 .579 .000
South .000 .000 .000 .000
.999 .999 .999 .999
MSA .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.999 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999
nonMSA .000 - .000 .000 - .000
.999 .999 .999 .999
Notes: • variable not defined over MSA.
- - unable to regionally pool.
Probability values follow DWH statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 3.7. County Durbin-Wu-Hausman Tests
Model: 4 6 6b 7 8 8b
Complete
MSA
nonMSA - - - -
West .000 .000 .000 .000
.999 .999 .999 .999
MSA .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.998 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999
nonMSA .000 - .000 .000 - .000
.992 .999 .998 .999
Midwest .029 .129 .152 .643
.865 .720 .698 .424
MSA .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
.995 .999 .999 .999 .999 .999
nonMSA 3.024 - 4.905* 9.686** - 10.930**
.088 .031 .003 .002
South 4.290* 4.329* 6.094* 6.056**
.040 .039 .015 .015
MSA .292 .098 .334 .374 .035 .608
.591 .755 .565 .543 .852 .439
nonMSA .000 - .000 .000 - .000
.997 .999 .999 .999
Notes: - variable not defined over MSA.
- - unable to regionally pool.
Probability values follow DWH statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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CONCLUSION
The F-lests of pooling the regional samples support the conclusion that the basic expenditure 
behavior is similar across regions when accounting for different intercepts for each region. Moreover, 
botli metropolitan and nonmetropolitan municipal samples also suggest that the expenditure behavior 
is similar across regions when controlling for leviathan (model 2), fiscal illusion (model 3), 
overlapping jurisdictions (model 4), and the leviathan and fiscal illusion model 5. However, when 
either leviathan and/or fiscal illusion are combined with overlapping jurisdictions variables, the 
municipal expenditure behavior is significantly different across regions. For the county MSA sample, 
any model controlling for overlapping jurisdictions shows expenditure behavior to be significantly 
different across regions.
Through the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests, we find that the potential endogeneity of county and 
municipal expenditures does not present a problem for OLS estimation, except in the nonmetropolitan 
Midwest samples and the pooled MSA and nonMSA South county sample. This is not surprising. In 
most cases our data set contains several municipalities per each county. However, there will be, at 
most, one municipality where endogeneity may be present (the case when a municipality holds both 
the municipal median voter and the county median voter). We say “at most” because our data set does 
not contain all the municipalities in each county, therefore, this pivotal county voter’s municipality 
may not be included in our data set Additionally, no data is available on the unincorporated areas 
within a county and these areas may hold the county median voter.
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CHAPTER IV 
MERGING LEVIATHAN, FISCAL ILLUSION, AND 
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS MODELS
This chapter empirically merges three separate models of local government growth: the 
leviathan, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses. Each model seeks to explain 
differences in the size of die local public sector. Testing for a leviathan government includes testing 
whether a decentralized and/or fragmented fiscal structure reduces public expenditures. Fiscal illusion 
posits Uiat individuals do not know die true marginal costs and benefits of public activity and Uierefore 
support a different level of public service than each would if he were frilly informed. Finally, the 
model of overlapping jurisdicdons studies the relationship between municipal and county spending. If 
overlapping jurisdictions have a complementary relationship, then die local public sector will be larger 
dian if a substitute relationship exists. Integrating these separate strands of literature provides a 
unique opportunity to see whether the expansion (contraction) effects envisioned by one might be 
offset by the contraction (expansion) effects envisioned by die others. Additionally, we are able to test 
each hypothesis more accurately when controlling for the other influences on public spending.
TESTING LEVIATHAN 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) posit that relatively greater fragmentation and greater 
decentralization will constrain the size of government. In order to test for these effects, we add 
variables to account for the extent of fragmentation, ln(F7L4G), and die extent of decentralization, 
ln(DEC), to the median voter model developed in Chapter HI:
la(EXI/ n)=ot.Q +CX[ ln(/H)+a2 In(s4)+a3 ln (x )+ a4 ln (/i)+ a5 ln(FiR.4G)+a6 In(D£C)+s. (4.1) 
The fragmentation hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between the number of 
jurisdictions in an area and the size of the leviathan, a s < 0. This research uses a measure of
fragmentation that can be thought of as horizontal competition. Horizontal competition is competition 
among governments on the same tier, e.g., municipalities v. municipalities or counties v. counties. 
Fragmentation in a broader sense would include all o f the governments (counties, municipalities,
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townships, and special districts) in an area. Understanding the nature of horizontal competition will 
inform an understanding of the broader measure of fragmentation. Therefore, this research analyzes 
horizontal competition while extensions will analyze fragmentation in the broader sense. Our measure 
of fragmentation follows Schneider (1986): the number o f jurisdictions (either municipalities or 
counties) in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) per MSA population (measured in 100,000). 
Therefore, each jurisdiction in an MSA will have the same value of fragmentation.
The decentralization hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between decentralization and 
the size of the public sector, a 6 < 0. The decentralization measure proxies for the structure of local 
government hierarchies and intends to capture which layer of government spends or collects relatively 
more. In order to be consistent with our fragmentation measure, our decentralization measure is also 
defined over the MSA. This is the first research to define decentralization over the MSA: the sum of 
total expenditures of all the municipalities in the MSA divided by the sum of total expenditures of all 
the municipalities and counties in the MSA. Oates (1989) advocates combining both fragmentation 
and decentralization measures in empirical studies. This is the Grst paper using expenditure data for 
both municipal and county governments which uses both of these measures.
TESTING FISCAL ILLUSION
Fiscal illusion posits that the size of the public sector demanded by individuals depends upon 
their perceptions of the marginal costs and benefits o f government When perceptions do not reflect 
the actual, or true, marginal costs and benefits, voters are fooled into supporting a different size of the 
public sector than they would have chosen if they knew the true costs and benefits (Buchanan and 
Wagner 1977). Fiscal illusion empirical models proxy the complexity of the budget structure using a 
Herfindahl index of tax revenue structure (Wagner 1976, Munley and Green 1978, Pommerhene and 
Schneider 1978, Breeden and Hunter 1985, Turnbull 1997) and a Herfindahl index of expenditure 
structure (Turnbull 1997). A jurisdiction with only one tax source (expenditure categories) will have a 
tax Herfindahl equal to one. On the other hand, the more tax sources (expenditure categories) a 
jurisdiction has, the lower its Herfindahl value. As the budget structure becomes more complicated,
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individuals will find it harder to accurately perceive the marginal benefits and marginal costs of 
additional government services, implying greater fiscal illusion. Following Turnbull (1997) we use 
two Herfindahl indices: TXCON is a Herfindahl over tax sources and EXCON is a Herfindahl over 
expenditure categories. Table 4.1 describes our Herfindahl indices which use sources of tax revenues 
and expenditures that are common in the literature. Adding these proxies to the median voter model 
determines, in part, the type of fiscal illusion present in the data:
ln(EV% ) = 8 0 + 5 , lnOn)+S2 InO s^+Sj In (j)+ 8 4 In(/i)+83 ln(TXCON)+56 ln(,EXCON)+e. (4.2)
The traditional fiscal illusion hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between the joint 
effect of TXCON and EXCON and expenditures: the more complicated the budget structure (i.e., a 
lower Herfindahl), the more inaccurate and lower the perception of the marginal tax price, therefore 
individuals are induced to support a  higher quantity demanded of government services. Turnbull’s 
uncertainty model, on the other hand, predicts that when uncertainty increases on the tax price, on 
benefits received, or on both, risk averse individuals, who realize they do not know the true marginal 
costs and benefits, support a smaller public sector (1997). Turnbull’s notion o f fiscal illusion predicts 
that a  more complex budget structure (i.e., a lower Herfindahl value) is associated with greater 
taxpayer uncertainty, and therefore, reduced public expenditures. This uncertainty effect of fiscal 
illusion by itself implies a positive joint effect of coefficients 5S and S6 . When coupled with the 
traditional fiscal illusion, Turnbull shows that the joint effect of 5S and S6 can take any sign, 
depending upon the relative strengths o f the offsetting fiscal illusion effects.
In addition to the output effect, information on the extent of the flypaper effect also helps to 
determine which type of fiscal illusion is present in the data. According to Fisher (1982), a flypaper 
effect, intergovernmental aid received by the public sector stimulates local government expenditures 
more than an equivalent increase in private personal income, exists when
( £ g (*o ) c  >  )«
where (EaijA  ^)e is the estimated elasticity of public expenditures, G , with respect to the median 
voter’s share o f lump-sum aid sA, s  is the median voter’s tax share, A is total lump-sum aid, /  is the
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Table 4.1. Definition of Herfindahls
TXCON =
EXCON m=
EXCONe =
(property tax revenue / T R ) 2 + (general sales tax revenue / T R ) 2 + 
(income tax revenue I T R )Z + (other tax revenue / T R ) 2
where TR is total tax revenue,
(education / EXPm)2 + (public welfare / EXPm )2 +
(health and hospitals / EXPm )2 + (highways / EXPm f  +
(police /  £Y P" )2 + (fire /  EXPm )2 + (park and rec /  EXPm f  + 
(housing and community develop /  EXPm f  +
(sewerage and sanitation /  EXPm )2,
where EXPm is total municipal expenditures, and
(education / EXPC)2 + (welfare / EXPC f  + (hospitals/ EXPC)2 + 
(healtli /  EXPC f  + (highways /  EXPC )2 + (police / EXPC f  + 
(correction /  £ \7 ,e )2 + (sewerage and sanitation / EXPC)2 + 
(natural resources and park and rec / EXPe f  , 
where EXPC is total county expenditures.
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median voter’s income, and (Ea I ) , is estimated elasticity of public expenditures with respect to the 
median voter’s income. The size of the flypaper effect is
(4-3)
A flypaper effect exists when (4.3) is positive. Both the traditional certainty model of fiscal illusion 
and the uncertainty model of tax price risk predict a flypaper effect, while the benefits uncertainty 
model does not (Turnbull 1997).
TESTING OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS 
Overlapping jurisdictions theoiy posits that there is a systematic, significant relationship 
between the demands for services provided by governments at different layers in the federalist tier 
(Turnbull and Djoundourian 1993). If an increase in expenditures of one tier leads to decreases in 
expenditures of the other tier, then the two types of governments are considered to be strategic 
substitutes. If this is the case, then a meaningful notion of “vertical competition’’ exits which reduces 
the total size of the local government sector. On the other hand, if an increase in expenditures o f one 
tier leads to an increase in expenditures of the other tier, then demand for expenditures of the two 
governments is considered to be strategically complementary. In the latter case there is no notion of 
vertical competition, per se, but instead possible cooperation/collusion that leads to an overall larger 
local public sector.
In order to estimate the municipal best response function between municipal expenditures and 
county expenditures, we add the county variables of population nc, county intergovernmental aid A e , 
the municipal median voter’s county tax share s” , and per capita county expenditures, EB/ £  to 
median voter model (Turnbull and Djoundourian 1993):
1"(SCP% -) = Yo + 7 i ln (« " )+ T 2 l n ( ^ m)+Y3 1 * 0 + 7 4  l n ( 0  +
(4.4)
Y5 ln (n e ) + Y «  ln(-4c ) + Y 7 l n ( s " ) + Y 8  ln (Ea% t ) + e m
1 We arrive at a measure of {u/ t ) by obtaining the value of (*%) for each observation and then take the 
mean of the column
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where mm is the municipal median voter’s income, s™ is the municipal median voter’s municipal tax 
share, A m is the total intergovernmental aid the municipality receives. A significantly negative sign 
on In(EXpy „ '\  y 8 < 0, reflects a strategic substitute relationship and vertical competition. A
significantly positive sign on ln(EXP^ /e), y g > 0, reflects a strategic complementary relationship.
To find the county expenditure best response function, we instead add municipal population 
nm, municipal intergovernmental aid A m, the county median voter’s municipal tax share, s cm, and
per capita municipal expenditures, EXP/m  :
h*EX% )  = Po +  P i +  P 2 W.4Ae) +  P 3 +  P4 ln( nC ) +
,  (4.5)
p5 ln(nm) + p6 la(Am) + p 7 ln ( s ') -r-Pg lnf03^ / . )  + e c
where mc , s' , and s ' A e are the county median voter’s income, county tax price, and share of 
intergovernmental aid to the county, andn* is county population. A significantly negative sign on 
In fsv p ^ ), y g < 0, indicates a strategic substitute relationship and a significantly positive sign, y , > 0,
indicates a strategic complement relationship.
GENERALIZING THE EMPIRICAL MODELS 
The focus of this study is to bring together the different strands of literature in order to 
determine whether any of the separate effects of the fragmentation, decentralization, fiscal illusion, 
and overlapping jurisdictions reinforce or offset each other. Recall from Chapter Q that estimating the 
horizontal effects (fragmentation, decentralization, and fiscal illusion) without controlling for the 
vertical relationship leads to overestimated parameters. We predict that models controlling for the 
overlapping jurisdictions parameters will result in smaller (absolute value) estimates of fragmentation, 
decentralization, and fiscal illusion or reduced significance of the parameters.
We use the following taxonomy of models: Model 1 is the basic median voter model which 
aggregates preferences for public services in each jurisdiction. Model 2 tests the decentalization 
hypothesis through the effect on la(DEC) and the fragmentation hypothesis through the effect on
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\n{FRAG) . Model 3 allows the data to reveal which type of fiscal illusion is present through both the 
ln(7IYCOW) and In{EXCON) measures and the flypaper effect. Model 4 tests the overlapping 
jurisdictions hypothesis through the variable lnf®3^ , )  in equations where ln(£'p/^») is the
dependent variable or through the variable ln(6XP^ t) in equations where Inf20^ /,)  is the dependent
variable. Model 5 combines the decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses and the fiscal illusion 
hypothesis. Model 6 results when the overlapping jurisdictions variables are added to model 2, and 
model 7 results when the overlapping jurisdictions variables are added to model 3. Finally, model 8 
merges all three hypotheses and results from adding the overlapping jurisdictions variables to model 5.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The models are estimated using 1980 data from the fifty most highly populated MSAs 
outside of the Northeast We use municipal and county data, rather than state or national data, to 
capture the effects of horizontal competition between jurisdictions and therefore provide the best 
possible test of the fragmentation hypothesis. This research uses local governments as the unit of 
analysis due to the fact that mobility costs are lower when moving across local jurisdictions than when 
moving across state lines and because mobility is the key mechanism in the fragmentation hypothesis. 
Within the fifty MSAs. data on total municipal property value were available for 530 municipalities. 
The 530 municipalities are contained in 166 counties. Table 4.2 presents the number of observations 
for each regional sample. Chapter in presents a discussion on the sources of the data and Appendix IV 
presents the summary statistics. This chapter presents only the estimates of interest and their 
corresponding probability values. Complete tables, including White’s standard errors, are in 
Appendix V.
Tabic 4.2. Number of Observations
Municipality County 
Regionally Pooled 530 166
W est 126 38
M idwest 254 57
South 150 71
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Table 4.3 presents the coefficients on dummy variables equal to one for Midwestern and 
Southern regions for both the regionally pooled municipal and county samples. In each case the 
Midwestern and Southern dummy variables are significantly negative. We therefore conclude that 
Midwestern and Southern per capita expenditures are significantly lower than Western per capita 
expenditures for both municipalities and counties. We now turn to the empirical findings for the 
decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses, the fiscal illusion hypothesis, and the overlapping 
jurisdictions hypothesis.
LEVIATHAN
Municipalities
Decentralization. Table 4.4 presents the coefficients on In(DEC) and the corresponding one- 
tailed probability values for each municipal sample. Our findings show a lack of support for the 
decentralization hypothesis at the municipal layer. The decentralization coefficients are in the 
predicted, negative direction in the Midwest and Southern samples. However, Southern model 5 
(Table* 4.4 DD) is the only time the coefficient is statistically significant.
Fragmentation. Table 4.5 presents the coefficients on In f /^ G "* )  and the corresponding 
one-tailed probability values for each municipal sample. Our results do not support the fragmentation 
hypothesis. Similar to the decentralization coefficients, the fragmentation coefficients are generally in 
the predicted, negative direction in the Midwest and South, but most are not significant. Again, only 
one case is significant: Midwest model 8 (Table 4.5 CF).
Discussion
These are the first results of testing the decentralization hypothesis at the municipal layer, so 
wc lack any comparable studies. On the other hand, we can compare our fragmentation results to 
those of Sjoquist (1982), Schneider (1986), and Eberts and Gronberg (1990). We find no evidence 
that either fragmentation or decentralization constrain government expenditures at the municipal
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Table 4.3. Coefficients on Regional Dummy Variables
Municipality Countv
A B C D E
Region: Midwest South M idwest South
A
Model:
1 -.300**
.000
-.254**
.000
-.494**
.000
-.355**
.003
B 2 -.289**
.000
-.250**
.000
C 3 -.273**
.000
-.225**
.000
-.491**
.000
-.354**
.003
D 4 -.250**
.000
-.220**
.000
- - - -
E 5 -.252**
.000
-.216**
.000
- - - -
F 6 - - - - - - - -
G 7 - - - -
H 8 - - - -
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 4.4. Municipal Decentralization Coefficients
A B C D E F
Model:
n -
2 5 6 8
A Regionally 
Pooled
530 -.049
.213
-.076
.140
• • • *
B West 126 .130 .140 .188 .187
.820 .848 .860 .864
C Midwest 254 -.139 -.335 -.428 -.458
.243 .100 .057 .058
D South 150 -.119 -.158* -.022 -.047
.065 .028 .402 .294
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
One-tailed t-tests.
Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
Table 4.5. Municipal Fragmentation Coefficients
A B C D E F
Model:
n=
2 5 6 8
A Regionally 
Pooled
530 -.006
.444
-.012
.387
B West 126 .069 .072 .065 .071
.779 .786 .763 .788
C Midwest 254 -.070 -.147 -.064 -.165*
.207 .061 .267 .049
D South 150 -.003 -.018 .054 .041
M l .382 .804 .740
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
One-tailed t-tests.
Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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layer. This is surprising, considering the bulk of empirical evidence supports the fragmentation 
hypothesis.
Though our measures of the dependent variable and fragmentation are similar to those used 
by Schneider (1986) and Eberts and Gronberg (1990), we arrive at different conclusions. We believe 
the differences arise because of different regression procedures. Both Schneider and Eberts and 
Gronberg have national datasets, use ad hoc empirical models rather than a median voter model, and 
differentiate between central cities and suburbs. Additionally, both use a regression technique different 
from ordinary least squares: Schneider uses stepwise regression while Eberts and Gronberg use 
seemingly unrelated regression. First, both studies use an income variable that is different from the 
median and both neglect to account for the tax price of government services. Regardless, re-estimating 
the model using only suburbs and deleting the tax share variable docs not change our regionally pooled 
municipal result that fragmentation does not constrain expenditures. Therefore, it is possible that the 
use of different estimation techniques may result in different conclusions regarding the fragmentation 
hypothesis.
Sjoquist (1986) does use a median voter model to test the fragmentation hypothesis, but 
considers only central cities in the South. His dependent variable is general expenditures and he 
measures fragmentation as the number of jurisdictions in the metropolitan area. We re-estimate model 
2 for only Soudiem central cities using general per capita expenditures and measure fragmentation as 
the number of jurisdictions in the metropolitan area. In this case, re-estimating the model results in a 
significantly negative fragmentation coefficient, supporting Sjoquist’s findings. This result holds only 
for the central cities and does not extend to Southern suburbs. However, the significance of the central 
city fragmentation coefficient disappears when we use our measure of government size, common 
expenditures. From these exercises, we conclude that the evidence for fragmentation is not consistent 
across samples, model specification, variable definition, or estimation technique.
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Counties
Decentralization. Table 4.6 presents the coefficients on In{DEC) and the corresponding one­
tailed probability values for each county sample. We find no evidence of leviathan behavior based on 
our decentralization coefficients. The county decentralization coefficients are quite different from the 
municipal decentralization coefficients. For the county sample, the West is the only region with 
coefficients consistently in the predicted, negative direction. However, significance occurs only once: 
West model 6 (Table 4.6 BE).
Fragmentation. Table 4.7 presents the coefficients on ln(FR4Gc) and the corresponding 
one-tailed probability values for each county sample. The county fragmentation coefficients are 
consistently negative for both the Midwest and Southern regions. However, the Midwestern 
coefficients are not significant while the Southern coefficients are highly significant The consistently 
negative and significant coefficients on lv(FRAGe) in the Southern county sample (Table 4.7 Row 0 ) 
provide the first time that the empirical evidence strongly and consistently supports the fragmentation 
hypothesis, and therefore, the model of government as leviathan.
Discussion
The literature offers us two studies, Zax (1989) and Forbes and Zampelli (1989), performed 
with data related to the county layer. Both studies are very different from the current research. For 
example, both use revenues rather titan expenditures and both use ad hoc empirical models rather than 
median voter models. Zax (1989) uses an intrajurisdictional competition (competition within a 
jurisdiction) model to test the effect of decentralization and fragmentation on the total size of 
government (county, municipalities, townships, and special districts) inside the county. Therefore, we 
cannot meaningfully compare our current results with those o f Zax.
This research presents the first inteijurisdictional (competition across jurisdictions) test of 
decentralization and fragmentation using individual county behavior. Forbes and Zampelli (1989) test 
inteijurisdictional competition, but aggregate all county taxes to the metropolitan area level. Our 
empirical design is more useful than Forbes and Zampelli’s because it shows the marginal effect of a
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Table 4.6.
Table 4.7.
Zounty Decentralization Coefficients
A B C D E F
Model: 2 5 6 8
n=
A Regionally 166
Pooled
B West 38 -.409 -.396 -.353* -.359
.086 .087 .039 .054
C M idwest 57 .114 .032 .237 .211
.602 .528 .709 .693
0  South 71 .357 .326 .375 .326
.908 .873 .962 .904
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
One-tailed t-tests.
Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
County Fragmentation Coefficients
A B C D E F
Model: 2 5 6 8
n=
A Regionally 166
Pooled
B West 38 .066 .047 .103 .084
.767 .691 .883 .823
C M idwest 57 -.058 -.056 -.049 -.037
.273 .276 .302 .341
D South 71 -.404** -.392** -.304* -.293*
.000 .000 .008 .008
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
One-tailed t-tests.
Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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change in horizontal competition and decentralization on the expenditures of an actual government 
unit. Forbes and Zampelli’s empirical results oppose the predictions of the fragmentation hypothesis. 
They find that greater county fragmentation increases aggregate county revenues in the metropolitan 
area.
In contrast to Forbes and Zampelli’s (1989) results, we find strong support for the 
fragmentation hypothesis in the Southern county sample. However, we find no other results consistent 
with the assumptions of the leviathan model of government. In the South, greater horizontal 
competition among county governments constrains per capita county expenditures, supporting the 
fragmentation hypothesis and the leviathan model o f government As is the case for municipalities, 
we conclude that capturing the presence of leviathan depends, to a great extent on the measurement of 
the size of government model specification, and the sample.
FISCAL ILLUSION
Table 4.8 summarizes the possible types of fiscal illusion. Turnbull (1998) shows that 
information on both the output effect and the flypaper effect determine the type of fiscal illusion 
present in the data. We measure the output effect of budget complexity by using a t-test on the joint 
effect of the coefficients on ln(DfCCWj and ln(£XCCWj. The following explains the fiscal illusion 
possibilities: The combination of significantly negative t-statistics and a flypaper effect support Oates’ 
traditional fiscal illusion—individuals underestimate the marginal tax price of government services 
because of the existence of intergovernmental aid; Significantly negative t-statistics without a flypaper 
effect supports Oates’ traditional fiscal illusion notion combined with tax price and/or benefits 
uncertainty fiscal illusion; Significantly positive t-statistics in addition to a flypaper effect supports 
Turnbull’s tax price uncertainty fiscal illusion; Significantly positive t-statistics without a flypaper 
effect supports Turnbull’s benefit uncertainty fiscal illusion; Absence of a significant t-statistic in 
conjunction with a flypaper effect supports uncertainty fiscal illusion partially offset by traditional 
fiscal illusion; and finally, absence of both a significant t-statistic and a  flypaper effect suggests full 
information or no fiscal illusion.
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Table 4.8. Summary of Fiscal Dlusion Possibilities
Sign on Flypaper
Joint Effect Effect
Oates’ Traditional Fiscal Illusion - Yes
Tax Price Uncertainty Fiscal Illusion + Yes
Benefits Uncertainty Fiscal Illusion + No
Full Information 0 No
Municipalities
Table 4.9 presents results of t-tests of the joint effect of \vH,TXCONm) and ln(£YCCWm) and 
the estimated flypaper efTect for each municipal sample. Each municipal sample shows evidence of 
traditional fiscal illusion (due to the significant flypaper effects) offset by uncertainty fiscal illusion 
(due to the insignificance of the t-statistics). An exception is Midwest model 8 (Table 4.9 EF) which 
displays traditional fiscal illusion due to the significantly negative joint effect of the budgetary 
complexity measures and the presence of a flypaper effect 
Counties
Table 4.10 presents results of t-tests of the joint effect of \n(JXCONc) and \tt(EXCONc ) and 
the estimated flypaper effect for each county sample. The county t-statistics are similar to the 
municipal t-statistics: insignificant. Combining this result with the lack of a consistent flypaper effect, 
we conclude that county governments tend, especially in the Southern sample, to display full 
information. In a few instances, however, we do find some evidence of fiscal illusion. The significant 
flypaper effects in the West (Table 4.10 DC, DE) and Midwest (Table 4.10 FE, FF) combined with the 
insignificant t-statistics point toward traditional fiscal illusion offset by uncertainty fiscal illusion. 
Discussion
Evidence of a flypaper effect is much stronger in the municipal samples than in the county 
samples. Both traditional fiscal illusion and tax price uncertainty fiscal illusion predict a flypaper 
effect while benefits uncertainty fiscal illusion does n o t We conclude that uncertainty fiscal illusion of 
the benefits of public expenditures is stronger at the county layer. This is not a surprising finding.
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Table 4.9. Municipal Flypaper and Fiscal Illusion Joint Effect t-statistics
Table 4.10.
A B C D E F
Model: 3 5 7 8
A Regionally
n
530 -1.190 -1.310
Pooled .235 .191
B Flypaper: 37.056** 36.228**
C West 126 -.266 -.228 -.005 .090
.790 .820 .996 .929
D Flypaper: 7.134** 7.706** 5.671* 5.880*
E M idwest 254 -1.335 -1.587 -1.700 -2.079*
.183 .114 .090 .039
F Flypaper: 12.875** 13.604** 12.419** 13.710**
G South 150 -.384 -1.187 -.502 -.514
.701 .237 .617 .608
H Flypaper: 64.458** 59.085** 41.505* 42.451*
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
Probability values follow t-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
One-tailed tests for flypaper effect.
County Flypaper and Fiscal Illusion Joint Effect t-statistics
A B C D E F
Model: 3 5 7 8
n —
A Regionally 166 -1.049
Pooled .296
B Flypaper: 11.559*
C West 38 -.460 .119 -.365 .263
.649 .906 .718 .795
D Flypaper: 17.043* 10.377 13.434* 7.424
E M idwest 57 .316 .290 .730 .705
.753 .773 .469 .485
F Flypaper: 6.447 7.326 7.460* 9.692*
G South 71 -1.715 -1.352 -1.055 -.824
.091 .181 .296 .414
H Flypaper: 3.096 16.440 -9.293 10.072
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
Probability values follow t-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
One-tailed tests for flypaper effect
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Counties are oflen referred to as “the forgotten governments” because county governments are less 
visible than municipal governments. Therefore, individuals are likely to have greater uncertainty on 
the benefits of county government services relative to the benefits of municipal government services.
Additionally, both the West (Table 4.10 Row D) an Midwestern (Table 4.10 Row F) county 
samples show mixed evidence for a flypaper effect but the South lacks any support for a flypaper 
effect. This is an interesting result considering that in the South, county governments, rather than 
municipal governments, are more important in the local governing process (Bingham and Hedge 1991 
191).
Turnbull (1998) uses Midwestern municipal expenditure data and finds a positive joint effect 
of \viTXCON) and \ti,EXCON) in addition to a flypaper effect He concludes that his sample displays 
traditional fiscal illusion (due to the flypaper effect) combined with tax price and benefits uncertainty 
fiscal illusion (due to the positive joint effect). Our conclusion on fiscal illusion for the Midwestern 
municipal sample is the same as Turnbull’s, however, we do not find a significantly positive joint 
effect. This is surprising because the empirical tests are very similar. The main differences are that 
Turnbull uses nonlinear least squares, his sample includes both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
municipalities with populations between 20,000 and 130,000, and he uses density in the regression. 
Affer re-estimating model 3 for the Midwestern municipal sample including nonmetropoiitan 
municipalities, restricting the population size and adding density to the regression, we still find 
insignificant t-statistics. Turnbull points out that we should expea output and flypaper effects to vary 
across governments with different levels of fiscal structure complexity. However, in this case it 
appears that the method of estimation, nonlinear least squares rather than ordinary least squares, may 
change our results.
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) show that a strategic complementary relationship exists 
when an increase in expenditures at one layer of government leads to an increase in expenditures of 
another layer. One the other hand, a strategic substitute relationship exists when an increase in
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expenditures at one layer of government leads to a decrease in expenditures of another layer. Table 
4.11 presents the coefficients on ln(£°^/,.) for each municipal sample while Table 4.12 presents the
coefficients on ln(EO% ,)  for each county sample. Significantly negative coefficients represent a
strategic substitute relationship while significantly positive coefficients represent a strategically 
complementary relationship.
Municipalities
Based on the positive and significant coefficients on ln(£l7^ /c) , we conclude there is a
complementary relationship in the Midwest (Table 4.11 Row C), South (Table 4.11 Row D), and 
regionally pooled (Table 4.11 Row A) samples. In other words, we find evidence of an enlarged local 
public sector in these areas. Our results confirm those of Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) who also 
find that county expenditures have a strategic complementary relationship with municipal 
expenditures in the Midwest. In the West (Table 4.11 Row B), however, we find no such evidence. 
The insignificance of the parameters leads to the conclusion of an unrelated relationship between 
county and municipal per capita expenditures in the West.
Counties
In a metropolitan sample, more than one municipality can exist inside of a county. This presents no 
problem when estimating municipal expenditures. However, this one-to-many, county-to-municipality 
relationship poses a problem when estimating the county best response function: We must somehow 
choose one municipality. Only one municipality within any given county will contain the county 
median voter, hence only one municipality’s spending will affect the demand for county spending. We 
do not know ex ante which municipality houses the county median voter, therefore, we use two 
different methods for finding the county median voter’s municipality. The first method selects the 
municipality with die median level of household income in the county while the second method uses 
die municipality whose median household income is closest to that of die county median income. 
Nonetheless, die estimates are not sensitive to the method, so we only report the results of the first 
method.
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Table 4.11.
Table 4.12.
Municipal Overlapping Jurisdiction Coefficients
A B C D E F
Model: 4 6 7 8
n=
A Regionally 530 .119** - -
Pooled .000
B West 126 .102 .147 .092 .134
.446 .311 .464 .326
C Midwest 254 .178* .179* .245** .247**
.011 .012 .003 .002
D South 150 .092* .103* .095* .103*
.026 .026 .026 .032
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
County Overlapping Jurisdictions Coefficients
A B C  D E F
Model: 4 6 7 8
n —
A Regionally 166 
Pooled
B West 38 .335 .297 .235 .221
.193 .219 .397 .411
C Midwest 57 .317 .333 .422* .433*
.056 .060 .014 .017
D South 71 .829** .844** .767** .798**
.002 .001 .004 .002
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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For the most part, the county results mirror those of municipalities. That is, we find positive 
and significant coefficients on In f™ //.)  for the Midwest and South, identifying a complementary
relationship in these regions. The complementary relationship is particularly strong in the South. 
Additionally, we find an unrelated relationship between municipal and county per capita expenditures 
in the West. Therefore, we find symmetry in the county-to-municipal relationship and the municipal- 
to-county relationship.
Discussion
This research presents the first county-layer estimates of the strategic relationship between 
county and municipal expenditures. In doing so, we solve the problem of unbalanced municipal and 
county samples. Our results are in line with those of Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993). We find 
county per capita expenditures to be complementary to municipal per capita expenditures and 
municipal per capita expenditures to be complementary to county per capita expenditures in the 
Midwest and South. We find no relationship in the West
In theory, the federal structure of government adds to the competition present in a party 
government system. In contrast our empirical results support the conclusion, not of competition 
between tiers of local government but collusion among elected officials in the Midwest and South. In 
no case do we find a substitute relationship between expenditures of municipalities and counties. 
MERGING THE MODELS
Our theoretical model shows that taking the overlapping jurisdictions relationship into 
account will no longer result in overestimated effects of decentralization, fragmentation, and fiscal 
illusion. Our model predicts that the presence of the overlapping jurisdictions variables will reduce 
the significance of these effects. Unfortunately, we find significance in only one case: fragmentation 
for the Southern county sample (Table 4.7 Row D). In this case, we find that the marginal effect and 
its significance decrease as the overlapping jurisdictions variables are included in the empirical 
models, supporting the prediction of our theoretical model. Considering the lack of significant
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variables, however, we cannot provide a  conclusion on whether the empirical estimates bear out the 
theoretical prediction.
CONCLUSION
We set out to merge the fragmentation, decentralization, fiscal illusion, and overlapping 
jurisdictions hypotheses of local government growth. Unfortunately, we lack the empirical evidence 
necessary to determine whether the empirical results bear out the theoretical prediction. However, the 
design of our empirical study allowed us to learn several important things regarding expenditure 
behavior of local governments.
Breaking down the municipal and county samples into regions is an important contribution to 
understanding the differences expenditure behavior across local governments. We find the Western 
region has the highest per capita expenditures relative to the Midwestern and Southern regions. 
Additionally, we find striking differences across regions with respect to the presence of leviathan and 
overlapping jurisdictions. Namely, Western local government expenditure behavior differs from 
Midwestern and Southern local government expenditure behavior when considering tests of 
fragmentation, decentralization, and overlapping jurisdictions.
Our horizontal competition findings provide strong support for the fragmentation hypothesis 
in Southern counties: greater horizontal competition restricts per capita expenditures. This result is 
consistent with the behavior of a leviathan-like government. On the other hand, this is our only result 
which is consistent with the leviathan model of government. In all other cases, we find no support for 
fragmentation or decentralization hypotheses. Our answer to the questions from Chapter m , “Does 
greater fragmentation/decentralization constrain the size of government?” appears to depend upon the 
definitions of the size of government, definitions of fragmentation and decentralization, the sample, 
and the estimation process. In other words, the presence of leviathan has been spotted from certain 
perspectives, but is not visible from every vantage point.
Our answer to the question from Chapter m  regarding fiscal illusion. “Does budgetary 
complexity significantly affect the size of government?” is a conditional no. We find no evidence that
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fiscal illusion significantly affects expenditures. However, we do find evidence of fiscal illusion due to 
the presence of the flypaper effect. Finally, we conclude that a strategic complementary relationship, 
serving to expand the size of the local public sector, exists between county and municipal per capita 
expenditures in the Midwest and Southern regions.
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CHAPTER V
LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BEHAVIOR DIFFERENCES 
ACROSS METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN AREAS
The fragmentation hypothesis posits that a more fragmented area will have smaller 
governments due to increased competition between governments. This prediction relies heavily on the 
Ticbout mechanism discussed in Chapter II. Clearly, the existence of more than one jurisdiction 
within a labor market makes choosing between jurisdictions possible. Zax points out that “with 
sufficient jurisdictional choice, citizens can inhibit monopoly behavior on the part of officials and 
bureaucrats by moving out of their jurisdictions” (1989 560). Moreover, the greater the number of 
jurisdictions, the more competition each jurisdiction faces in attracting a larger tax base. Once the 
appropriate jurisdiction provides the public good and economies of scale in administration are 
accounted for, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that leviathan’s ability for fiscal exploitation 
decreases when the number of jurisdictions increases for two reasons. First, increasing the number of 
jurisdictions increases the potential for individuals to move out of a particular jurisdiction decreasing 
the leviathan’s monopoly power. Second, the potential for collusion among politician/bureaucrats 
decreases when the number of possible colluders increases (180).
This chapter uses a new method of testing for a leviathan model of government We employ 
data from both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.1 Metropolitan counties in our sample have an 
average of 16 municipal governments while nonmetropolitan counties average only 6 municipal 
governments. Due to the greater number of jurisdictions within metropolitan areas, metropolitan 
governments face greater competition than do their nonmetropolitan counterparts. Therefore, 
metropolitan samples should provide relatively stronger support for the fragmentation hypothesis than 
nonmetropolitan samples.
1 “Metropolitan” refers to jurisdictions within Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) while 
“nonmetropolitan” refers to jurisdictions with populations above 10,000 that are not in MS As. 
Therefore, a nonmetropolitan jurisdiction does not refer to a rural jurisdiction, but an urban 
jurisdiction that is not located inside of a M SA
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Both the decentralization and fragmentation measures used so far in this research are defined 
over the MSA. Therefore, a comparable measure capturing the presence of the leviathan in 
nonmetropolitan areas does not exist In redefining the measures, we drop decentralization from the 
analysis because a meaningful measure does not exist for jurisdictions in nonmetropolitan areas where 
there is just one municipality per county or where data for only one municipality is available and alter 
the definition of fragmentation.
The measure of fragmentation used in Chapter IV is one of horizontal competition: 
competition of like-govemments. We are able to continue to test for the effects of horizontal 
competition in the municipal samples. The measure of fragmentation for municipal samples used in 
this chapter is the total number of municipalities within the county. Unfortunately, there is no 
meaningful measure of horizontal competition at the county layer because nonmctropolitan areas 
usually have just one county. However, we do test the leviathan model using a broad measure of 
county fragmentation: the total number of governments (county + municipalities + townships + 
special districts) within the county. Zax (1989) defines fragmentation in this manner and uses a 
measure of the size of total government in the county (county, municipalities, townships, and special 
districts) in order to capture the effects of fragmentation on the total size of government inside the 
county. Individual county expenditures proxy the size of government in our study. Therefore, this 
research looks at the relationship fragmentation (broadly defined) and the size of individual county 
governments.
Though the fragmentation parameters drive the current research, we also present a discussion 
o f the differences found for fiscal illusion and overlapping jurisdiction parameters across metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan areas. Existing empirical studies of fiscal illusion and overlapping jurisdictions 
either pool the samples or look only at MSA data. Though the literature lacks any a priori predictions 
regarding differences in the nature of fiscal illusion or overlapping jurisdictions across MS As and 
nonMSAs, we present these results here in keeping with the theme of this dissertation. Additionally, 
this chapter will present only the results of each hypothesis modeled separately. We find no patterns
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with respect to the pairings of the hypotheses, therefore we can focus on models 2, 3, and 4 without 
losing any insight Appendix V holds complete tables while this chapter presents only the coefficients 
of interest
This chapter does the following: presents the results of F-tests of pooling the MSA and 
nonMSA divisions of each regional sample; compares MSA and nonMSA estimates for the 
fragmentation, decentralization, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions parameters; and provides 
conclusions. This is the first research examining the differences in local government expenditure 
behavior inside and outside of metropolitan areas.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As in Chapter IV, we estimate the models for the metropolitan samples using 1980 data from 
the fifty most highly populated MSAs outside of the Northeast. Within the fifty MSAs, data on total 
municipal property value were available for S30 municipalities. Therefore, we have S30 observations 
to explain the differences in municipal spending levels. The 530 municipalities are contained in 166 
counties. The nonmetropoiitan samples include areas not classified as an “MSA” and not classified as 
“rural.” These municipalities and counties are drawn from the nonmetropolitan areas in states 
corresponding to the states in the MSA samples. Within these nonmetropolitan areas, data on total 
municipal property value were available for 178 municipalities and the corresponding 178 counties. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 hold the number of observations for each regional sample for municipalities and 
counties, respectively. Chapter in describes the data sources while Appendix IV holds summary 
statistics for each sample.
The current taxonomy of models follows that of Chapter IV. However, in order to denote the 
differences in the measures used to test the fragmentation hypothesis, we append an “a” or a “b” to the 
model number. Model 1 is the basic median voter model which aggregates preferences for public 
services in each jurisdiction. Model 2a tests the fragmentation hypothesis at the municipal tier 
through the variable FRAG” , the number of municipalities in the county, and model 2b tests the 
fragmentation hypothesis at the county tier through the variable FRAGe , the total number of
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Tabic 5.1. Number of Observations for Municipal Samples
MSA nonM SA Complete
Regionally Pooled 530 178 708
West 126 23 149
M idwest 254 65 319
South 150 90 240
Table 5.2. Number of Observations for County Samples
MSA nonM SA Complete
Regionally Pooled 166 178 344
West 38 23 61
M idwest 57 65 122
South 71 90 161
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jurisdictions—county, municipality, township, and special district—in the county. Model 3 allows the 
data to reveal which type of fiscal illusion is present through the joint effect of \ti,TXCOM) and 
ln(£YCOA0 and the flypaper effect. Model 4 tests the overlapping jurisdictions hypothesis through 
the variable ln(£W^ /e) in equations where In(Exp/ ^ )  is the dependent variable or through the variable
^ EXpm/„ -) i11 equations where ln(Exp^ /e) is the dependent variable. Models Sa and 5b combine the
fragmentation and fiscal illusion hypotheses. Models 6a and 6b combine the fragmentation and 
overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses. Models 7 combines the fiscal illusion and overlapping 
jurisdictions hypotheses. Finally, models 8a and 8b merge all three hypotheses.
REGIONAL DUMMY VARIABLE RESULTS
Based on the F-tests in Table 3.4 we are unable to regionally pool the “complete,” (pooled 
MSA and nonMSA sample). We can regionally pool models 1, 2a, 3, and 4 for metropolitan 
municipalities and 1 ,2a, 3, and 5 for nonmetropolitan municipalities. The county F-tests presented in 
Table 3.5 preclude us from regionally pooling the “complete” sample and all nonmetropolitan models 
but allow us to pool models 1, 2b, 3, and 5b for metropolitan counties. Table 5.3 presents the 
coefficients on the regional dummy variables for the nonmetropolitan municipal samples. (Recall that 
the coefficients on the regional dummy variables for the metropolitan sample are in Table 4.2.)
Similar to the metropolitan sample, both the Midwestern and Southern nonmetropolitan municipal 
samples show that per capita expenditures are significantly lower than Western per capita 
expenditures. Unlike the metropolitan sample, where Southern per capita expenditures are greater than 
Midwestern per capita expenditures, we find that per capita expenditures are greater in the Midwest 
than in the South the nonmetropolitan municipal sample.
F-TESTS OF POOLING MSA AND NONMSA SAMPLES
Table 5.4 presents the results of F-tests of pooling MSA and nonMSA samples of each 
municipal region. We can use a dummy variable to control for the difference in the intercepts and 
pool the MSA and nonMSA municipalities for all Western (Table 5.4 Row A) and Midwestern (Table 
5.4 Row B) models. Additionally, we can pool Southern (Table 5.4 Row C) models 1 ,2a, 3, 5a, and 7,
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but are unable to pool the municipal MSA and nonMSA samples for Southern models 4 ,6a, and 8a. 
Table 5.5 presents the results of F-tests of pooling MSA and nonMSA subsamples of each county 
region. Based on these F-statistics, we can pool each model in the Western sample (Table 5.5 Row A) 
and Midwestern (Table 5.5 Row B) models 4, 7, and 8a. We are unable to pool the MSA and nonMSA 
subsamples for Midwest models 1, 2a, 3, 5a, and 6a and all Southern county models (Table 5.5 Row 
C).
LEVIATHAN
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) posit that a significantly negative relationship exists between 
the number of competing jurisdictions and the size of each jurisdiction. Because metropolitan samples 
have a greater number of jurisdictions, i. e., more competition, than nonmetropolitan samples, the 
metropolitan samples should provide more support for the fragmentation hypothesis than the 
nonmetropolitan samples. In addition to the estimates, an intercept dummy variable (equal to one for 
metropolitan observations) and slope dummy variable (equal to one multiplied by the independent 
variable for metropolitan observations) can tell us about the differences in the effects of fragmentation 
across samples.
Municipalities
Intercept Dummy Variables. The fragmentation hypothesis predicts a negative relationship 
between the extent of fragmentation in an area and the size of the public sector, ceteris paribus. 
Holding everything else constant, expenditures in metropolitan jurisdictions (where there is greater 
competition) should be lower than expenditures in nonmetropolitan areas. Therefore, significantly 
negative coefficients on the dummy variable will lend support to the fragmentation hypothesis. Table
5.6 presents the coefficients on a dummy variable equal to one for municipalities inside a metropolitan 
area. The intercept dummy variable coefficients do not lend support to the fragmentation hypothesis. 
The coefficients reveal that, for the most part, municipal expenditure behavior does not depend upon 
being inside or outside of a metropolitan area. The intercept dummy variable from the Southern 
median voter model (Table 5.6 CC) shows per capita expenditures in metropolitan municipalities are
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Table 5.3. Coefficients on Regional Dummy Variables for Nonmetropolitan Samples
Municipality
A B C
Region: M idwest South
A Model:
1
-.131*
.019
-.303**
.000
B 2a -.134*
.020
-.289**
.000
C 3 -.172**
.006
-.333**
.000
D 4 - -
E 5a -.175**
.007
-.321**
.000
F 6 - - - -
G 7 - -
H 8 - -
Notes: - • unable to regionally pool.
Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 5.4. Municipal Chow Tests of Structural Difference Across MSA and Non-MSA
A B C D E
Model: 1 2a 3 4
A West .688 .859 .565 .385
.634 .527 .783 .941
B Midwest 1.520 1.558 1.971 .631
.183 .159 .059 .771
C South .967 .775 .726 2.357*
.438 .590 .650 .015
Notes: Probability values follow F-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
Table 5.5. County Chow Tests of Structural Difference Across MSA and Non-MSA
A B C D E
Model: 1 2b 3 4
A West 1.684 1.829 1.050 1.237
.155 .113 .410 .299
B Midwest 8.859** 8.252** 6.537** 3.708**1
.000 .000 .000 .000
C South 4.475** 3.671** 3.976** 2.753**
.001 .002 .001 .005
Notes: 1 F-test shows the difference only to be in the intercept.
Probability values follow F-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 5.6.
Table 5.7.
Municipal MSA Intercept Dummy Variable Coefficients
A B C D E F
Model:
n=
1 2a 3 4
A West 149 .112
.120
.096
.198
.119
.099
.011
.894
B Midwest 319 -.009
.081
-.106
.066
-.111
.057
.025
.669
C South 240 .087*
.045
.085
.071
.083
.053
—
Notes: —  unable to pool MSA and nonMSA.
Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
County MSA Intercept Dummy Variable Coefficients
A B C D E F
Model:
n —
1 2b 3 4
A West 61 -.211
.102
-.273*
.033
-.193
.098
-.105
.410
B M idwest 122 ---- ---- ---- -.473**
.000
C South 161
Notes: —  unable to pool MSA and nonMSA.
Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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significantly greater than per capita expenditures in nonmetropolitan municipalities. In the Midwest 
(Table 5.6 Row B), the dummy variable coefficients are in the predicted, negative direction, though 
they are not significant.
Estimates. Table 5.8 presents the coefficients on the measure of horizontal competition (the 
number o f municipal governments in the county) for each municipal sample. The estimates do not 
lend support to the fragmentation hypothesis. The coefficients are consistently negative and 
significant in only one sample, West nonMSA (Table 5.8 FC). Therefore, we find behavior consistent 
with a leviathan only in the Western nonmetropolitan sample.
Slope Dummy Variables. A significantly negative coefficient on a fragmentation slope 
dummy variable reveals that fragmentation reduces the expenditures of metropolitan governments 
significantly more than expenditures of nonmetropolitan governments, supporting the fragmentation 
hypothesis. We find this outcome in the Midwest. The Midwest fragmentation coefficients themselves 
(Table 5.8 IC, JC) do not support the fragmentation hypothesis, but the difference in the marginal 
eficcts docs support the fragmentation hypothesis (Table 5.8 KC). This provides support for the 
leviathan model of government where it was not previously found. In the West (Table 5,8 CC), on the 
other hand, we find the presence of fragmentation constrains expenditures in nonmetropolitan 
municipalities significantly more than expenditures in metropolitan municipalities, which opposes the 
predictions of die fragmentation hypothesis.
Discussion
The conclusions on leviathan do not change from Chapter IV. Again, we find support for a 
leviathan in some cases, but there is no general pattern of support for a leviathan model of 
government The dummy variable analysis provides an untraditional way of searching for leviathan.
In one sample we do find evidence consistent with leviathan behavior when using metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan samples where it was not present using traditional mediods.
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Table 5.8. Municipal Fragmentation Coefficients and Slope Dummy Variables
A B C
Model: 2a
n=
A Regionally 708
Pooled
B MSA 530 .043
.991
C Non-MSA 178 .023
.755
D West 149 .068
.971
E MSA 126 .092
.991
F Non-MSA 23 -.163**
.005
G Slope DV .014*
.017
H M idwest 319 .048
.969
I MSA 254 .047
.957
J Non-MSA 65 .095
.887
K Slope DV -.011*
.036
L South 240 .011
.667
M MSA 150 .002
.528
N Non-MSA 90 .018
.669
O Slope DV .006
.519
Notes: - • unable to regionally pool.
—  unable to pool MSA and nonMSA 
Fragmentation coefficient t-tests are one tailed.
Slope dummy coefficient t-tests are two-tailed. 
Probability values follow errors.* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Counties
Intercept Dummy Variables. Table 5.7 presents the coefficients on dummy variables equal to 
one for counties inside metropolitan areas. Based on the intercept dummy variable coefficients, the 
fragmentation hypothesis has much greater support at the county layer of government than at the 
municipal layer for the West (Table 5.7 Row A) and Midwest (Table 5.7 Row B). Coefficients for 
Western metropolitan counties are all negative, though significant only once (Table 5.7 AD). In 
models 4 ,7 , and 8b, Midwestern metropolitan counties have significantly lower expenditures than 
their nonmetropolitan counterparts, lending strong support to the fragmentation hypothesis. This 
result is consistent with Zax (1989) who reports negative and significant coefficients on dummy 
variables equal to one for counties located in metropolitan areas across the country.
Estimates and Slope Dummy Variables. Table 5.9 presents the coefficients on fragmentation 
for county samples. Recall that fragmentation, in this case, is not a measure of horizontal competition, 
but defined more broadly to be competition among all jurisdictions within the county. In each region 
the metropolitan fragmentation coefficients follow the predictions of the fragmentation hypothesis 
while the nonmetropolitan fragmentation coefficients do not. The Western and Midwestern 
metropolitan samples provide support for the fragmentation hypothesis.
In the West, both samples have consistently negative coefficients and both samples show 
statistical significance. The fragmentation coefficients are significantly negative in models 2b and 5b 
in the metropolitan sample (Table 5.9 EC) while the model 6b and 8b show a significantly negative 
fragmentation coefficient in the nonmetropolitan West. The slope dummies are consistently negative, 
though insignificant. Therefore, fragmentation lends to constrain both metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan expenditures, supporting the fragmentation hypothesis.
In the Midwest we find that fragmentation constrains metropolitan (Table 5.9 IC) 
expenditures but not nonmetropolitan (Table 5.9 JC) expenditures. The coefficients on the slope 
dummy for model 8b (the only model we can pool with the fragmentation variable for the Midwest) is 
-.0007 with a  two-tailed probability value of .001. Therefore, we find support for the fragmentation
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Table 5.9. County Fragmentation Coefficients and Slope Dummy Variables
A B C
Model: 2b
n=
A Regionally 344
Pooled
B htSA 166 -.034
.337
C Non-MSA 178
D West 61 -.181*
.046
E MSA 38 -.224*
.048
F Non-MSA 23 -.095
.161
G Slope DV -.003
.103
H Midwest 122
I MSA 57 -.249*
.013
J Non-MSA 65 .301
.989
K Slope DV ----
L South 161 ----
M MSA 71 -.007
.475
N Non-MSA 90 .170
.860
0 Slope DV . . .
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
—  unable to pool MSA and nonMSA. 
Fragmentation coefficient t-tests are one-tailed.
Slope dummy coefficient t-tests are two-tailed. 
Probability values follow errors.* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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hypothesis through both the estimates and the slope dummy variables in the Midwestern county 
sample.
Discussion
The fragmentation hypothesis, tested using a broad measure, gets support in both the Western 
and Midwestern county samples. Our findings, therefore, are consistent with Zax (1989)’s result that 
increases in the total number of governments in a county reduces the total size of the public sector in 
the county. In the Midwest, the county sample consistently shows support for the fragmentation 
hypothesis: through the intercept dummy variable, the fragmentation coefficient, and the 
fragmentation slope dummy variable. For the first time, leviathan reveals itself in each test o f the 
Midwestern county sample. In the West, both municipal and county samples provide support for the 
fragmentation hypothesis. Once again, however no pattern is present. For municipalities, the Western 
nonMSA sample provides evidence of behavior consistent with leviathan while at the county layer, the 
Western MSA sample supports a leviathan model.
It is not surprising that redefining the fragmentation variable leads to changes in our 
conclusions. In Chapter IV, we measure horizontal fragmentation only: the number of counties in a 
MSA per MSA population (measured in 100,000). In the current analysis, we use a  broad measure of 
fragmentation: all the governments in the county. The difference in conclusions when using the 
difFcrcnt measures is most dramatic in the Southern county sample where horizontal fragmentation 
defined over the MSA results in coefficients that strongly support the fragmentation hypothesis (Table
4.6 Row D), whereas fragmentation broadly defined over the county results in coefficients which do 
not support the fragmentation hypothesis (Table 5.9 MC). On the other hand, the broad measure of 
firagmentation shows support for a leviathan government in the Western and Midwestern county 
samples.
FISCAL ILLUSION
Recall that Table 4.8 shows the possible types of fiscal illusion. Turnbull (1997) shows that 
information on both the output effect and the flypaper effect determine the type of fiscal illusion
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present in the data. In this research we measure the output effect of budget complexity by using a t- 
test on the joint effect of the coefficients on \ni_TXCOM) and \tttEXCON) .  The combination of 
significantly negative t-statistics and a flypaper effect support Oates' traditional fiscal illusion— 
individuals underestimate the marginal tax price of government services because of the existence of 
intergovernmental aid. Significantly negative t-statistics without a flypaper effect supports Oates’ 
traditional fiscal illusion notion combined with benefits uncertainty fiscal illusion. Significantly 
positive t-statistics in addition to a flypaper effect supports Turnbull’s tax price uncertainty fiscal 
illusion alone while significantly positive t-statistics without a flypaper effect supports Turnbull’s 
benefit uncertainty fiscal illusion. Absence of a significant joint effect in conjunction with a flypaper 
effect supports uncertainty fiscal illusion partially offset by traditional fiscal illusion. Finally, absence 
o f both a significant joint effect and a flypaper effect suggests full information or no fiscal illusion. 
Municipalities
Estimates and Slope Dummy Variables. Tables 5.10 presents results of t-tests of the joint 
effect of \n(TXCON) and In(EXCON) for municipalities. On the basis of both the t-statistics of the 
fiscal illusion variables, the flypaper effects, and the t-statistics of slope dummy variables for 
\n(TXCON) and ln( EVCO/V), we find the effects of fiscal illusion to be similar across metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan municipalities. As in Chapter IV, we find evidence of traditional fiscal illusion 
offset by tax price and/or benefits uncertainty fiscal illusion due to the combination o f no significant 
joint effect and the presence of a flypaper effect.
Counties
Estimates and Slope Dummy Variables. Table 5.11 presents results of the fiscal illusion 
output and flypaper effects and t-statistics of the slope dummies for fiscal illusion variables for each 
county sample. We find that fiscal illusion is similar across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties 
in the West (Table 5.11 HC, JC) and South (Table 5.11 TC, VC). In the West, both types of county 
government expenditure behavior reflect traditional fiscal illusion offset by uncertainty fiscal illusion. 
In the South, both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties display full information.
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Table S. 10. Municipal Meats of the Joint Effect of Fiscal Illusion Variables,
Flypaper Effects and Slope Dummy Variables
A B C
Model: 3
n -
A Regionally 708
Pooled
B MSA 530 -1.190
.235
C Flypaper: 37.056**
D Non-MSA 178 .502
.616
E Flypaper: 6.943**
F Slope DV: . . .
G West 149 -.287
.775
H Flypaper: 6.511**
I MSA 126 -.266
.790
; Flypaper: 7.134**
K Non-MSA 23 -.604
.554
L Flypaper: 5.335**
M Slope DV: -.772
.441
(table con’d)
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A B C
Model: 3
n=
N M idwest 319 -1.211
.227
0 Flypaper: 9.354**
P MSA 254 -1.335
.183
Q Flypaper: 12.875**
R Non-MSA 65 .778
.440
S Flypaper: 2.792*
T Slope DV: -.756
.450
U South 240 -.149
.882
V Flypaper: 47.721**
W MSA 150 -.384
.701
X Flypaper: 64.458**
Y Non-MSA 90 .020
.984
Z Flypaper: 9.053**
AA Slope DV: -1.687
.093
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
—  unable to pool MSA and nonMSA.
Probability values follow t-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
One-tailed t-tests for flypaper effects.
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Tabic 5.11. County t-tests of Joint Effect of Fiscal Dlusion Variables,
Flypaper Effects and Slope Dummy Variables
A B C
Model: 3
n=
A Regionally 344
Pooled
B MSA 166 -1.049
.296
C Flypaper: 11.559*
D Non-MSA 178 - -
E Slope DV:
F West 61 -.948
.347
G Flypaper: 16.028**
H MSA 38 -.460
.689
I Flypaper: 17.043*
J Non-MSA 23 -1.474
.160
K Flypaper: 13.682**
L Slope DV: 1.376
.175
(table con’d)
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A B C
Model: 3
n=
M Midwest 122 ----
N MSA 57 .316
.753
0 Flypaper: 6.447
P Non-MSA 65 4.444**
.000
Q Flypaper: 6.833**
R Slope DV: ----
S South 161 ----
T MSA 71 -1.715
.091
U Flypaper: 3.096
V Non-MSA 90 1.414
.161
W Flypaper: -80.04
X Slope DV: ----
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
—  unable to pool MSA and nonMSA.
Probability values follow t-statistics. * p
One-tailed t-tests for flypaper effects.
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In the Midwest, however, we do find differences. The Midwestern nonmetropolitan county 
sample supports tax price uncertainty fiscal illusion because of the significantly positive joint effect 
and the presence of a  flypaper effect On the other hand, the Midwest metropolitan county sample 
supports traditional fiscal illusion in conjunction with uncertainty fiscal illusion due to the 
insignificant joint effect and the presence o f a flypaper effect.
Discussion
The additional fiscal illusion results presented in this chapter leave us with little to discuss.
In most cases, our fiscal illusion conclusions from Chapter IV extend to the nonmetropolitan samples. 
In the Midwestern county sample, though, we find that our fiscal illusion conclusions are strikingly 
different across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan samples. Unfortunately we are unable to offer any 
reasons why we find this difference. We present these results as a first step toward understanding the 
differences in expenditure behavior across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan local governments. 
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) show that a strategic complementary relationship exists 
when an increase in expenditures at one layer of government leads to an increase in expenditures of 
another layer. One the other hand, a strategic substitute relationship exists when an increase in 
expenditures at one layer of government leads to a decrease in expenditures of another layer. A 
strategic substitute relationship restricts the local public sector while a strategic complementary 
relationship promotes larger local public sectors. Table 5.12 presents the coefficients on ln(EXfy^c) for
each municipal sample while Table 5.13 presents the coefficients on ln(EVP^ / , ) for 63011 county
sample. Significantly positive coefficients represent a strategically complementary relationship while 
significantly negative coefficients represent a strategic substitute relationship.
Municipalities
Estimates and Slope Dummy Variables. Overlapping jurisdictions coefficients and slope 
dummy variables for each municipal sample are in Table 5.12. We find differences in the marginal 
effects of the overlapping jurisdictions variable in each region. In the nonmetropolitan West (Table
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S. 12 FC), the overlapping jurisdictions estimates show a positive and significant, and therefore 
complementary, relationship between municipal and county per capita expenditures. As we discovered 
in Chapter IV, the overlapping jurisdictions coefficients are consistently positive, though insignificant, 
in the metropolitan West (Table 5. 12 EC) sample, which suggests an unrelated relationship. The 
overlapping jurisdictions slope dummy variable shows that the overlapping jurisdiction relationship 
affects metropolitan and nonmetropolitan governments similarly.
In the metropolitan Midwest (Table 5.12 IC), we again find evidence of a complementary 
relationship between municipal and county per capita expenditures. In the nonmetropolitan Midwest 
(Table 5.12 JC), the overlapping jurisdictions coefficients are insignificantly positive, supporting an 
unrelated relationship. The overlapping jurisdictions slope dummy variables show a significant 
difference in the effects of the overlapping jurisdictions variables on metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
Midwest expenditures in models 6a and 8a. The overlapping jurisdictions slope dummy variables are 
significantly positive suggesting that increases in Midwestern county per capita expenditures tends to 
increase metropolitan municipal per capita expenditures significantly more than nonmetropolitan 
municipal per capita expenditures.
In the South, the metropolitan sample (Table 5.12 MC) displays a complementary 
relationship due to the positive and significant overlapping jurisdictions coefficients. On the other 
hand, the Southern nonmetropolitan sample (Table 5.12 NC) displays an unrelated overlapping 
jurisdictions relationship due to the insignificant negative coefficients. We are only able to pool the 
Southern municipal metropolitan and nonmetropolitan samples for model 7. In this case we find no 
significant difference in the between the Southern metropolitan and nonmetropolitan overlapping 
jurisdiction relationships using an overlapping jurisdictions slope dummy variable.
Counties
Estimates and Slope Dummy Variables. Coefficients for the overlapping jurisdictions 
variables and slope dummy variables for each county sample are in Table 5.13. We find differences in 
the marginal effect of the overlapping jurisdictions variables in the each region. The Western
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Table 5.12. Municipal Overlapping Jurisdiction Coefficients and Slope Dummy Variables
A B C
4Model:
n=
708A Regionally 
Pooled
B MSA 530 .119**
.001
C Non-MSA 178
D West 149 .116
.281
E MSA 126 .102
.446
F Non-MSA 23 .307**
.002
G Slope DV: .001
.949
H M idwest 319 .226**
.001
I MSA 254 .178*
.011
J Non-MSA' 65 .140
.598
K Slope DV‘; .002
.902
L South 240 ----
M MSA 150 .092*
.026
N Non-MSA 90 -.017
.732
O Slope DV: ----
Notes: Based on 2SLS estimation.
- .  unable to regionally pool. —  unable to pool MSA and nonMSA. 
Probability values follow errors. * p  < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 5.13. County Overlapping Jurisdiction Coefficients and Slope Dummy Variables 
A B C
4Model:
n=
A Regionally 344 
Pooled
B
C
MSA 166
Non-MSA 178
D West 61 .277
.155
E MSA 38 .335
.193
F Non-MSA 23 .531
.053
G Slope DV: -.019
.438
H Midwest 122 .404**
.000
I MSA 57 .317
.056
J Non-MSA 65 .367**
.002
K Slope DV: -.092**
.001
L South 161 ----
M MSA 71 .829**
.002
N Non-MSA 90 -.139
.579
0 Slope DV: . . .
Notes: - - unable to regionally pool.
—  unable to pool MSA and nonMSA.
Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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nonmetropolitan sample (Table 5.13 FC) tends to display a complementary overlapping jurisdictions 
relationship2 while the Western metropolitan sample (Table 5.13 EC) displays an unrelated 
overlapping jurisdictions relationship. In the Southern metropolitan sample (Table 5.13 MC) we find a 
complementary relationship between county and municipal per capita expenditures due to the positive 
and significant overlapping jurisdictions coefficients. On the other hand, we find an unrelated 
overlapping jurisdictions relationship for the Southern nonmetropolitan sample (Table 5.13 NC). We 
are unable to pool metropolitan and nonmetropolitan samples for the Southern counties, and therefore, 
we are unable to get any information from slope dummy variables.
Both the metropolitan (Table 5.13 IC) and nonmetropolitan (Table 5.13 JC) Midwestern 
county samples exhibit a complementary overlapping jurisdictions relationship. The slope dummy 
variable (Table 5.13 ICC) reveals that the nonmetropolitan complementary relationship is stronger than 
the metropolitan complementary relationship.3 
Discussion
We find differences in the marginal effects of the overlapping jurisdictions variables across 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan municipal governments in each region. In the Midwestern and 
Southern samples, both the metropolitan municipal per capita expenditures display a complementary 
relationship with county per capita expenditures. In the West, it is the nonmetropolitan municipal 
sample which displays a complementary overlapping jurisdictions relationship. As in Chapter IV, we 
find no evidence of a substitute relationship, which would limit the size of the local sector. Instead, in 
each region, we find evidence of a complementary relationship which serves to enlarge the size of the 
local government We also find differences in the marginal effects of the overlapping jurisdictions 
variables in each sample at the county layer. For the most part, we again find symmetry in the county-
2 West nonMSA model 6b has a  positive coefficient and is significant at the five percent level.
3 Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests reveal that 2SLS should be used for models 6b, 7, and 8b in the Midwest 
nonmetropolitan sample. These coefficients reveal an unrelated overlapping jurisdictions relationship. 
Using 2SLS on the metropolitan sample also reveals an unrelated relationship. However, the slope 
dummy variable coefficient obtained when using 2SLS continues to be significantly negative.
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municipal overlapping jurisdictions relationship and the municipal-county overlapping jurisdictions 
relationship.
CONCLUSION
This chapter set out to compare local government expenditure behavior across highly 
competitive metropolitan regions and relatively less competitive nonmetropolitan regions. We find 
differentiating between the two types of samples to be an important contribution. Additionally, again 
we find that breaking down the municipal and county samples into regions provides important 
insights. For example, we Gnd that in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas, the West region 
has the highest per capita expenditures relative to those o f the Midwestern and Southern regions. 
However, Southern metropolitan municipalities have greater per capita expenditures than Midwestern 
metropolitan municipalities, while Midwestern nonmetropolitan municipalities have greater per capita 
expenditures than Southern nonmetropolitan municipalities.
Using a new way to search for leviathan, we Gnd behavior consistent with a leviathan model 
of government in the Midwest sample and the nonmetropolitan Western sample. As in Chapter IV, 
however, we can identify only scattered evidence supporting leviathan-like municipal governments. 
County governments in the Midwest are the only exception to our scattered spotting of leviathan. We 
find evidence consistent with the assumptions of a leviathan government in the Midwestern county 
sample each way we test the fragmentation hypothesis.
Estimates of fiscal illusion and overlapping jurisdictions parameters are also presented as a 
Grst step toward understanding the differences in the budgetary complexity and vertical relationships 
across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. We find differences across metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan areas do exist for the overlapping jurisdictions variables. However, these differences 
do not emerge in a consistent pattern and therefore we cannot explain the differences due to placement 
inside or outside of a metropolitan area.
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CHAPTER VI
EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES
Whether a jurisdiction’s type o f governmental organization significantly affects its 
expenditures is an important question within the study of local government Municipalities in the 
United States take one of three forms of government: mayor-council, council-manager, or 
commission, while counties take either council-administrator, council-elected executive, or council- 
commission (International City Management Association 1989).1 The reform movement within public 
administration promoted the use of a manager in order to coordinate administrative duties (Bingham 
and Hedge 1991 227). A manager, more so than a mayor, is said to utilize professionalism. Normally 
a manager has an advanced degree in public administration and is connected to other public 
administrators through professional memberships (Bingham and Hedge 1991 222). Therefore, the 
reformers argued the council manager form of government would be more efficient than the mayor 
council or commission forms of government, ceteris paribus. For example. Booms (1966) states that 
costs may be lower in council-manager municipalities because managers can cope with administrative 
problems better than mayors can; managers are more cost conscious because a manager is less 
concerned with politics and is less influenced by special interest groups.
However, economists make no distinctions between types of bureaucrats. Each, whether a 
mayor or city manager, is viewed as an agent in the principle-agent problem where the electorate plays 
the role o f the principle. Deno and Mehay (1987) argue that there should be no significant difference 
in the expenditures of council-manager or mayor-council forms of government because a  city manager 
serves at the pleasure of council members who are elected. In other words, city managers are simply an 
extension of an elected body, and therefore, the incentives of a city manager no different than those of 
a  mayor.
1 Municipalities may also take the form o f town meeting or representative town meeting. However, 
only cities in the Northeast take these forms, so a  discussion of these types is not relevant for this paper 
which only considers the West, Midwest, and South.
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The question of which form of government leads to relatively lower expenditures is an 
empirical one. Booms (1966) and Dcno and Mehay (1987) test the hypothesis that council-manager 
forms of government result in significantly lower expenditures. Using Midwestern municipal data 
Booms finds that per capita expenditures are significantly lower for council-manager cities than for 
mayor-council cities, supporting the public administration argument that professionally trained city 
managers are more efficient than mayors. Using a data set similar to that of Booms, Oeno and Mehay 
find that no significant difference exists in per capita expenditures between the two samples. 
Additionally, Hays and Chang (1990) test the hypothesis that council-manager forms of government 
are more efficient titan mayor-council forms of government Hays and Chang estimate a cost function 
and related efficiency measures for municipalities using expenditures on police, fire, and refuse 
collection. They conclude that no statistical difference exists in the efficiency of council-manager and 
mayor-council forms o f government Both Deno and Mehay and Hays and Chang’s empirical results 
support the view that the incentives of the city manager and mayor arc similarly aligned.
This paper contributes to the literature by exploring whether significant differences in local 
government expenditures are due to differing forms of governments. This chapter presents the first 
regression analysis using county level data and adds to the existing municipal studies. Additionally, in 
keeping with the theme of this dissertation, this chapter presents the first analysis of the leviathan, 
fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses within the context of different organizational 
forms of local government. The leviathan hypothesis is linked with the propositions that lower public 
expenditures will result when the fiscal structure is decentralized and fragmented. Fiscal illusion 
posits that individuals do not know the true marginal costs and benefits of public activity and therefore 
support a  different level of public service than each would if he were fully informed. Finally, the 
model o f overlapping jurisdictions studies the relationship between municipal and county spending. If 
overlapping jurisdictions have a complementary relationship, then the local public sector will be larger 
than if  a substitute relationship exists.
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This chapter proceeds as follows: section two presents a discussion of the different 
organizational forms of local governments, section three presents preliminary empirical results when 
the different samples of governments are pooled, section four presents the empirical results of the 
leviathan, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses, and section five provides 
conclusions.
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
MUNICIPALITIES
The mayor-council form of government is the oldest form in the United States. It was 
adapted from an older English model while council-manager and commission forms are both twentieth 
century ideas. The commission form sprang into existence in 1900 when the city of Galveston, Texas 
was struck by the damage of a severe hurricane (Bingham and Hedge 1991 219). Turn of the century 
reformers developed the commission form and the Texas governor appointed the first commission to 
help rebuild Galveston (Keller and Perry 1991 41). By 1920, about 500 cities adopted the plan in 
order to make their governments more businesslike (Bingham and Hedge 1991 219). In response to 
coordination problems between commissioners and agency heads, the reformers soon promoted 
replacement of both the commission and the mayor-council forms with the council-manager form 
(Keller and Perry 1991 42).2 Sumter, South Carolina, became the first municipality with the council- 
manager form of government in 1912 (Bingham and Hedge 1991 220).3 The relationship between 
legislative and executive powers distinguishes different organizational forms of government. 
Mayor-Council Form of Government
The mayor-council form provides the traditional separation between legislative and executive 
power found in federal and state governments. The council members are elected to be policy makers 
while the mayor is elected to be the chief executive. In strong-mavor governments, mayors normally 
have the following responsibilities: control over the budget, appointment and dismissal of department 
heads without the approval of the council, power to make legislative recommendations, in addition to
2 “Council-manager” is sometimes referred to as “city-manager.”
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possible veto power. In weak-mavor governments the mayor’s duties may be significantly reduced so 
that the council is in charge of the budget and appointment of key agency heads. In many 
municipalities with the mayor-council form, the mayor appoints a city manager, or Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO). The CAO serves at the pleasure of the mayor (and not the council) and 
is responsible for only the mayor’s administrative duties (Bingham and Hedge 1991 220). The mayor- 
council form with a  CAO is significantly different from the council-manager form of government 
(Whitaker and Jenne 1993 86). Contrary to the mayor-council form, both the council-manager and 
commission forms have no distinct separation of legislative and executive powers (Bingham and 
Hedge 1991 221).
Council-Manager Form of Government
Under a council-manager form, the council appoints a city manager who is responsible to the 
council for formulating the proposed budget, the council agenda, and administrative duties. To be 
recognized as a council-manager municipality by the International City Management Association, the 
professional association of city managers, the city manager must possess the following responsibilities:
1. Full authority for the appointment and removal of most of the heads
o f the major departments in the city.
2. Administrative responsibility over those department heads the
manager appoints.
3. Responsibility for the preparation and administration of the municipal
budget.
4. Direct responsibility for policy formulation on overall problems
(Bingham and Hedge 1991 222).
The city manager under a council-manager form of government has the added responsibilities of 
legislative, or policy making, duties whereas a CAO within a  mayor-council form only has 
administrative duties. In a council-manager form o f government, the mayor is a legislative officer, 
serving as a  council member (Whitaker and Jenne 1995 84-86).
Commission Form of Government
Under the commission form of municipal government, individuals are elected to head up a 
specific agency and serve on the legislative body. A mayor, who has very little power under this form
3 Staunton, VA introduced the first city manager in 1908.
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of government, may be elected by the voters or may be appointed by the commissioners from one of 
their own members. Under this form of government, individual departments remain separate.
Bingham and Hedge report that a  commissioner often keeps to himself so that his own department will 
be left alone (1991 221).
COUNTIES
There are three prevalent forms of county government: council-elected executive, council- 
administrator, and council-commission. The council-commission is the traditional county form of 
government (Bingham and Hedge 1991 198). Very little work exists on the organizational forms of 
government at the county level. Schneider and Park (1989) use an analysis o f means and find council- 
elected executive governments spent about 100% more than council-commission governments and 
73% more than council-administrator governments.
Council-Elected Executive Form o f Government
The council-elected executive form of government parallels the strone-mavor mayor-council 
municipal government form (MacManus 1996). The elected-executive acts as the formal head of the 
county and may have veto power, as a state governor would. He is responsible for county 
administration, preparation of the budget, hiring and firing department heads, carrying out council 
policy, and making policy recommendations to the council. The council adopts the budget, sets policy, 
and acts as auditor of the county administration (Bingham and Hedge 1991 199-200). 
Council-Administrator Form of Government
The adoption o f the council-administrator form is a product o f the same public administration 
reform movement that promotes the use of professional managers in local government Similarly, we 
find that the elected council creates policy and the appointed administrator (manager), who serves at 
the pleasure of the council, administers the policy. Additionally, the administrator prepares and 
implements the budget hires and fires department heads, and provides policy recommendations to the 
council (Bingham and Hedge 1991 199). Again, we find that the council expects the administrator to
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participate in legislative duties by setting board agendas and helping form policy (Bingham and Hedge 
1991 202).
Council-commission Form of Government
It is possible for a commission to have between one and one hundred members, though most 
average between 3 and 5. The council-commission is responsible for appointing advisory boards and 
special commissions, adopting the budget, and legislating (Bingham and Hedge 1991 198). The 
commission shares the responsibility of administrative duties with the other officials elected to run 
specific functions such as the county clerk, coroner, sheriff assessor, and treasurer (Bingham and 
Hedge 1991 198-199).
PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Tables A6.1 through A6.12 present summary statistics for each form of municipal 
government. Most metropolitan municipalities are either mayor-council (34%) or council-manager 
(64%) while only a few take the commission form (2%). There is a disproportionate amount of 
council-manager municipalities in the West (86%) and the South (77%) whereas the Midwest is 
relatively balanced between mayor-council (53%) and council-manager (45%) municipalities. Tables 
A6.13 through A6.24 present summary statistics for each form of county government. Again, we find 
the regionally pooled sample to be made up of mainly two forms of government: council-administrator 
(49%) and council-commission (42%). The county regional samples appear to be more evenly 
distributed than the municipal samples, though the Western county sample is still disproportionate. 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 contain the number of observations for each metropolitan municipal and county 
sample, respectively.
The taxonomy of models in this chapter follows that of the previous chapters: Model 1 is the 
basic median voter model which aggregates preferences for public services in each jurisdiction. Model 
2  tests the decentralization hypothesis through the effect on ln(D£C) and tests the f r a g m e n t a t i o n  
hypothesis through the effect on InfFR^lG). Model 3 allows the data to reveal which type of fiscal
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Table 6.1. Number of Observations for Municipal Samples
Mayor- Council- Commission
Council Manager
(M Q (CM) (CO)
Regionally Pooled 180 339 11
West 14 108 4
M idwest 135 115 4
South 31 116 3
Table 6.2. Number of Observations for County Samples
Council- Council- Council-
Executive Administrator Commission
(CE) (CA) (CC)
Regionally Pooled 15 82 69
West 2 25 11
M idwest 6 26 25
South  7 31 33
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illusion is present through the joint effect of Us(TXCON) and la(EXCON) and the flypaper effect 
Model 4 tests the interdependent demands hypothesis through the variable lnf03/ ^ )  in equations 
where municipal per capita expenditures are the dependent variable or through the variable
in equations where county per capita expenditures are the dependent variable. Model 5
combines the decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses and fiscal illusion hypothesis. Model 6 
combines the decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses and interdependent demands hypothesis. 
Model 7 combines the fiscal illusion and interdependent demands hypotheses. Finally, Model 8 
merges all three hypotheses. We present only the coefficients of interest in this chapter. Additionally, 
we only present the results of the hypotheses modeled separately (model 2, 3 and 4). In most cases, this 
provides enough information in order to draw our conclusions. Complete tables are in Appendix VI. 
POOLING ALL THREE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT
Table 6.3 presents the results of F-tests for structural breaks for all three types of municipal 
governments.4 In all but a few cases, the value of the F statistic is larger than the critical value, so we 
must reject the null hypothesis of no structural breaks between the three types of governments and 
conclude that at least one form of government is significantly different than the others. In a few cases, 
however, the F-statistics are small. Table 6.3 shows that we can pool the three different municipal 
forms of government for the following models: regionally pooled models 1, 2, and 3 (Table 6.3 Row 
A); Midwestern model 1 (Table 6.3 CE); Southern models 1,2, and 3 (Table 6.3 Row D). Further, we 
find the structural difference is in the intercept and not in the slopes for one additional model3: 
Midwest model 3 (Table 6.3 CG). We capture the differences in per capita expenditures by pooling the 
samples and employing a dummy variable equal to one for mayor council (MC) and council manager 
(CM) municipalities. Table 6.4 presents the coefficients of the dummy variables for the municipal 
sample. We find no significant difference in per capita expenditures of mayor-council, council- 
manager, or commission governments in the regionally pooled (Table 6.4 Row A, Row B) and
4 Johnston (1991 Chapter 6) explains the appropriate F-tests when the number of observations in a 
subsample is less than the number of explanatory variables (n, < k ) .
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Southern samples (Table 6.4 Row E, Row F). However, in the Midwest, the median voter model 
(Table 6.4 CC) shows that the commission form of government has significantly greater per capita 
expenditures than the mayor-council form. We also conclude that the median voter model shows 
council-manager forms also have significantly lower per capita expenditures than commission forms 
(Table 6.4 DC).
Table 6.5 reveals that we can pool the three types of county government forms for the West 
model 4 (Table 6.5 AH) and Midwest model 1 (Table 6.5 BE)6. We capture the differences in per 
capita expenditures by pooling the samples and employing a  dummy variable equal to one for council 
administrator (CA) and council commission (CC) counties. Table 6.6 shows that per capita 
expenditures of council-elected executive forms are significantly greater than per capita expenditures 
of botli council-administrative and council-commission forms using the median voter model for the 
Midwestern sample of counties (Table 6.6 CC, DC). This supports the previous findings of Schneider 
and Park (1989). Western model 4 (Table 6.6 BD) shows that the council-elected executive form of 
government has significantly greater per capita expenditures than the council-commission form of 
government.
POOLING ONLY THE MAIN FORMS OF GOVERNMENTS
Booms (1966) and Deno and Mehay (1987) compare per capita expenditures between only 
council-manager and mayor-council municipalities. Using an F-test on a sample o f Michigan and 
Ohio municipalities of population 25,000 -100,000, Booms finds a significant structural difference 
between the two types of governments. However, he finds the difference is in the intercept term only 
and not in the slopes. Therefore, he pools the samples and includes a dummy variable equal to one for 
council-manager municipalities and finds that per capita expenditures of council-manager 
municipalities are significantly lower than those of mayor-council municipalities. This supports the
5 Johnston (1991 Chapter 6) explains the appropriate tests.
6 We cannot test whether the CA, CE, and CC samples can be pooled because we cannot regionally 
pool the CA sample due the F-test results.
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Table 6.3. Municipal MSA Chow Tests of Pooling Mayor-Council (MC),
Council-Manager (CM), and Commission (CO)
Table 6.4.
A B C D E F G H
Model: I 2 3 4
MC CM CO
n - n= n=
A Regionally 180 339 11 1.207 1.162 1.467 2.710**
Pooled .266 .289 .097 .002
B West 14 108 4 3.022* 7.241** 5.439** 5.105**
.021 .000 .000 .001
C M idwest 135 115 4 1.652 3.240* 2.959*1 4.310**
.162 .013 .021 .002
D South 31 116 3 1.084 1.776 1.505 3.160*
.358 .155 .216 .027
Notes: 1 F-test shows the difference only to be in the intercept.
Probability values follow F-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
Dummy Variable Coefficients for Mayor-Councii (MC) 
and Council-Manager (CM)
A B C D E
Model: 1 2 3
A Regionally MC -.075 -.081 -.082
Pooled .314 .276 .302
B CM -.056 -.064 -.052
.423 .361 .492
C M idwest MC -.221* -  -  -  - -.251
.031 .056
D CM -.192 •  •  •  • -.192
.051 .136
E South MC .005 -.012 .046
.973 .941 .764
F CM .023 .004 .061
.876 .979 .686
Notes:  unable to pool MC, CM, and CO.
Probability values follow F-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 6.5. County MSA Chow Tests of Pooling Council-Executive (CE),
Council-Administrator (CA), and Councii-Commission (CC)
Table 6.6.
A B C D E F G H
Model: 1 2 3 4
CA CE CC
n= n= n=
A West 25 2 11 5.482** 9.870** 5.109* 3.266
.010 .001 .015 .062
B Midwest 26 6 25 1.139 3.585** 4.860** 2.588*
.358 .007 .001 .036
C South 31 15 33 4.390** 10.983** 7.436** 5.603**
.000 .000 .000 .000
Notes: Probability values follow F-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
Dummy Variable Coefficients for Council-Administrator (CA) 
and Councii-Commission (CC)
B
Model:
C
1
D
4
West CA -.088
.604
B CC -.322*
.013
Midwest CA -.362** 
.009
D CC -.399* 
.012
Notes:  unable to pool MC, CM, and CO.
Probability values follow F-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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public administration argument that a professionally trained city manager can utilize resources more 
efficiently than a mayor.
Using a sample similar to Booms (1967) and a median voter model rather than an ad hoc 
model, Deno and Mehay (1987) find no significant difference exists between council-manager and 
mayor-council samples and proceed with dummy variable analysis. They find no significant difference 
in the per capita expenditures of the two types of governments which supports their theory that no 
significant difference should be found between mayor-council and council-manager forms of 
government
Table 6.7 presents results of structural break F-tests when only considering two out o f the 
three types of municipal governments: mayor-council and council-manager. When only considering 
mayor-council and council-manager governments, we find that we can pool all but two models for 
each municipal sample. Table 6.8 holds the coefficients on dummy variables equal to one for council- 
manager municipalities. Our results mirror those of Deno and Mehay (1987): there is no significant 
difference in per capita expenditures between the two types of governments in the Midwest (Table 6.7 
Row C), and additionally, in the West (Table 6.7 Row B) or South (Table 6.7 Row D). Hays and 
Chang (1990) use an institutional explanation of why we may find no significant difference. They 
report that the two forms of government, though seemingly distinct, in fact, operate similarly. They 
state that this is mainly due to the role o f the mayor in the council-manager form of government. 
Though said to be mainly a figurehead, in actuality, these mayors appear to be actively involved in 
policy. Coupling the Hays and Chang explanation with the presence of a professionally trained CAO 
in a mayor-council government, it appears that the distinctions between these two types of 
governments are not, in practice, as stark as on paper.
Table 6.9 presents the F-statistics when considering only council-administrator and council- 
commission county governments. We find that the two samples can be pooled for the West (Table 6.9 
Row A)and Midwest samples (Table 6.9 Row B) and model 4 in the South sample (Table 6.9 CG). 
Table 6.10 presents the coefficients o f dummy variables equal to one for council-administrator
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Table 6.7.
Table 6.8.
Municipal Chow Tests of Pooling Mayor-Council (MC) and
'ouncil-M anager (CM)
A B C D E F G
Model: 1 2 3 4
MC CM
n - n=
A Regionally 180 339 .925 .905 1.173 1.149
Pooled .532 .572 .279 .290
B West 14 108 .898 1.825* 1.236 1.021
.538 .044 .260 .443
C M idwest 135 115 .422 .750 .592 .872
.935 .723 .870 .613
D South 31 116 .126 .231 .188 .440
.999 .998 .999 .976
Dummy Variable Coefficients for Council-Manager (CM) Governments
A B C D E F
Model:
n=
1 2 3 4
A Regionally 519 .017 .017 .030 .018
Pooled .607 .623 .390 .596
B West 122 -.046 -.035 -.065
.707 .764 .589
C M idwest 250 .029 .028 .061 .004
.499 .523 .165 .926
D South 147 .018 .017 .015 .073
.757 .777 .795 .229
4otes: ------ unable to pool MC and C M .
Probability values follow F-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 6.9. County Chow Teats of Pooling Council-Administrator (CA) and
Councii-Commission (CC)
A B C D E F G
Model: 1 2 3 4
CA CC
n= n=
A West 25 11 1.065 1.392 .726 .314
.422 .236 .723 .991
B M idwest 26 25 .488 .870 1.275 .606
.883 .595 .268 .869
C South 31 33 2.825** 
.007
4.515**
.000
2.750**
.004
1.108
.375
Table 6.10. Dummy Variable Coefficients for Council-Administrator (CA) Governments
A B C D E F
Model:
n=
1 2 3 4
A West 36 .330*
.019
.315*
.014
.361*
.014
.235
.109
M idwest 51 .043 .049 .041 .033
.680 .678 .698 .755
South 64 ------ ------ ------ .081
.594
Notes:  unable to pool CA and C C .
Probability values follow errors. * p  < .05. ** p < .01.
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governments. We find no significant difference for the Midwestern (Table 6.10 Row B) or Southern 
samples (Table 6.10 Row C), supporting the economists’ argument However, per capita expenditures 
in the West (Table 6.10 Row A) are significantly higher in council-administrator governments than in 
council-commission governments. The findings in the Western county sample do not support the 
arguments of either economists or public administration reformers.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Explaining the differences in the relative size of government across jurisdictions using the 
leviathan, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions models is the main focus of this dissertation. 
Within the context o f specific organizational forms of government, we now return to this theme. This 
is the first attempt to seek out the differences in the effects of decentralization, fragmentation, fiscal 
illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions variables across different forms of government.
LEVIATHAN
Municipalities
Decentralization. Table 6.11 presents coefficients for decentralization and the corresponding 
one-tailed probability values. The decentralization hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between 
decentralization and government expenditures. There is a striking difference in the marginal effect of 
decentralization across mayor-council and council-manager governments in each sample. In the West 
(Table 6.11 DC) and Midwest (Table 6.11 FC), mayor-council governments provide support for the 
decentralization hypothesis while in the South (Table 6 .1 1 IC), council-manager governments provide 
support for the decentralization hypothesis. We conclude that decentralization tends to constrain 
expenditures in mayor-council governments in the West and Midwest and council-manager 
governments in the South.
Fragmentation. Table 6.12 presents the coefficients for fragmentation for each metropolitan 
municipal sample and the corresponding one-tailed probability values. The fragmentation hypothesis 
also predicts an inverse relationship: greater horizontal competition decreases government 
expenditures. We find differences across types of governments in the marginal effects of fragmentation
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Table 6.11.
B
H
icipal Decentralization Coefficients
A B C
Model:
Regionally
Pooled
MC
n -
180
2
-.315
.030
CM 339 -.015
.412
CO 11 1.321
.943
West
M C 14 -15.71**
.001
CVI 108 .145
.845
M idwest
MC 135 -.600*
.022
CM 115 .357
.931
South
MC 31 .006
.516
CM 116 -.163*
.037
Notes: • too few degrees o f freedom.
One-tailed t-tests.
Probability values follow estimates.* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 6.12. Municipal Fragmentation Coefficients
A B C
Model: 2
n -
Regionally
Pooled
A MC  180 -.104
.062
B CM 339 .017
.635
C CO 11 -.291
.278
D
West
MC 14 .260
.702
E CM 108 .133
.905
F
M idwest
MC 135 -.131
.147
G CM 115 -.058
.323
H
South
MC 31 -.119*
.037
I CM 116 .017
.589
Notes: - too few degrees of freedom.
One-tailed t-tests.
Probability values follow estimates.* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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in the South. Southern mayor-council governments (Table 6.12 HC) support the fragmentation 
hypothesis while council-manager governments do not (Table 6.12 IQ . Greater fragmentation 
constrains Southern mayor-council government per capita expenditures but not Southern council- 
manager government per capita expenditures.
Discussion
We discover several results which were not previously apparent by breaking down each 
sample by organizational form of government Comparing the decentralization coefficients from the 
stratified samples (Table 6.11) to the decentralization coefficients from the pooled samples (Table 
4.2), we reveal support for the decentralization hypothesis by mayor-council governments in the West 
and Midwest and council-manager governments in the South. Therefore, we find evidence consistent 
with leviathan model assumptions where we had previously found none.
It is reasonable that greater fragmentation (Table 6.12) affects mayor-council and council- 
manager governments differently because city managers may have more solidarity with neighboring 
city managers than mayors have with neighboring mayors due to membership in professional 
organizations. This may lead to more collusion among council-manager municipalities, and therefore, 
relatively more competition among mayor-council municipalities. This distinction may explain the 
support for the fragmentation hypothesis in Southern mayor-council municipalities and the lack of 
support for the fragmentation hypothesis in Southern council-manager municipalities. If this rationale 
rings true, however, we should see similar differences in the West and Midwest.
We find evidence supporting the leviathan model o f government through both the 
decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses in Southern municipalities. It is interesting that 
evidence for leviathan is not consistent across types of government. Southern council-manager 
governments support the decentralization hypothesis while it is Southern mayor-council governments 
which support the fragmentation hypothesis.
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Counties
Decentralization. Table 6.13 presents the decentralization coefficients for counties and the 
corresponding one-tailed probability values. We find negative coefficients on the decentralization 
parameters in each council-commission sample. In both the regionally pooled (Table 6.13 BC) and 
Southern samples (Table 6.13 HC), greater decentralization constrains council-commission 
government per capita expenditures, while greater decentralization also tends to constrain Midwestern 
(Table 6.13 FC) council-commission government expenditures.7 In the West, however, it is council- 
administrator governments (Table 6.13 CC) that provide support for the decentralization hypothesis 
rather than council-commission governments (Table 6.13 DC).
Fragmentation. Table 6.14 presents the fragmentation coefficients for each county sample 
and the corresponding one-tailed probability values. In only one case do we find significance o f the 
fragmentation variable. Coefficients for council-administrator governments follow the predictions of 
the fragmentation hypothesis in the South. This result is consistent with the prediction of a leviathan 
model of government.
Discussion
Separating the samples yields new insights in the case of county decentralization variables. 
Each pooled sample (Table 4.4) has no significant parameters. However, when we sort the samples by 
type of government (Table 6.13), we find the following: council-commission governments provide 
support for the decentralization hypothesis for the Southern and regionally pooled samples and 
Western council-administrator governments support the decentralization hypothesis. Therefore, we 
find support for the leviathan model of government for council-commission governments in the South; 
and council-administrator governments in the West
Sorting each sample by organizational form of government is also important because, in some 
cases, we discover what drives the results in the pooled samples. Comparing the fragmentation 
coefficients horn Table 6.14 (G Q  to those in Table 4.5 (Row D), we learn that the council-
7 Midwest model 5 shows the significance of decentralization at the 5 percent level.
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Table 6.13. County Decentralization Coefficients
B
H
A B C
Model:
Regionally
Pooled
CE
n=
15
2
-1.508**
.004
CC 69 -.695**
.002
West
CA 25 -.593*
.023
CC 11 -1.418
.342
Midwest
CA 26 2.052
.993
CC 25 -.773
.057
South
CA 31 .891
.999
CC 33 -1.000**
.003
Notes: - too few degrees of freedom.
One-tailed t-tests.
Probability values follow estimates.* p < .05. ** p < .01.
109
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 6.14. C oun ty  Fragmentation Coefficients on Fragmentation
A B C
Model: 2
n=
Regionally
Pooled
A CE 15 .330
.988
B CC 69 .108
.824
C
West
CA 25 -.075
.174
D CC 11 .995
.934
E
Midwest
CA 26 .052
.577
F CC 25 -.034
.407
G
South
CA 31 -.473**
.000
H CC 33 .501
.958
Notes: • too few degrees of freedom.
One-tailed t-tests.
Probability values follow estimates.* p < .05. ** p < .01.
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administrator sample drives the strong support for the fragmentation hypothesis in the South. It is also 
interesting that we find evidence supporting the leviathan model through both decentralization and 
fragmentation for Southern counties, as is the case for Southern municipalities. Again, however, we 
find the support for the leviathan model of government is not consistent across types of governments. 
Southern council-administrator governments support the decentralization hypothesis while it is 
Southern council-commission governments which support the fragmentation hypothesis.
FISCAL ILLUSION
Recall that Table 4.6 shows the possible types of fiscal illusion. Turnbull (1998) shows that 
information on both the output effect and the flypaper effect determine the type of fiscal illusion 
present in the data. We measure the output effect of budget complexity by using a t-test on the joint 
effect of the coefficients on ItiTXCON) and in^EXCON) . The following explains the fiscal illusion 
possibilities: The combination of significantly negative t-statistics and a flypaper effect support Oates’ 
traditional fiscal illusion—individuals underestimate the marginal tax price of government services 
because of the existence of intergovernmental aid; Significantly negative t-statistics without a flypaper 
effect supports Oates' traditional fiscal illusion notion combined with tax price and/or benefits 
uncertainty fiscal illusion; Significantly positive t-statistics in addition to a flypaper effect supports 
Turnbull’s tax price uncertainty fiscal illusion; Significantly positive t-statistics without a flypaper 
effect supports Turnbull's benefit uncertainty fiscal illusion; Absence of significant joint effect in 
conjunction with a flypaper effect supports uncertainty fiscal illusion partially offset by traditional 
fiscal illusion; and finally, absence of both a significant joint effect and a flypaper effect suggests full 
information or no fiscal illusion.
Municipalities
Table 6.15 provides the results o f t-tests of the fiscal illusion output and flypaper effects for 
each municipal sample. We find no major differences across types of governments with regard to fiscal 
illusion parameters. Both the mayor-council and council-manager samples for each municipal
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Table 6.15. Municipal t-tests of the Joint Effect of Fiscal Illusion Variables
and Flypaper Effects
A B C
Model: 3
n=
Regionally
Pooled
A MC 180 -.693
.489
B Flypaper: 20.842**
C CM 339 -1.652
.100
D Flypaper: 47.695**
E CO 11 -2.023
.108
F Flypaper: 27.439
West
G M C 14 2.037
.081
H Flypaper: 70.262**
I CM 108 -1.502
.136
J Flypaper: 7.495**
(table con’d)
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KL
M
N
A
Model:
Midwest
B
n=
MC  135 
Flypaper:
CM  115 
Flypaper:_______
South
0 MC
p Flypaper:
Q CM
R Flypaper:
C
3
-.687
.493
13.570**
-1.551
.124
13.118**
.383
.705
11.670
-.560
.577
79.324*
Notes: - too few degrees of freedom.
Probability values follow t-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
One-tailed t-tests for flypaper effects.
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sample show uncertainty fiscal illusion (due to insignificant joint t-statistics) in conjunction with 
traditional fiscal illusion (due to the positive flypaper effects).
Counties
Table 6.16 provides the results o f t-tests of the joint effect of the fiscal illusion parameters and 
flypaper effects for each county sample. We find no differences across types of governments in the 
West or regionally pooled samples. The Midwest and South, however, do provide different fiscal 
illusion conclusions for council-administrator and council-commission governments. In Midwestern 
council-administrator governments (Table 6.16 IC, JC) there is strong support for uncertainty fiscal 
illusion due to the significantly positive joint effect and the absence of a flypaper effect, while 
Midwestern council-commission governments (Table 6.16 K.C, LC) show no evidence of fiscal 
illusion. In the South, council-administrator governments have a tendency to support traditional fiscal 
illusion when leviathan variables are in the model8 and provide no evidence o f a flypaper effect The 
Southern council-commission sample estimates are very different than Southern council-administrator 
estimates. F irst we find a strong tendency for the joint effect of the fiscal illusion variables to be 
significantly positive.9 Second, we find a flypaper effect 
Discussion
Separating the samples by council-administrator and council-commission allows us to find 
evidence of fiscal illusion which was not found in Chapter IV’s analysis. We find positive and 
significant t-statistics for Midwest council-administrator and Southern council-commission samples. 
We also find significant negative t-statistics in  the Southern council-administrator sample when 
leviathan variables are present. Additionally, we also find that in every region, council-commission 
government support a flypaper effect while in every sample, council-administrator governments do 
not.
8 The joint t-statistics for Southern CA models 5 and 8 are significantly negative at the 1 percent level.
9 The joint t-statistics for Southern CC models 5 ,7 , and 8 are significantly positive at the 5 percent 
level.
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Table 6.16. County t-tests of the Joint Effect of Fiscal Illusion Variables
and Flypaper Effects
A B C
Model: 3
n=
Regionally
Pooled
A CE 15 .439
.676
B Flypaper: 14.117*
C CC 69 .953
.345
D Flypaper: 33.143*
West
E CA 25 -.259
.798
F Flypaper: 2.267
G CC 11 .094
.930
H Flypaper: 15.099
(table con’d)
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A B C
Model: 3
n=
Midwest
1 CA 26 4.785**
.000
J Flypaper: 4.455
K CC 25 -1.498
.151
L Flypaper: -.326
South
M CA 31 -1.394
.176
N Flypaper: -11.320
0 CC 33 1.856
.075
P Flypaper: 83.746*
Notes: - too few degrees of freedom.
Probability values follow t-statistics. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
One-tailed t-tests for flypaper effects.
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OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS
Hypothesizing about the reasons for differences of the effects of different organizational forms 
of governments is very difficult in this case due to the number of different types of county governments 
which one form of municipal government can meet, e.g., mayor-council municipality and council- 
administrator county, mayor-council municipality and council-elected executive county, or mayor- 
council municipality and council-commission county.10 The same problem applies when the 
dependent variable is county per capita expenditures. Again, we offer these estimates as a first step 
toward understanding the relationships.
Municipalities
Coefficients on per capita county expenditures ln(EXP^ /e) provide the basis for conclusions on
the differences in the strategic relationship between counties and municipalities when the municipality 
takes the mayor-council or council-manager form. Table 6.17 presents the overlapping jurisdictions 
coefficients for municipalities. Complementary relationships exist between per capita county 
expenditures and per capita municipal expenditures for both mayor-council and council-manager 
municipalities for the regionally pooled sample (Table 6.17 AC, BC). In the West (Table 6.17 CC, 
DC), we find that making comparisons is difficult because of inconsistent signs on the coefficients."
In the South (Table 6.16 GC, HC), both mayor-council and council-manager municipal per capita 
expenditures have insignificant overlapping jurisdictions coefficients, supporting an unrelated 
relationship. The main difference across types o f governments exists in the Midwest (Table 6.16 EC, 
FC). In the Midwest a complementary relationship exists in mayor-council municipalities while an 
unrelated relationship exists in council-manager municipalities.
Counties
Table 6.18 presents the interdependent demand coefficients for counties. We find a 
complementary relationship between municipal per capita expenditures and county per capita
10 This is also the case when explaining the differences in the effects on decentralization.
11 West MC models 6 and 8 have significantly negative overlapping jurisdictions coefficients at the 5 
percent level.
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Table 6.17. Municipal Overlapping Jurisdiction Coefficients
A B C
Model:
Regionally
Pooled
MC
n=
180
4
.265**
.000
CM 339 .072*
.040
West
MC 14 1.586
.061
CM 108 -.037
.782
Midwest
MC 135 .299**
.003
CM 115 -.010
.909
South
MC 31 .060
.457
CM 116 .091
.074
Notes: Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 6.18. County Overlapping Jurisdiction Coefficients
A B C
Model:
Regionally
Pooled
CE
n=
15
4
.415
.134
CC 69 .772**
.000
West
CA 25 .053
.851
CC 11 .566
.396
Midwest
CA 26 -.183
.504
CC 25 .723**
.002
South
CA 31 .473
.203
CC 33 .889**
.002
Notes: Probability values follow estimates. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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expenditures for council-commission counties in the regionally pooled (Table 6.18 BC), Midwestern 
(Table 6.16 FC), and Southern (Table 6.16 HC) samples. Differences across types of governments exist 
for both the Midwestern and the Southern samples. In both regions, council-commission municipal per 
capita expenditures exhibit a complementary relationship with county per capita expenditures. On the 
other hand, council-administration counties in both regions display an unrelated relationship. We find 
no difference in the Western council-administrator and council-commission samples: both exhibit an 
unrelated relationship.
Discussion
Table 4.9 reports the coefficients for overlapping jurisdictions for the pooled municipal 
samples. By sorting the samples into mayor-council and council-manager forms of government, we 
unmask the tendency of Western mayor-council per capita expenditures to be substitutes to Western 
county per capita expenditures. Additionally, we find that it is the mayor-council sample which drives 
the Midwestern pooled result of a strategic complementary relationship with Midwestern county per 
capita expenditures.
Separating the pooled samples (Table 4.12) by type of government allows us to expose the 
patterns among county council-administrator and council-commission governments. In every region 
council-administrator governments display an unrelated strategic relationship. In the regionally 
pooled, Midwestern, and Southern samples, council-commission governments display a strong 
complementary relationship with municipal per capita expenditures. Further, we find that it is the 
council-commission samples which drive the conclusions of the pooled samples in the Midwest (Table 
4.12 Row C) and South (Table 4.12 Row D).
CONCLUSION
The public administration reform movement advocates the adoption of the council- 
manager/council-administrator form of government over the mayor-council/council-executive and 
commission/council-commission forms. Debate about the effects of a council-manager form continues 
today. This chapter explores the differences in per capita expenditure levels and the effects on
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leviathan, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions parameters. This chapter contributes to the 
literature on different organizational forms of local government in several different ways. First, this 
research updates and extends the work of Booms (1966) and Deno and Mehay (1987). Second, this 
chapter presents the first empirical regression analysis on the different forms of county governments. 
Third, the analysis incorporates the leviathan, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses 
into the context of different organizational forms of government.
We find that when only considering the demand factors (model 1) of local government 
service, the three different organizational forms of government behave similarly for the municipal 
Midwest and Southern regions and for the regionally pooled and Midwestern samples of counties. In 
these cases we pool the samples across organizational form o f government: mayor-council, council- 
manager, and commission for municipalities and council-elected executive, council-administrator, and 
council-commission for counties. By pooling and using dummy variables, we conclude that 
commission forms have significantly higher per capita expenditures than that of mayor-council and 
council-manager forms in Midwest municipalities, but this difference docs not exist in Southern 
municipalities. Additionally, we establish that council-elected executive forms have significantly 
higher per capita expenditures than council-administrator and council-commission forms of 
government. These findings are the first of their kind. We also find that by adding supply factors 
(models 2-8) significant structural differences appear in at least one o f the three samples, prohibiting 
the pooling o f all three samples in most cases.
We then followed the pattern of Booms (1966) and Deno and Mehay (1987) of considering 
only the most prevalent types of governments: mayor-council and council-manager forms for 
municipalities and council-administrator and council-commission forms for counties. Our results 
support the findings of Deno and Mehay: no significant difference exists between mayor-council and 
council-manager governments. For the county layer, we do find a significant difference between 
council-administrator and council-commission forms of government in the West: county per capita
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expenditures are significantly higher in council-administrator governments. However, the Midwest 
sample of counties shows no significant difference in the two samples.
Stratifying each sample by organizational form of government proves to be an important 
contribution. First, we discover several results by breaking down each sample which were not 
previously apparent, and second, in some cases we discover what drives the results of the pooled 
samples presented in Chapter IV. We find support for the fragmentation hypothesis in Southern 
mayor-council and council-administrator samples. We learn that the strong support for the 
fragmentation hypothesis in the pooled Southern county sample (Chapter IV) is driven by Southern 
council-administrator governments. We find support for the decentralization hypothesis in each region 
for both municipalities and counties. Unfortunately, the results are not consistent across types of 
governments or regions. Therefore, we find support for the leviathan model of government in each 
region, though no general patterns emerge. This conclusion supports our conclusions in Chapter IV 
that the evidence for a leviathan model of government is not pervasive, but is prevalent
We conclude that no differences exist across types of municipal governments for fiscal 
illusion. At the county layer we find differences across types of governments in the Midwest and 
South. However, the only pattern we find with respect to fiscal illusion is that council-commission 
governments support a flypaper efTea while council-administrator governments do no t This explains 
the inconsistency in the county flypaper effects reported in Chapter IV.
At the county layer we find that council-administrator governments exhibit an unrelated 
relationship between municipal and county per capita expenditures while council-commission 
governments exhibit a complementary relationship between municipal per capita expenditures and 
county per capita expenditures in the Midwest and South. Looking at the differences across types of 
governments in overlapping jurisdictions variables, we find the tendency of Western mayor-council 
government per capita to be a substitute for Western county per capita expenditures. This is the only 
time our results show a substitute relationship between municipal and county expenditures. In this 
case, symmetry does not hold. Additionally, we find that it is the mayor-council sample which drives
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the Midwestern pooled result of a strategic complementary relationship with Midwestern county per 
capita expenditures.
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CHAPTER VH 
CONCLUSIONS
Understanding the fiscal behavior of subnational governments is increasingly important as 
fiscal responsibilities are devolved. In order to get a clearer picture of subnational government 
behavior, we employ local government data and perform tests o f the fragmentation, decentralization, 
fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions hypotheses. Each model seeks to explain differences in 
the size of government across jurisdictions. We conclude that our research does contribute to a better 
understanding of fiscal behavior of municipal and county governments in metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan areas and across different forms of governments in the Western, Midwestern, and 
Southern regions of the United States.
This dissertation makes the first attempt at empirically merging the leviaiiian, fiscal illusion, 
and overlapping jurisdictions models of government. The focus of this study is to bring together the 
different strands of literature in order to determine whether any of the separate effects of the 
fragmentation, decentralization, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions reinforce or offset each 
other. Our theoretical model predicts that failing to control for the vertical relationship between a 
municipality and a county leads to overestimated parameters. We predict that models controlling for 
the overlapping jurisdictions variables will result in smaller (absolute value) estimates of 
fragmentation, decentralization, and fiscal illusion or reduced significance of the parameters. In ten of 
the fourteen instances that we find significance in either fragmentation, decentralization, or fiscal 
illusion variables, the estimates follow the predictions of our model. In some cases, the significance 
disappears. We conclude that controlling for the overlapping jurisdictions relationship is important in 
order to obtain unbiased coefficients.
We use a cross-sectional data set of corresponding municipal and county governments in the 
Western, Midwestern, and Southern regions of the United States. This is the first study to examine the 
behavior of corresponding municipal and county governments. In doing so, we solve the empirical 
problem of unbalanced samples due to the one-to-many county-to-municipality relationship. Our
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analysis employs a median voter model, uses ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares where 
appropriate, and presents White’s (1980) hetcroskedastic consistent standard errors.
This is the first study to examine the differences in local government fiscal behavior across 
regions of the United States. Breaking the data into regions is an important contribution due to the 
many differences we find in expenditure behavior. Using the median voter model, we find that 
government expenditure behavior is similar across the Western, Midwestern, and Southern regions for 
both the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan samples and the metropolitan county sample. However, 
after adding “supply-side” variables to the model, we find that, in many cases, regionally pooling is 
inappropriate. Regionally pooling when it is appropriate, we find both municipal and county 
expenditures in the West to be significantly higher than expenditures in the Midwest and South.
This is also the first study that examines local government fiscal behavior across metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan areas. As in the case of regionally pooling, we find expenditure behavior is 
similar across municipal metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas when using the median voter model. 
This does not hold for counties. Additionally, we find that adding the “supply-side” factors makes 
pooling across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas inappropriate in many cases. We also find 
differences across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan expenditure behavior due to the presence of 
fragmentation, decentralization, fiscal illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions relationship for each 
county sample. We also gain insight on the differences across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
expenditures due to the presence of fragmentation and overlapping jurisdictions for each municipal 
sample.
Further, this research is the first to examine the fiscal behavior of different types of local 
governments at both municipal and county layers and, additionally, in the context of leviathan, fiscal 
illusion, and overlapping jurisdictions models. In stratifying the samples according to the type of 
organizational government, we find municipal commission governments have significantly higher 
expenditures than mayor-council or council-manager governments in the Midwest We find no 
significant difference exists in the expenditure behavior of mayor-council and council-manager
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governments supporting the conclusions of the existing public finance literature on this topic. We 
present the first regression results stratifying county governments by form of government In the 
Midwest we find council-executive governments have significantly higher expenditures than council- 
administrator and council-commission governments. In the West, we find council-executive and 
council-administrator governments have significantly higher expenditures than council-commission 
governments, which does not support the public administration argument that types of governments 
with professional administrators are relatively more efficient than other forms of governments.
LEVIATHAN
Does decentralization constrain the size of local government?
We do not find consistent support for the decentralization hypothesis until breaking down the 
samples by types of organizational form. In doing so we find that greater decentralization constrains 
municipal expenditures in mayor-council governments in the West and Midwest and in council- 
manager governments in the South. Additionally, we find greater decentralization constrains county 
government expenditures in council-administrator governments in the West and council-commission 
governments in (lie South.
Does fragmentation constrain the size of local government?
We find at least some evidence supporting the fragmentation hypothesis in each municipal 
region. In the municipal nonmetropolitan West and the municipal Southern sample of mayor- 
councils, coefficients support the fragmentation hypothesis. In the municipal Midwestern sample, 
slope dummy variables support the fragmentation hypothesis.
We find much stronger support for the firagmentation hypothesis at the county layer. In each 
region, we find evidence supporting the fragmentation hypothesis in metropolitan areas. In both the 
West and Midwest, greater competition among all governments in the county reduces county 
expenditures while in the South, greater competition among county governments in the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area reduces county expenditures. We also learn that the nonmetropolitan Western county 
sample supports the fragmentation hypothesis and that it is council-administrator governments driving
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the support for horizontal fragmentation in the Southern metropolitan sample. We conclude that 
greater competition among governments docs tend to constrain county government expenditures in 
metropolitan areas.
Conclusions on Leviathan
Though we find support for both the decentralization and fragmentation hypotheses in each 
municipal region, it is rarely in a  consistent pattern. We find more evidence of behavior consistent 
with a leviathan at the county layer rather than at the municipal layer. This is not surprising due to 
the relatively fewer substitutes available to residents of a county, compared to the relatively greater 
number of substitutes available to residents of a municipality. This means that county residents have 
relatively less choice than do municipal residents, and therefore, county governments tend to have 
more monopoly power than municipal governments.
FISCAL ILLUSION 
Does budgetary complexity affect the size of government?
We find no evidence that budgetary complexity significantly affects the size of municipal 
governments. In each sample, the output effect, i. e., the joint t-test, is insignificant. However, we do 
find evidence of a flypaper effect, an increase in the median voter’s share of intergovernmental aid 
given directly to the local government increases government expenditures more than an equivalent 
increase in the median voter’s income because “money sticks where it hits,” in each municipal region.
At the county layer, we do find some evidence that budgetary complexity significantly affects 
the size of government, though there is no consistent pattern. The lack o f a consistent pattern with 
respect to the fiscal illusion results is expected. Turnbull (1998) notes that we should expect output 
and flypaper effects to vary across governments with different levels of fiscal structure complexity. We 
find the joint t-test of the fiscal illusion variables to be significa ntly positive in  the nonmetropolitan 
Midwest, metropolitan Midwestern council-administrator, and metropolitan Southern council- 
commission samples. The joint effect is significantly negative in only one sample: metropolitan 
Southern council-administrator.
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Our main fiscal illusion finding is the difference in the extent of the flypaper effects across 
municipal and county samples. Municipal samples display a  flypaper effect while the flypaper effect is 
much less prevalent at the county layer. We conclude that benefits uncertainty fiscal illusion, which 
does not predict a flypaper effect, is stronger at the county layer. This is not a surprising finding. 
Counties are often referred to as “the forgotten governments” because county governments are less 
visible than municipal governments. Therefore, individuals are likely to have greater uncertainty on 
the benefits of county government services relative to the benefits of municipal government services.
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS 
Does the overlapping jurisdictions relationship affect the size of government?
In all but one case, we find symmetry in the overlapping jurisdictions relationships, i. e., 
changes in county expenditures affect municipal expenditures in the same way that changes in 
municipal expenditures affect county expenditures. We find symmetric strategic relationships in 
nonmetropolitan West, metropolitan Midwest, and metropolitan Southern samples. In each case, we 
find a complementary relationship. That is, an increase in the expenditures of one layer leads to an 
increase in the expenditures of the other layer, enlarging the size of the public sector. In only one 
case, the metropolitan Western mayor-council sample, do we find any evidence of a substitute 
relationship. We conclude that the federal structure, which was intended to increase the competition 
of a party system, may result in collusion among elected officials, leading to larger local public sectors.
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APPENDIX I 
DERIVATION OF BEST RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS
Consider the case o f municipality B : The median voter’s utility function is represented by 
the following regular s tria  quasi concave utility function,
U b = U \ x \ E bm,E bc ) (A l.l)
where U b is the utility of the median voter in municipality B , x 6 is his private consumption, £* is
his municipal public good consumption, and E b is his county public good consumption. Public good 
consumption depends on the congestability of the service, therefore
£ i  and £ .* = “ %  <AU)
where EXPb is the total municipal spending in B , nbm is the total population in B , EXPe is the total
county spending, and n c is the total population in the county, a  and p are the congestion 
parameters, where 0 < a ,p  < 1. If either parameter equals 1, then the public service is considered a 
pure private good, while if either parameter equals 0, then the public service is considered a pure 
public good.
The median voter is faced with an income constraint,
mb = x b +T* + T b (A1.3)
where mb is the median voter’s income, Tb is the tax bill he pays to the municipality, and 7]? is the tax 
bill he pays to the county. In addition, the municipality receives intergovernmental aid from higher 
levels of government, A bm. The municipal median voter’s municipal tax bill is equal to his marginal 
tax rate multiplied by expenditures minus aid,
Tb = sbm{EXPb - A bm)
or equivalently,
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T6 = s bm((*bm)a £ b - A b ) (A1.4)
where sbm is the municipal median voter's marginal tax price of municipal services. The municipal 
median voter’s county tax bill is a function of his county marginal tax price sb , the population of the 
county nc, the county expenditures E bc , and the intergovernmental aid the county receives A c ,
Tb = Tb(sb,ne,E b,A e) .  (A1.5)
Following Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) we assume that an increase in the municipal median 
voter’s county marginal tax rate increases the municipal median voter's county tax bill, * %  > 0 - an
increase in county spending raises his county tax bill, drry{E» > 0, and an increase in
intergovernmental aid received by the county decreases his county tax bill, < 0.
Substituting (A1.4) and (A1.5) into (A1.3) gives
mb = x6 + sbm((nbm)a E ^ - A b ) + TbCsb,ne ,E b ,A e ), 
rearranging gives the following,
f»b + & A b ~ T b(sb,nc,E e,A c) = xb +sb (nb )a E b. (A1.6)
Municipality B  ’s problem is to maximize the median voter’s utility (A l.l)  subject to (A1.6). Solving 
the constraint for x b and plugging it into the utility function (A l.l) we can simplify the problem, 
xb =rnb ^ ^ mA bm - T bc - 5 bm{nbmt E bm 
Municipality B ’s augmented problem becomes:
max Ub = U b(mb +sbAbm - T cb - s bm(nbm)* E bm,E bm,E bc ).
Maximizing this gives the first order condition,
r ‘  =  ( - ^ ( » ; ) “ ) " X * + a % * . = a  CA1.7)
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8E* /Applying the implicit function rule, we obtain the following derivatives: nnd
* % ■
%  is the second derivative of the municipal problem and represents the Jacobian, J m, of 
the system. It is negative by maximization of a regular strict quasi concave function: 
jm  = %  = -2 ^ (« » ) a + C /1  < 0
where £/* = 3U%  and UtJ = a*lji/4 ldr
The first step in understanding how the municipal median voter’s demand for municipal 
spending changes when exogenous factors change is to obtain the effect of a change in income, m b .
^ /L  = tfminbm F U bB t- U bm' ) I J m 
Assuming that municipal spending is a normal good, the effect of an increase in the municipal median 
voter’s income results in an increase in his demand for municipal public spending.
The municipal tax share effect simplifies to the following:
dE'my  U n l r u t /  b (nb , a . E b ,dE 'm/  1
/ S s m~ \  / j "  m ’ /d m ")
in which we can identify the traditional substitution and income effects found in the literature. Both 
terms are negative, which means that an increase in the municipal median voter’s tax price leads to a 
decrease in his quantity demand for municipal expenditures.
To introduce fragmentation, we add a shift parameter, 6 ,  where ar% j < 0 , i.e., as 
fragmentation in each area increases, expenditures in each municipality fall. This analysis can be 
extended to consider the case for the municipality with endogenous county spending and the county 
with endogenous municipal spending.
BEST RESPONSE FUNCTION ANALYSIS 
We can define best response functions given the first order conditions of the simultaneous 
county and municipal maximization problem:
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Municipal Reaction Function: £* = <|>m(£* ,9  ) which is defined by r m(£m,£c,0) = 0
County Reaction Function: E * = <j>c(£ * ) which is defined by Te(Em,E e) = 0.
The next step is to determine the relative slopes of the reaction functions on a graph with 
municipal expenditures on the horizontal axis and county expenditures on the vertical axis. The slope 
of the municipal reaction function is,
0 % . ) * -  = -  < * % . ) / ( * % )  (A1.8),
and the slope of the county reaction function is,
C % . V  = -  (a% . }A a% c )  • (A!.9)
The Jacobian of the system is,
a r /  ar*/_ /a s . / se€
where the Jacobian, J , is negative definite by the Hicksian stability condition. Therefore, \ J X | must 
be less than zero and | must be greater than zero: \JX | = er/aEm < 0 by second order conditions,
and |y2| = {drmA ^ v‘A ^  ~ { ^ /d E c ^ A m ) > 0 ^  Lipschitz’s condition: the direct effects outweigh
the indirect effects. Therefore,
( * % .) ( < % .)  CAl.10)
Both left hand side terms are negative by second order conditions and the signs of the right hand side 
terms depend upon the strategic relationship between municipal and county spending demands.
[dr/3E')’ ( ^ A m j > 0 when 310 complements, and (3r" A ) ,  (ar' A . ) < 0 when 816 substitutes.
Rearranging (A1.10) to obtain (A1.8) and (A1.9) and determining the appropriate signs gives us the 
relative slopes of the best reaction functions.
To find the effect of fragmentation on expenditures, we take the total differential and using 
Cramer’s Rule, we find the effect on municipal expenditures,
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= -(^"/seX^/aB.) / \j21X  0, 
where (ar/^e) < 0, (ai/ a r J  < 0, and |J z | > 0. We find the effect on county expenditures to be,
aS^  = - ( r t ) ( a% J / | ^ 2|)
which is negative when municipal and county expenditures are complements, and is positive when 
they are substitutes.
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APPENDIX n  
2SLS METHODOLOGY
The use of two-stage least squares to obtain estimates for both the municipal and county 
equations is another contribution this paper makes. The municipal-to-county relationship is a one-to- 
many relationship. That is, for each county there is more than one municipality. Therefore, the 
number of observations for the municipality data set does not equal the number of observations in the 
county data set. This is not a problem when the dependent variable is municipal expenditures. In this 
case, the same county information, e.g. income, aid, population, TXCON , and EXCON , can be 
repeated for each municipality in that particular county. On the other hand, when county expenditures 
is the dependent variable, we can only use information on one municipality on the right-hand side. 
Tliis paper presents results of choosing the municipality on the basis of median household income. The 
municipality that is kept is the municipality which has the median value in the county of median 
household income.
Two-stage least squares is desirable because it is an equation by equation estimator which 
allows us to keep as much information as possible. We want to estimate the following system:
>'™=ai>'c + ^ i P m +em (A2.1)
y e =a-2ym + X £ e + e c (A2.2)
where in the regionally pooled sample y m is a (530 x 1) vector holding municipal per capita common 
expenditures EXP"/n.  , y c is a (166 x 1) vector holding county per capita common expenditures ,
.V, is a (530 x 13) matrix of exogenous variables, and X 2 is a (166 x 13) matrix of exogenous
variables. y m and y c are endogenously determined and are therefore correlated with the errors, e m 
and e c , respectively.
We use two-stage least squares to get an estimate of “ V ,  that is not correlated with an
/  f t
error. Stage one for equation (A.2.1) is to obtain the reduced form parameters o f (A2.2):
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y c = X eI lc +vc ,
where X t  is a (166 x 20) matrix of all the exogenous variables in the system, nc is a vector of 
parameters of all the exogenous variables in the system, and v e is an error term. We get the estimated
parameters by applying OLS: n c = ( X c X c)~' X cy e and the predicted values of fi* % , y e , are:
y e = * m n c
where X m is a (530 x 20) matrix o f all the exogenous variables. The resulting values of y c now 
contain information on each o f the municipal observations and can be used as a right hand side 
variable because each is no longer correlated with the error term, e c . Stage two for equation (A2.1) 
is:
-Vm — Zm&m +
where Zm is [.pe| *Y,] • The two-stage least squares estimator is 5 m = (Z'„Zm)~l Z'my m.
The estimated covariance matrix of 5m is the following: 
c6v(5m) = a ^ (Z ;Z (B) -1
In order to obtain estimated standard errors using standard equations we must have the true 
Z m matrix:
= 0 'm - Z „ 8 m)'ty* - Z m8 j / ( t - k )  
where Z m is [_yc|A'1] where y c is a (166 x 1) vector of true y c values and X { is a (530 x 13).
Therefore, the true Z„ matrix is non-conformable. We define Z cm as where X \  is a (166x
13) matrix which contains the median municipality within each county. We can now obtain 
= Cv«- Z $ my t f m- Z cJ>m) / ( t - k )  
where y c„ is a  (166 x 1) vector containing municipal expenditure data corresponding to the median 
municipality in the county and t  is 166.
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Again, we employ two-stage least squares in order to arrive at an estimate of EXP"/nm that is
not correlated with an error term. Stage one for equation (A2.2) is to obtain the reduced form 
parameters of (A2.1):
ym ~ ^m^-m ^m
where X m is a (530 x 20) matrix of all the exogenous variables in the system, n m is a vector of 
parameters of all the exogenous variables in the system, and vm is an error term. We get the estimated 
parameters by applying OLS: n m = X'my n and the predicted values of EXP"/I.  , y m,
are:
y m = x mh m
where X m is defined as above and y m is a (530 x 1) matrix. In order to make y m conformable to 
equation (A2.2) we must again keep only the observations where the municipality is the median 
municipality in the county and we are then left with y cm which is (166 x 1). The resulting values of 
y cm can now be used as a right hand side variable because they are no longer correlated with the error 
term, e„ . Stage two for equation (A2.2) is:
y e = z
where Zc is |y^|.V 2]. The two-stage least squares estimator is 5 c ={Z'eZc)~xZ'cy c .
The estimated covariance matrix o f 8 C is: 
cov(8 c) = &\(Z'eZ c)~x.
In order to obtain estimated standard errors using standard equations we must have the true Zc matrix:
= CVc -  Z cK) ' (ye  -  ZeSc)/(f -  *) 
where Zc is [ym|-V2] where y m is a (530 x 1) vector of actual y m values and X z is a (166 x 13).
Again, the true Ze matrix is non-conformable. We define Z" as ^  | A% J and we can now obtain
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6 1 =  {ye -  Z*8 c)'Cye -  ZcmSc)/(r -  k)
where t is 166.
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APPENDIX m  
DURBIN-WU-HAUSMAN TEST FOR ENDOGENEITY
As stated in Chapter III, the DWH allows us to test the effects of possible endogeneity. 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest the use o f this test when “economic theory suggest that 
certain explanatory variables could be endogenous, but does not unambiguously indicate that they arc, 
and does not say whether their correlation with the error terms is likely to be great enough that using 
least squares will result in serious bias” (237). The Hausman (1978) Specification Error Test tests the 
orthogonality of the design matrix and the error.
ffo- / 'to n  Z j -  = 0
H\ '■ plim  *  0
where X  is the usual design matrix, e the error term, and T  the number of observations. The OLS 
estimator, fiOLS is consistent and efficient under the null hypothesis and inconsistent under the
alternate hypothesis. P2.sls *s consistent, though not efficient, under both the null and the alternate 
hypotheses. The test statistic is based on a vector o f contrasts, i.e., a vector of differences between two 
vectors of estimates, one (2SLS) which is consistent under weaker conditions than the other (OLS).
The vector of contrasts idea was first proposed by Durbin and Wu presented tests similar to those of 
Hausman, therefore, Davidson and MacKinnon term the test Durbin-Wu-Hausman (237).
Implementing the test as Hausman (1978) proposes is sometimes precluded due to the 
inability to invert the covariance matrix of the vector of contrasts when it is not full rank, as is the case 
in this research. Davidson and MacKinnon show that using artificial regressions (which do not 
require inversion) is equivalent to using the vector of contrasts approach. They show that the vector of 
contrasts reduces to the following:
&2SLS- Pols = (X 'P wX)~x X ' P v M x y
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where Pw = W(W'\V)~XW'  and W  is the matrix of instrumental variables and M x  =
I - X ( X ' X ) ~ xX ' . Suppose the following: let A: be the number of columns in IF which are also in
X  and k  * be the number of columns in W  which are not in jf .  In our case k* = 1 because we only 
have one endogenous variable.
Because (X ’PwX ) ~ x will take the same value under both estimators it will have no effect on 
any test statistic based on differences in the estimators. The presence of M x  eliminates all columns of 
PiVX  that are instruments:
X '  Pw M x y  = X 'IF(IFW ) " 1 IV’[I -  X ( X ' X ) ~ x X ' ] y  
multiplying through and using only the columns of X  which are instruments gives:
X ' P „ \ t x y  = [ X X ( X ' X ) ~ x X '  -  X X ( X X y x X ' X { X X ) ~ x X ' ] y  
which simplifies to,
X '  PWM X y  = [X '  -  X ' ] y  = 0.
Therefore, we are only interested in testing whether the k  * by 1 vector X v PWM x y  has 
mean zero asymptotically. Davidson and MacKinnon propose the following artificial regression,
y x = A"P + Pw A'* 5 + error. (A3.1)
In the case whereyx represents municipal expenditures, the possibly endogenous variable, A'* is
county expenditures, y 2 . The first stage in the 2SLS process gives y 2 = IV(fV'fV)'1 W'y2 = Pw X * . 
Therefore, we can substitute y 2 into (A3.1): 
y x = Afp + y 2 5 + error 
Multiplying through by M x  give the following:
M x  At = M x X$  + M x y 28 + M x  error 
which simplifies to,
M x y\  -  A /x A2 5 +  XIx  error (A3.2)
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The DWH test now is:
H0: 5 =0
Hx : 6 * 0 .
Performing OLS on (A3.2) gives
s  ou = [ W x h Y W x h ) \ ~ \ M x y2)'Mxy\  •
We can see how OLS on the artificial regression (A3.2) arrives at a test of whether X  *” Pw Klx  y x has 
mean zero asymptotically by replacing y 2 with PffX :
8 q£5 =(A  Pw M x PwX  ) 1X  PlvM x y l .
Again, the first term will have no effect on any test statistic we compute.
The test statistic is derived from the F-distribution where the unrestricted sum of squared 
errors comes from the artificial regression (A3.2) with degrees of freedom T - k - k *  and the 
restricted sum of squared errors come from the following artificial regression with 1 degree of 
freedom:
\ f x  y x = M x  error.
If the F ^ F C, we reject the null in favor of the alternative hypothesis. In this case we conclude that 
the effects o f the endogeneity seriously affect the OLS estimates and we use the consistent 2SLS 
estimates to base our conclusions. Otherwise, we do not reject the null hypothesis and conclude the 
effects of endogeneity do not affect the OLS estimates and use the OLS estimates because they are 
consistent and efficient.
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APPENDIX IV
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR CHAPTERS IV AND V
Table A4.1. Municipal Regionally Pooled 
Pooled MSA + nonMSA 
n=708
Variable 
(SI 000)
Mean Sid. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
ExpT 13763 44745 2.00E+9 184 651295 3.251
nm 65.161 198 39098 10.073 3005.072 3.035
IncT 18.915 6 33 9.544 48.872 .302
Aid" 9048 43391 1.88E+9 56 736841 4.796
s ” .000419 .000454 2.06E-7 7.60E-7 .00672 1.0829
ne 827.234 1363 1.86E+6 15.801 7477.421 1.648
Ai<f 116571 312166 9.74E+10 113 2445491 2.678
* : 8.91E-5 .000205 4.22E-8 3.50E-7 .00275 2.306
ttmuni gov 'Is 23 26 667 1 121 1 .121
TXCOIT .5779 .2037 .0415 .2609 1i .352
EXCON” .0844 .0637 .0041 .001 .4956 .755
EXP* 
able A4.2.
50266
Municipal
MSA
n=S30
93732 8.79E+9 
Regionally Pooled
321 677669 1.865
Variable
(SI000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
Exp” 17357 51219 2.62E+9 184 651295 2.951
n” 80.586 226 51285 10.073 3005.072 2.810
IncT 20.613 6 30 10.553 48.872 .267
A id” 11260 49936 2.49E+9 56 736841 4.435
.000379 .000447 2.0E-7 7.6E-7 .00672 1.181
nc 1089.743 1486 2.21E+6 2 1 .2 7477.421 1.364
A icf 153948 353064 1.25E+U 188 2445491 2.293
3.76E-5 .000135 1.83E-8 3.5E-7 .00275 3.602
DEC .6208 .1308 .0171 .2497 .9796 .2 1 2
FRAG” 1.404 .4748 .2254 .1819 2.3864 .338
ttmuni gov 'is 29 28 760 I 121 .963
TXCON” .5666 .1988 .0395 .2609 1 .351
EXCON” .0875 .0605 .0037 .0036 .4301 .691
EXP1 66101 103638 1.074E+10 752 677669 1.568
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Table A4.3. Municipal Regionally Pooled 
non-MSA 
n=178
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
Expm 3064 1751 3.065E+6 808 9692 .571
nm 19.233 8 62 10.199 46.577 .409
Ind” 13.859 2 6 9.544 20.321 .169
AicT 2462 3086 9.52E+6 74 28303 1.254
* : .000539 .000453 2.05E-7 6.39E-5 .0 0 2 2 .841
nc 45.605 20 381 15.801 108.525 .428
Aief 5282 6919 4.79E+7 113 41884 1.310
.000243 .000287 8.23E-8 9.52E-6 .0019 1.183
#muni gov ’ts 6 4 18 1 2 0 .675
TXC O tr .6115 .2145 .0460 .3367 .9959 .351
EXCON” .0750 .0718 .0052 .0 0 1 .4956 .957
EXP1 
able A4.4.
3115 2284 5.21E+6
County Regionally Pooled 
Pooled MSA +  nonMSA 
n=344
321 14466 .733
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X P 17093 46347 2.15E+9 321 677669 2.712
ne 247.663 591 348879 15.801 7477.421 2.385
Inc‘ 16.557 4 13 8.931 30.011 .214
Aicf 36851 145956 2.13E+10 113 2445491 3.961
s i .000155 .000254 6.43E-8 5.21E-7 .0026 1.631
nm 36.422 69 4782 10.073 786.023 1.899
AicT 4053 8601 7.40E+7 74 87842 2 .1 2 2
Sin .000466 .000505 2.55E-7 8.03E-6 .00637 1.083
Utotal gov "t 42 48 2283 2 516 1.132
TXCON* .73 .1865 .0348 .3555 .9979 .256
EXCON* .6 6 8 6 .1424 .0203 .2381 .9487 .213
EXP” 6610 13658 1.87E+8 808 131909 2.066
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Tabic A4.5. County Regionally Pooled 
MSA 
n=166
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Mm Max Coeff.
($1000) Variation
E X P 32081 63427 4.02E+9 752 677669 1.977
n* 464.328 796 633564 2 1 .2 7477.421 1.714
Incc 18.795 3 11 11.687 30.011 .179
Aicf 70703 204952 4.20E+10 188 2445491 2.899
s t 7.79E-5 .000227 5.15E-8 5.21E-7 .00261 2.913
n 54.854 96 9214 10.073 786.023 1.750
Aid" 5759 11743 1.38E+8 75 87842 2.039
.000414 .000578 3.34E-7 8.03E-6 .00637 1.397
DEC .6150 .1521 .0231 .2497 .9796 .247
FRAG1 .4358 .2557 .0654 .0435 1.0691 .587
Utotal g o v ’t 58 62 3878 2 516 1.069
TXCON* .7243 .1803 .0325 .3555 .9924 .249
EXCON1 .6425 .1466 .0215 .2381 .9487 .228
E X P ” 10413 18878 3.56E+8 810 131909 1.813
Table A4.6. County Regionally Pooled 
non-MSA 
n=178
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000) Variation
EXP' 3115 2284 5.2 IE+ 6 321 14466 .733
ne 45.605 20 381 15.801 108.525 .428
Inc1 14.469 2 5 8.931 19.513 .150
Aicf 5282 6919 4.79E+7 113 41884 1.310
!
.000228 .000256 6.56E-8 9.44E-6 .00183 1.125
n 19.233 8 62 10.199 46.577 .409
A id ” 2462 3086 9.52E+6 74 28303 1.254
s i .000515 .000421 1.77E-7 6.93E-5 .00244 .817
Utotal g o v ’t 27 18 341 3 104 .679
EXCON* .7354 .1926 .0371 .3849 .9979 .262
EXCON* .693 .1342 .018 .3014 .9319 .194
EXP” 3064 1751 3.06E+6 808 9692 .571
147
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Table A4.7. Municipal Western
Pooled MSA + nonMSA
n=149
Variable
(51000)
Mean Std  Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
Exp” 23688 59189 3.50E+9 1453 632495 2.499
t f 100.783 268 71730 10.146 2968.579 2.657
Ind” 19.063 4 19 9.751 36.525 .226
Aid" 12088 36515 1.33E+9 379 360849 3.021
C .000403 .000455 2.07E-7 3.57E-6 .0 0 2 1 1 1.131
ne 1226.860 1876 3.52E+6 17.349 7477.421 1.529
Aicf 313107 620941 3.86E+11 1008 2445491 1.983
5.68E-5 .000146 2.13E-8 3.50E-7 .0 0 1 1 1 2.568
Hmuni gov 'is 19 19 365 2 82 1.007
TXCON” .4423 .1065 .0113 .3334 .7888 .241
EXCON” .0904 .0652 .0043 .0055 .4209 .722
E X F  
'able A4.8.
101652 168432
Municipal W estern
MSA
n=126
2.84E+10 1416 677669 1.657
Variable
(51000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
Exp” 27323 63724 4.06E+9 1453 632495 2.332
nm 115.775 289 83450 10.146 2968.579 2.495
Ind" 19.860 4 17 13.211 36.525 .209
Aid" 13860 39466 1.56E+9 379 360849 2.848
C171 .00035 .00038 1.44E-7 3.57E-6 .0 0 2 1 1 1.092
nc 1441.009 1966 3865965 55.332 7477.421 1.365
Aicf 368766 660504 4.36E+11 4220 2445491 1.791
2.20E-5 3.56E-5 1.27E-9 3.50E-7 .0 0 0 2 2 1.624
DEC .5543 .0916 .0084 .2497 .6936 .165
FRAG" 1.1837 .2828 .0800 .1882 1.9775 .239
if muni gov ’is 21 20 401 2 82 .955
TXCON” .4382 .1059 .0 1 1 2 .3334 .7888 .242
EXCON” .0895 .0606 .0037 .0055 .3536 .677
E X F 119181 177708 3.16E+10 3307 677669 1.491
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Table A4.9. Municipal Western 
non-MSA 
ii=23
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000) Variation
Exp” 3775 2282 5.21E+6 1504 9225 .605
nm 18.657 8 64 10.629 40.960 .430
Inc? 14.700 2 4 9.751 18.471 .132
A id ” 2382 1864 3.47E+6 461 6876 .782
.00070 .00068 4.63E-7 8.29E-5 .00193 .967
nc 53.696 26 680 17 109 .486
A icf 8189 9980 9.96E+7 1008 41884 1.219
s? .000248 .000302 9 .10E-8 2.02E-5 .0 0 1 1 1 1.217
ttmuni gov 'ts 8 5 21 2 19 .584
TXCON” .4651 .1092 .0119 .3367 .6742 .235
EXCON” .0949 .0878 .0077 .0198 .4209 .925
E X F 5622 3913 1.53E+7 1416 14466 .696
Table A4.10. County Western
Pooled MSA + nonMSA 
n=61
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000) Variation
E X F 40606 89907 8.08E+9 1416 677669 2.214
ne 470.876 1016 1032583 17.349 7477 2.158
Incc 17.597 3 9 12.703 24.554 .173
A icf 109902 323970 1.05E+11 1008 2445491 2.948
s i .000109 .000204 4.15E-8 5.21E-7 .00105 1.871
nm 57.340 96 9229 10.394 629.531 1.675
A id” 6195 11796 1.39E+8 439 66431 1.904
s i .000488 .000505 2.55E-7 9.83E-6 .00182 1.034
tttotal gov't 6 8 48 2332 9 276 .711
TXCON* .6991 .1677 .0281 .415 .9864 .240
EXCON* .6601 .0869 .0076 .4838 .8187 .132
E X F 12199 21705 4.71E+8 1453 131909 1.675
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table A 4 .ll. County Western 
MSA 
n=38
Variable
($1000)
E X F
d
Ince
A id
ri
AicT
S'm 
DEC 
FRAG1 
H total g o v ’t 
TXCON1 
EXCON  
E X F
Table A4.I2.
Mean Std. Dev. Variance
61780
723.379
19.125
171465
3.10E-5
80.754
8503
.000377
.5412
.2898
84
.7066
.6565
17299
108985
1225
3
399771
4.40E-5
116
14459
.000370
.1124
.1601
53
.1558
.0928
26269
1.19E+10
1.50E+6
7
1.60E+11
1.94E-9
13434
2.09E+8
1.37E-7
.0126
.0256
2841
.0243
.0086
6.90E+8
Min
3307
55.332
15.339
4220
5.21E-7
10.394
439
9.83E-6
.2497
.0435
19
.4385
.4838
1453
Max
677669
7477.421
24.554
2445491
.000196
629.531
66431
.00165
.6936
.5393
276
.9648
.8187
131909
Coeff.
Variation
1.764
1.693
.142
2.332
1.419
1.435
1.701
.983
.208
.552
.635
.2 2 0
.141
1.519
County Western
non-MSA
n=23
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X F 5622 3913 1.53E+7 1416 14466 .696
d 53.696 26 680 17.349 108.525 .486
Ince 15.073 1 2 12.703 18.593 .098
A id 8189 9980 9.96E+7 1008 41884 1.219
S'c .000238 .000287 8.22E-8 2.0OE-5 .00105 1.207
n 18.657 8 64 10.629 40.96 .430
A id ” 2382 1864 3.47E+6 461 6876 .782
s em .000672 .000639 4.08E-7 8.56E-5 .00182 .951
tt total gov't 42 2 0 410 9 93 .488
TXCON .6 8 6 6 .1887 .0356 .415 .9864 .275
EXCON .6661 .0779 .0061 .5337 .8078 .117
E XP” 3775 2282 5.21E+6 1504 9225 .605
150
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Table A4.13. Municipal Midwest 
Pooled MSA + nonMSA 
n=319
Variable
($1000)
Expm 11057
ri” 54.203
Ind” 20.757
A id” 10096
s ” .000453
nc 955.541
Aicf 87226
s? 8.09E-5
Hmuni gov 'ts 32
TXCON” .6606
EXCON” .0886
E X F 41615
Mean Std. Dev.
44608
192
6
57679
.000347
1424
97850
.000167
32
.2161
.0558
51542
'ariance Min Max Coejf.
Variation
1.99E+9 184 651295 4.034
36720 10.093 3005.072 3.535
35 9.622 48.872 .284
3.33E+9 249 736841 5.713
1.20E-7 3.90E-6 .00192 .766
2.03E+6 23.825 5253.628 1.490
9.57E+9 381 278792 1 .122
2.78E-8 6.00E-7 .00152 2.060
1033 2 121 .996
.0467 .2789 1 .327
.0031 .0099 .3984 .630
2.66E+9 531 170702 1.239
Table A4.14. Municipal Midwestern
MSA
n-254
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000) Variation
Exp” 13029 49811 2.48E+9 184 651295 3.823
n” 63.139 214 45745 10.093 3005.072 3.388
IncT 22.340 6 30 11.511 48.872 .246
A id ” 11905 64507 4.16E+9 249 736841 5.419
.000420 .000334 1.12E-7 3.90E-6 .001920 .796
nc 1188.482 1510 2.28E+6 53.84 5253.628 1.271
A icf 108409 99099 9.82E+9 1521 278792 .914
5C" 2.99E-5 4.84E-5 2.35E-9 6.00E-7 .000566 1.617
DEC .6508 .0880 .0077 .5160 .7745 .135
FRAG” 1.6521 .4562 .2081 .6836 2.3864 .276
it muni gov ’ts 38 33 1114 3 121 .871
TXCON” .6406 .2145 .046 .2789 1 .335
EXCON” .0910 .0520 .0027 .0063 .3984 .572
E X F 51426 53519 2.86E+9 1713 170702 1.041
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able A4.15.
Variable
Municipal Midwest 
non-MSA Sample 
n=65
Mean Std Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000)
ExpT 3352 1846 3.41E+6 1051 9692
Variation
.551
nm 19.284 8 64 10.199 41.843 .414
Ind” 14.570 2 4 9.622 18.948 .143
AicT 3029 4124 1.70E+7 365 28303 1.362
C .000581 .000368 1.35E-7 .000136 .001756 .633
n‘ 45.276 18 325 23.825 97.408 .398
Aicf 4446 3335 1.11E+7 381 14251 .750
*7 .000280 .000279 7.81E-8 2.91E-5 .00152 .998
ttmuni gov ‘ts 9 4 20 2 2 0 .515
TXCON” .7385 .2061 .0425 .3525 .9959 .279
EXCON” .0794 .0684 .0047 .0 0 1 0 .3048 .861
EXP1 3276 1429 2.04E+6 531 7785 .436
Table A4.16. County Midwestern 
Pooled MSA +  nonMSA 
n= 1 2 2
Variable Mean Std Dev. Variance Min Max
($1000)
E X P 12151 24572 6.04E+8 531 170702
nc 237.028 560 313759 23.825 5253.628
In d 17.553 3 12 9.981 27.509
Aicf 22680 48408 2.34E+9 381 278792
s : .000165 .000199 3.97E-8 6.82E-7 .000985
n” 28.567 35 1229 10.108 313.939
AicT 3628 6318 3.99E+7 249 46025
.000476 .000303 9.21E-8 2.24E-5 .00173
Htotal gov't 56 52 2675 14 516
TXCON* .7750 .2018 .0407 .4042 .9967
EXCON* .6729 .1272 .0162 .3522 .9079
EXP” 5080 7513 5.64E+7 855 67870
Coeff.
Variation
2 .0 2 2
2.363
.198
2.134
1 .210
1.227
1.741
.638
.932
.260
.189
1.479
152
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tble A4.17.
Variable
County Midwestern
MSA
n=57
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000)
E X P 22271 33266 1.11E+9 1713 170702
Variation
1.494
nc 455.693 766 586226 53.840 5253.628 1.680
Inc" 20.061 3 9 11.698 27.509 .152
Aicf 43472 64998 4.22E+9 1521 278792 1.495
S'c 5.97E-5 8.81E-5 7.75E-9 6.82E-7 .000623 1.475
nm 39.153 49 2367 10.108 313.939 1.243
AicT 4311 8118 6.59E+7 249 46025 1.883
*'* .000383 .000237 5.59E-8 2.24E-5 .000896 .617
DEC .6549 .0899 .0081 .5160 .7745 .137
FRAG1 .3843 .1914 .0366 .1638 .8572 .498
tttotal g o v ’t 73 70 4959 18 516 .968
TXCON1 .7606 .1998 .0399 .4042 .9924 .263
EXCO N .6347 .1277 .0163 .3522 .9018 .201
E X P 7052 10519 1.11E+8 855 67870 1.492
blc A4.18.
Variable
County Midwestern
non-MSA
n=65
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min M ax Coeff.
($1000)
E X P 3276 1429 2040963 531 7785
Variation
.436
nc 45.276 18 325 23.825 97.408 .398
Ince 15.354 2 4 9.981 19.513 .133
Aicf 4446 3335 1.11E+7 381 14251 .750
s i .000257 .000223 4.98E-8 2.95E-5 .000985 .869
n 19.284 8 64 10.199 41.843 .414
AicT 3029 4124 I.70E+7 365 28303 1.361
s em .000557 .000333 1.11E-7 .000138 .00173 .598
ttiotal gov't 40 15 221 14 104 .368
TXCON .7877 .2042 .0417 .4122 .9967 .259
EXC O N .7065 .1178 .0139 .3568 .9079 .167
E X P 3352 1846 3.41E+6 1051 9692 .551
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Table A4.19. Municipal Southern
Pooled MSA + nonMSA
n=240
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
ExpT 11199 32059 1.03E+9 808 331852 2.863
nm 57.611 146 21372 10.073 1595.138 2.538
Ind* 16.374 5 28 9.5440 36.5930 .322
AicT 5767 17304 2.99E+8 56 180224 3.000
C .000384 .000564 3.18E-7 7.60E-7 .00672 1.467
nc 408.591 567 321460 15.801 2409.547 1.388
Aicf 33561 67935 4.62E+9 113 382578 2.024
s : .0 0 0 1 2 0 .000270 7.31E-8 9.08E-7 .00275 2.252
ttmuni gov 'ts 13 12 152 1 89 .928
TXCON” .5522 .1797 .0323 .2609 .9950 .325
EXCON” .0750 .0713 .0051 .0025 .4956 .950
EXF1 
able A4.20.
29862 52180
Municipal Southern
MSA
n=150
2.72E+9 321 214029 1.747
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
Exp” 16313 39714 1.58E+9 810 331852 2.435
n” 80.571 181 32830 10.073 1595.138 2.249
IncT 18.320 6 31 10.553 36.593 .304
A id” 7984 21537 4.64E+8 56 180224 2.697
s ”n .000336 .000628 3.94E-7 7.60E-7 .00672 1.871
ne 627.481 622 386805 2 1 .2 0 0 2409.547 .991
Aicf 50612 81158 6.59E+9 188 382578 1.604
6.36E-5 .000243 5.89E-8 9.08E-7 .00275 3.820
DEC .6259 .1877 .0352 .3279 .9796 .300
FRAG" 1.1690 .4222 .1783 .1819 2.0802 .361
ttmuni gov ‘ts 19 13 161 1 89 .679
TXCON” .5492 .1710 .0292 .2609 .9800 .311
EXCON” .0800 .0722 .0052 .0036 .4301 .903
EXP1 46364 60287 3.64E+9 752 214029 1.300
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Table A4.21. Municipal Southern 
non-MSA 
n=90
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000) Variation
Exp” 2675 1419 2.01E+6 808 6575 .530
ftm 19.344 8 61 10.462 46.577 .403
Ind* 13.131 2 6 9.544 20.321 .184
Aid* 2072 2335 5.45E+6 74 15216 1.127
C .000465 .000427 1.82E-7 6.39E-5 .0 0 2 2 .917
nc 43.774 18 336 15.801 83.435 .419
A itf 5143 7738 5.99E+7 113 34265 1.505
*7 .000214 .000288 8.32E-8 9.52E-6 .0019 1.347
Umuni gov 'ts 4 3 8 1 14 .665
TXCON” .5572 .1942 .0377 .3439 .9950 .349
EXCON” .0668 .0693 .0048 .0025 .4956 1.038
EXP1 2358 1702 2.90E+6 321 8148 .722
Table A4.22. County Southern
Pooled MSA + nonMSA 
n=161
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X F 11929 29338 8.61E+8 321 214029 2.459
d 171.151 314 98438 15.801 2409.547 1.833
In d 15.408 3 12 8.9310 30.0110 .223
A id 19913 45402 2.06E+9 113 382578 2.280
s t .000166 .000302 9.12E-8 1.15E-6 .00261 1.818
n” 34.449 75 5643 10.073 786.023 2.181
Aid* 3564 8607 7.41E+7 74 87842 2.415
4 .000450 .000616 3.80E-7 8.03E-6 .006370 1.369
Utotal gov't 2 2 35 1212 2 402 1.558
TXCON" .7076 .1757 .0309 .3555 .9979 .248
EXCON" .6 6 8 6 .1684 .0283 .2381 .9487 .252
EXP” 5652 28811 1.66E+8 808 111725 2.279
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Table A4.23. County Southern 
MSA 
n=71
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000) Variation
E X F 24062 41190 1.70E+9 752 214029 1.711
n* 332.613 421 177272 2 1 .2 0 0 2409.547 1.266
Ince 17.603 4 12 11.687 30.011 .2 0 0
A icf 38635 63241 4.00E+9 188 382578 1.637
1
.000118 .000333 1.11E-7 1.15E-6 .00261 2.834
n 53.597 110 12156 10.073 786.023 2.057
Aid" 5454 12487 1.56E+8 75 87842 2.290
< .000458 .000817 6.67E-7 8.03E-6 .00637 1.784
DEC .6225 .1926 .0371 .3279 .9796 .309
FRAG? .5552 .2883 .0831 .0756 1.069 .519
n total g o v’t 33 50 2488 2 402 1.518
TXCON* .7045 .1738 .0302 .3555 .9917 .247
EXCON* .6414 .1814 .0329 .2381 .9487 .283
E X F 9426 18730 3.51E+8 810 111725 1.987
Table A4.24. County Southern 
non-MSA
ii=90
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X F 2358 1702 2.90E+6 321 8148 .722
n* 43.774 18 336 15.801 83.435 .419
Inc* 13.676 2 5 8.931 19.082 .155
Aicf 5143 7738 5.99E+7 113 34265 1.505
1
.000204 .000270 7.31E-8 9.44E-6 .00183 1.324
n 19 8 61 10.462 46.577 .403
AicT 2072 2335 5.45E+6 74 15216 1.127
S'n, .000445 .000398 1.59E-7 6.93E-5 .00244 .896
if total gov't 14 8 64 3 50 .567
TXCON* .7100 .1780 .0317 .3849 .9979 .251
EXCON* .6901 .1550 .0240 .3014 .9319 .225
E X F 2675 1419 2.01E+6 808 6575 .530
156
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ES
TI
M
AT
IO
N 
RE
SU
LT
S 
FO
R 
CH
AP
TE
RS
 
IV 
AN
D 
V
* ♦
©  o *  ©  CM *  r -
vC © N  P  C O n PS
t n  © P S ©  © sC  G
* • PS  " *
**
K  oo o  p; cn oCH O
♦♦
<
C/3sI
fi.
BJO
*5d
csJ.
Ti
c.
2*s
3
S
<
£
£
03 OCcn r*
oc ©  
r- o
«n o
♦ —
^  5
PS
~  P  £  |cn . 
rn
c2
60s:
a
o
■82
<•* © m r* — ©
«o *♦ «o ©•n © ©© © G
* ** CN M ♦ p** ©M  sC © m  cs ©—  ©  © ©  ©(N
i .  oo r*
3 § S
♦* W") Qm PS ©'C © ©
* ** VO PS ♦ «r> ©
0 0 VO © Cv PS ©G © © G ©
PS
♦ *
♦ * o PS ♦ ©•O vC © m PS ©
© o © »n G O
p s
E '
E E60
P* © m © © ©
oc ©  m  o  © ©
p** © ro © © ©
<N © cn © © G
PS ©  
<*) ©  
O  G
* -a- c  2  -r c 
2  O ©
* ae ©  S  r-i ©
— *  p
•
* fN © 
2  © © 
—  ® ®
* ae ©  2  n  e 
2 c ©
ae © t  n  C ©
rr fS r~
cn is oc© © (N
~  r~ mP s in
157
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(ta
ble
 
co
n’
d)
£  r* r- c  C  N
CS
£  cs «n
N 3  g  5f
■8e
ts  rs
e  c
2  — oc 2  oc 9  c  ae
n * 2  
2  P  c
§ -* 
5  Sa* eo
2  —<o  >e ae “ t o e
S  ao e \ 2  wi c\P o o
1
fNc
m n  *r — cs o c * o
vC m  — cs o  o
I
£*Ia:
♦♦ © © o  cn o  — © o
Ie
£ t o  o  2  Tf c  © o
c*i
♦♦o   ^*n © cs ^r
* — oC  o  £  P  ©
5» ?
S  °-
n  O
c \  c  rn o  O  C
^ o  c  ~ -r cH o c
♦
*  C\ o2  CS e c
♦
X  r* o  S c  * ^ 0  0  cs .
*
* r» c
« s gcs . .I*
2  „• ■« 
cs
§  «  °
* n  rs
S  2  Rc**cs
£  Jn <N
S  «. £
r i
m  *S  oc *22 o  rs
2  5  «CN
J  c\ ^“ CIM
r-i
v.
I
5 '
£- ^  SNm
N*
■N?
158
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
No
tes
: 
W
hi
le
’s 
er
ro
rs 
fol
low
 
es
tim
at
es
. 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
va
lu
es
 f
oll
ow
 
er
ro
rs
. 
* 
p 
< 
.05
. 
*♦ 
p 
< 
.0
1.
Table A5.2. Municipal—Regionally Pooled— nonMSA
Model: 1 2a 3 5a
Constant 3.444** 3.418** 3.408** 3.393**
.375 .378 .416 .416
.0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
Inm ” .208 .198 .218 .2 1 0
.1 2 2 .1 2 1 .121 .119
.090 .1 0 2 .073 .081
In (s”Am) .157** .155** .147** .146**
.025 .025 .028 .029
.0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
in s: -.223** -.224** -.214** -.215**
.035 .036 .038 .038
.0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
In nm -.158* -.159* -.140* -.140*
.069 .069 .070 .070
.023 .0 2 2 .047 .046
tt muni .023 .018
gov 'ts. .034 .033
.491 .585
InTXCONm .074 .075
.077 .077
.334 .330
InEXCONm -.030 -.029
.0 2 0 .0 2 0
.138 .156
DV-XfW -.131* -.133* -.172** -.175**
.055 .056 .062 .064
.019 .019 .006 .007
D V S -.303** -.290** -.334** -.321**
.055 .062 .056 .061
.0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0
Flvoaoer: 6.943** 6.879**
Adj. R: .339 .338 .345 .343
F 16.16** 13.92** 12.67** 11.29**
d.f. 171 170 169 168
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p < .
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ft muni .095 .125 .192 .188
gov 'is. .078 .083 .107 .101
.227 .134 .079 .068
InTXCOlT .127 .207 -.200 -.084
.150 .143 .178 .285
.403 .153 .266 .770
InEXCOtT .004 -.006 -.014 -.025
.037 .040 .036 .039
.923 .875 .690 .515
ln(EXP*/nc) .140 .215 .427** .414
.263 .167 .138 .370
.598 .204 .003 .268
Flypaper: 2.792* 2.328* 2.477* 2.005
Adj. R2 .152 .158 .133 .149 .226
F 3.88** 3.41** 2.64* 2.60* 2.87**
d.f. 60 59 58 57 54 - -
Notes: '2SLS estimation. White's errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table A5.12. County—Regionally Pooled—MSA
Model: 1 2b 3 5b
Constant .723 .807 .510 .580
.678 .730 .682 .753
.288 .271 .455 .443
ln m e .853** .855** .871** .872**
.205 .207 .205 .206
.000 .000 .000 .000
l n ( s ceAc) .076 .066 .093* .085
.041 .046 .042 .050
.066 .155 .029 .091
Ins* -.137* -.130* -.155* -.149*
.060 .063 .062 .067
.024 .041 .014 .027
In n e -.063 -.042 -.084 -.068
.076 .094 .079 .101
.410 .658 .285 .499
it total -.034 -.026
gov 'ts. .080 .081
.675 .753
InTXCON* -.043 -.040
.144 .143
.764 .781
InEXCON* -.191 -.187
.203 .205
.350 .364
DV-MW -.494** -.499** -.491** -.495**
.090 .091 .090 .091
.000 .000 .000 .000
DV-S -.355** -.393** -.354** -.382*
.117 .150 .115 .152
.003 .010 .003 .013
Flypaper: 11.559* 10.106*
A d j .# .257 .256 .254 .252
F 10.51** 9.12** 8.02** 7.17**
d.f. 159 158 157 156
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p <
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Model: 1 2b 3 4 5b 6b 7 8b
II total -.181 -.185 -.129 -.147*
gov 'Is. .105 .099 .085 .072
.091 .068 .136 .046
InTXCON' -.451** -.423** -.455** -.436**
.161 .149 .154 .147
.007 .006 .005 .005
InEXCON* .091 .300 .281 .434
.281 .246 .270 .255
.748 .227 .304 .095
ln(EXPm/nm) .277 .261 .101 .097
.192 .185 .207 .198
.155 .166 .629 .629
DV-MSA -.211 -.280* -.193 -.105 -.254* -.160 -.095 -.145
.127 .123 .115 .127 .109 .120 .120 .112
.102 .027 .098 .410 .025 .190 .432 .203
Flypaper: 16.028** - - 15.369** 14.579** 14.366**
Adj. R1 .382 .399 .436 .452 .452 .445 .513 .507
F  8.41** 7.65** 7.63** 6.51** 7.19** 5.81** 6.75** 6.15**
d.f. 55 54 53 51 52 50 49 48
Notes: White's errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. *♦ p <  .01.
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APPENDIX VI
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR CHAPTER VI
'able A6.1.
Variable
Municipal Regionally 
MAYOR COUNCIL
n=180
Mean Std. Dev.
Pooled
Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000)
Expm 22866 79350 6.30E+9 184 651295
Variation
3.470
nm 105.297 354 125595 10.093 3005.072 3.366
Ind” 21.207 5.146 26.481 11.296 36.593 .243
A id ” 19427 82018 6.72E+9 75 736841 4.222
£ .000478 .000623 3.876E-7 1.82E-6 .006719 1.303
nc 1127.797 1436 2.06E+6 40.983 7477.421 1.273
A id 116183 203367 4.14E+10 746 2445491 1.750
sZ 5.065E-5 2.147E-4 4.608E-8 5.73E-7 .002754 4.238
DEC .643 .0981 .0096 .3396 .8781 .153
FRAG” 1.5095 .5064 .2565 .1819 2.386 .336
ttmuni gov ‘ts 35 31 954 2 121 .890
TXCOIT .5902 .2096 .0439 .2609 1.000 .355
EXCOIT .1009 .0680 .0046 .0051 .4301 .674
EXP-' 54817 71817 5.158E+9 1327 677669 1.310
able A6.2.
Variable
Municipal Regionally 
CITY MANAGER 
□=339
Mean Std. Dev.
Pooled
Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000)
Expm 14314 26657 7.106E+8 810 224768
Variation
1.862
nm 67.454 114 12897 10.073 904.078 1.684
Ind” 20.430 5.680 32.258 10.553 48.872 .278
A id ” 6917 16596 2.754E+8 56 171920 2.399
Cfft .000327 .000312 9.748E-8 7.6E-7 .002114 .955
ne 1076.942 1515 2.296E+6 21.200 7477.421 1.407
A id 177671 413942 1.713E+U 188 2445491 2.330
Z 3.038E-5 6.298E-5 3.966E-9 3.5E-7 .000701 2.073
DEC .6074 .1444 .0208 .2497 .9796 .238
FRAG” 1.351 .4507 .2031 .1819 2.386 .334
ttmuni gov ’ts 25.351 25 609 1 121 .973
TXCONm .5568 .1939 .0376 .2845 .9875 .348
EXCObT .0810 .0534 .0028 .0036 .3903 .659
E X P 72852 117797 1.388E+10 752 677669 1.617
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table A6.3. Municipal Regionally Pooled 
COMMISSION 
n =ll
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
Expm 20945 34326 1.178E+9 1722 112080 1.639
d ” 80.935 n o 12036 10.814 366.383 1.356
IncT 16.524 3.625 13.143 11.548 23.149 .219
A id ” 11452 18739 3.511E+8 523 61949 1.636
•Cn .000358 .000292 8.497E-8 5.98E-6 .000793 .815
nc 861.539 1485 2206478 37.021 5253.628 1.724
A icf 40810 59214 3.506E+9 2257 210693 1.451
4.445E-5 6.483E-5 4.202E-9 1.53E-6 .000214 1.458
DEC .6721 .1001 .01001 .5495 .8781 .149
FRAG” 1.3245 .4058 .1646 .7742 1.9775 .306
timuni gov 'is 30 39 1513 3 121 1.300
TXCOld” .4825 .1129 .0127 .3353 .6659 .234
EXCOX” .0712 .0977 .0095 .0063 .3536 1.372
E X T  
'able A6.4.
42690 49024
Municipal WEST 
MAYOR COUNCIL 
n=14
2.403E+9 1964 170702 1.148
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
Expm 64456 168546 2.841E+10 1453 632495 2.615
nm 275.206 785 616798 10.146 2968.579 2.854
Ind” 18.487 3.560 12.675 14.095 26.335 .193
A id” 36813 98172 9.638E+9 439 360849 2.667
•Cm .000298 .000476 2.269E-7 3.57E-6 .001419 1.597
ne 1113.12 1893 3586602 55.332 1 A l l  A l l 1.701
A icf 233654 641795 4.119E+11 4220 2445491 2.747
s? 2.135E-5 3.772E-5 1.423E-9 5.730E-7 .000142 1.767
DEC .6204 .0596 .0035 .5205 .6683 .096
FRAG” 1.106 .4063 .1650 .8121 1.978 .367
timuni gov 'ts 23 18 338 10 82 .802
TXCOIT .4468 .1433 .0205 .3342 .7801 .321
EXCOX” .1080 .1003 .0101 .0055 .3367 .929
EXP1 94364 172767 2.985E+10 3307 677669 1.831
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table A6.5. Municipal WEST
CITY MANAGER
n=108
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min M ax Coeff.
Variation
Expm 21892 31629 1.000E+ 9 1671 188895 1.445
nm 94.001 134 17989 11.064 875.538 1.427
Ind” 20.198 4.164 17.337 13.506 36.525 .206
A id ” 10522 23348 5.451E+8 379 179120 2.219
s m*m .000361 .000371 1.377E-7 1.42E-5 .00211 1.027
ne 1519.049 2006 4024311 63.116 7477.421 1.321
Aicf 398764 672355 4.521E+11 4708 2445491 1.686
2.21 IE-5 3.616E-5 1.307E-9 3.5E-7 .00022 1.636
DEC .5442 .0924 .0085 .2497 .6936 .170
FRAG” 1.1827 .244 .0595 .1882 1.9775 .206
U muni gov 'ts 21 21 422 2 82 .970
TXCON” .4360 .1002 .0100 .3334 .7888 .230
EXCOIT .0861 .0478 .0023 .0080 .2904 .555
E X P  
able A6.6.
125381 181366
Municipal WEST
COMMISSION
n=4
3.289E+10 4312 677669 1.447
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min M ax Coeff.
Variation
Expm 43971 50530 2.553E+9 4605 112080 1.149
nm 145.654 161 25791 25.750 366.383 1.103
Ind” 15.523 2.172 4.718 13.211 18.391 .140
A id ” 23653.5 26545 7.046E+8 992 61949 1.122
* : .000156 .000209 4.376E-8 5.98E-6 .000465 1.345
nc 481.259 239 57350 124.264 619.066 .498
Aicf 31720.75 15513 2.406E+8 9992 46813 .489
* : 2.007E-5 1.217E-5 1.482E-10 3.87E-6 3.11E-5 .607
DEC .5974 .0584 .0034 .5495 .6683 .098
FRAG” 1.4807 .5906 .3488 .8121 1.9775 .399
ttmuni gov 'ts 9 3 10 6 12 .346
TXCON" .4581 .1387 .0192 .3353 .5797 .303Excoir .1184 .1581 .0250 .0118 .3536 1.336
EXP* 38639 19522 3.811E-8 10174 51367 .505
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Table A6.7. Municipal MIDWEST 
MAYOR COUNCIL
n=135
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
($1000) Variation
ExfT 17093 66621 4.438E+9 184 651295 3.898
nm 79.713 288 82785 10.093 3005.072 3.610
Ind" 22.136 4.661 21.726 11.511 35.129 .211
A id” 18127 87541 7.663E+9 249 736841 4.829
* : .00045 .000377 1.419E-7 3.9E-6 .00192 .836
ne 1234.330 1503 2260480 77.240 5253.628 1.218
Aicf 118626 107769 1.161E+10 1521 278792 .909
s? 2.996E-5 3.973E-5 1.579E-9 6.0E-7 .000275 1.326
DEC .6475 .08799 .0077 .516 .7745 .136
FRAG” 1.67 .4247 .1804 .6836 2.3864 .254
ttmuni gov ’is 39 33 1088 5 121 .839
TXCOIT .6214 .2195 .0482 .2789 1.000 .353
EXCOlf” .1017 .0604 .0036 .0113 .3984 .593
EXP* 50935 54855 3.009E+9 1713 170702 1.077
Table A6.8. Municipal MIDWEST 
CITY MANAGER 
n=115
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff
Variation
Expm 8334 15535 2.413E+8 1227 116292 1.864
nm 43.932 58 3383 11.022 448.033 1.324
Ind” 22.710 6.380 40.699 11.649 48.872 .281
A id” 4782 11195 1.253E+8 319 89519 2.341
•Cm .000383 .000278 7.72 IE-8 1.69E-5 .00138 .725
ne 1118.192 1495 2234001 53.840 5253.628 1.337
Aicf 97864 87147 7.595E+9 1521 278792 .891
2.953E-5 5.718E-5 3.27E-9 1.9E-6 .000566 1.937
DEC .6526 .0885 .0078 .516 .7745 .136
FRAG” 1.6392 .497 .247 1.0239 2.3864 .303
ttmuni gov 'ts 36 33 1093 6 121 .909
TXCOIT .6672 .2087 .0435 .2845 .9875 .313
EXCOIT .0793 .0376 .0014 .0063 .2155 .474
EXP* 51508 51513 2.654E+9 2657 170702 1.000
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Table A6.9. Municipal MIDWEST 
COMMISSION 
n=4
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coelf.
Variation
Expm 10853 15240 2.323E+8 2388 33664 1.404
nm 55.981 70 4944 15.177 161.148 1.256
Ind” 18.607 3.308 10.943 15.21 23.149 .178
AicT 6703 11748 1.38E+8 523 24322 1.753
sZm .000433 .000245 6.005E-8 7.46E-5 .000621 .566
nc 1661.951 2422 5864115 172.335 5253.628 1.457
A id 66768 97851 9.575E+9 3944 210693 1.466
4.122E-5 5.315E-5 2.825E-9 1.53E-6 .000119 1.289
DEC .7128 .0628 .00395 .6586 .7745 .088
FRAG” 1.4197 .1257 .0158 1.2557 1.5622 .089
ttmuni gov ‘ts 60 55 2989 3 121 .915
TXCOIT .5246 .1087 .0118 .4301 .6659 .207
EXCOIT .0649 .0269 .0007 .0307 .0897 .416
EXP* 
able A6.10.
65644 77663
Municipal SOUTH 
MAYOR COUNCIL 
n=31
6.032E+9 4221 170702 1.183
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
ExpT 29227 66595 4.435E+9 1054 331852 2.279
ri” 139.979 308 94672 10.284 1595.138 2.198
Ind” 18.388 6.318 39.921 11.296 36.593 .344
A id ” 17238 39724 1.578E+9 75 180224 2.304
s m .000678 .001233 1.52 IE-6 1.82E-6 .00672 1.818
nc 670.452 617 380201 40.983 2409.547 .920
A id 52495 75803 5.746E+9 746 382578 1.444
s? .000154 .000504 2.539E-7 9.08E-6 .00275 3.273
DEC .6333 .1445 .0209 .3397 .8781 .228
FRAG” .9924 .4302 .1851 .1819 1.9998 .434
ttmuni gov 'ts 20 17 303 2 89 .870
TXCOIT .5192 .1375 .0189 .2609 .8303 .265
EXCOIT .0940 .0828 .0069 .0051 .4301 .881
EXP* 53862 60010 3.601E+9 1327 214029 1.114
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Table A6.11. Municipal SOUTH
CITY MANAGER
n=116
Variable
(S/000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
ExpT 13188 28767 8.275E+8 810 224768 2.181
nm 66.057 129 16598 10.073 904.078 1.950
Ind" 18.385 5.373 28.865 10.553 32.373 .292
A id” 5679 12640 1.598E+8 56 87842 2.226
c .000239 .000264 6.978E-8 7.6E-7 .00151 1.105
nc 624.432 630 396806 21.2 2409.547 1.009
A icf 50944 83650 6.997E+9 188 382578 1.642
3.894E-5 8.402E-5 7.06E-9 9.08E-7 .000701 2.158
DEC .6216 .199 .0396 .328 .9796 .320
FRAG” 1.2209 .4123 .1700 .1819 2.0802 .338
ttmuni gov ‘ts 18 11 125 1 37 .610
TXCOIT .5596 .1794 .0322 .3531 .9800 .321
EXCOIT .0779 .0693 .0048 .0036 .3903 .890
EXP1 
'able A6.12.
45107 61032
Municipal SOUTH
COMMISSION
n=3
3.725E+9 752 214029 1.353
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff
Variation
Expm 3702 1722 2.964E+6 1722 4849 .465
nm 27.915 16 242 10.814 41.201 .557
Ind” 15.083 5.332 28.43 11.548 21.216 .354
A id” 1517 867 751881 658 2392 .572
*: .000526 .000365 1.335E-7 .00011 .000793 .694
nc 301.361 330 108952 37.021 671.324 1.095
Aicf 18322 23163 5.365E+8 2257 44874 1.264
*7 8.128E-5 .000115 1.33 IE-8 5.95E-6 .000214 1.419
DEC .7176 .1464 .0214 .5913 .8781 .204
FRAG” .9894 .2023 .0409 .7742 1.1758 .205
ttmuni gov ‘ts 18 14 206 7 34 .813
t x c o i t .4589 .1074 .0115 .3354 .5305 .234
EXCOIT .0169 .014 .0002 .0063 .0328 .826
E X T 17488 18929 3.583E+8 1964 38575 1.082
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Table A6.13. County Regionally Pooled
COUNCIL ADMINISTRATOR 
n=82
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std  Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X F 39866 80568 6.491E+9 752 677669 2.021
nc 522.805 888 788235 21.2 7477.421 1.698
Incc 18.418 3.255 10.596 13.404 30.011 .177
Ai<f 112419 281612 7.931E+10 1701 2445491 2.505
< 7.486E-5 3.015E-4 9.089E-8 5.21E-7 .00261 4.027
nm 61.163 91 8266 10.073 629.531 1.487
A id” 7101 11508 1.3244E+8 249 66431 1.621
S'm .000403 .000738 5.44 IE-7 8.03E-6 .00637 1.832
DEC .5284 .1345 .0181 .2497 .9796 .255
FRAG' .4136 .279 .0778 .0435 1.0691 .675
Utotal g o v ’t 55 50 2451 2 276 .908
TXCON* .7319 .1526 .0233 .4519 .9898 .208
EXCONc .6686 .1470 .0216 .2797 .9487 .220
EXP” 12387 20311 4.126E+8 855 131909 1.640
Table A6.14. County Regionally Pooled 
COUNCIL EXECUTIVE 
n=15
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min M ax Coeff.
Variation
E X P 64396 44836 2.01E+9 2138 170702 .696
nc 925.427 1247 1.554E+6 49.499 5253.628 1.347
In d 20.118 4.233 17.918 11.687 28.987 .210
A id 96845 78873 6.22 IE+9 2946 239264 .814
5l 6.177E-5 .000171 2.914E-8 1.79E-6 .000675 2.763
n 28.839 18 321 11.022 85.725 .622
A id” 3396 6747 4.552E+7 489 27278 1.987
s ‘m .000511 .000452 2.046E-7 6.77E-5 .001680 .885
DEC .6652 .0962 .0093 .5380 .7864 .145
FRAC? .3177 .1376 .0189 .1638 .6368 .433
Utotal gov ’t 83 128 16413 6 516 1.547
TXCON* .6094 .222 .0493 .4042 .9924 .364
EXCON* .6658 .1096 .012 .4429 .84 .165
EXP” 5661 6606 4.364E+7 1457 28325 1.167
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table A6.1S. County Regionally Pooled 
COUNCIL COMMISSION 
n=69
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X F 15804 32299 1.043E+9 860 214029 2.044
nc 294.594 445 198105 36.446 2409.547 1.511
Incc 18.956 3.234 10.459 11.698 25.827 .171
Ai<f 15444 28803 8.296E+8 188 220210 1.865
4 8.507E-5 .000103 1.064E-8 6.82E-7 .000623 1.212
rT 53.011 111 12243 10.394 786 2.087
A id” 4678 12763 1.629E+8 75 87842 2.728
4 .00406 .000344 1.183E-7 1.09E-5 .001417 .848
DEC .7071 .1204 .0145 .4572 .9302 .170
FRACT .4878 .2359 .0557 .1638 .9406 .487
If total gov't 57 54 2960 7 402 .949
TXCO lf .7401 .1943 .0377 .3555 .9917 .263
EXC O lf .6065 .1472 .0217 .2381 .9018 .243
EXP” 9100 18785 3.529E+8 810 111725 2.064
Table A6.16. County WEST
COUNCIL ADMINISTRATOR 
n=25
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff
Variation
E X F 80825 129775 1.684E+10 9536 677669 1.606
ne 913.05 1467 2150711 63.116 7477.421 1.606
In d 19.162 2.914 8.489 15.339 24.554 .152
A id 246593 478463 2.289E+11 9992 2445491 1.940
K 1.818E-5 2.307E-5 5.322E-10 5.21E-7 8.66E-5 1.269
nm 108.137 135 18351 11.064 629.531 1.253
Aid" 12049 16825 2.831E+8 485 66431 1.397
s e„ .000365 .000384 1.47E-7 9.83E-6 .001649 1.049
DEC .5088 .1232 .0152 .2497 .6936 .242
FRACT .2284 .1499 .0225 .0435 .5393 .656
titotal gov't 91 60 3564 19 276 .656
TXCO lf .7167 .1368 .0187 .5042 .9648 .191
EXC O lf .6829 .082 .0067 .5267 .8144 .120
EXP■ 23629 30622 9.377E+8 2444 131909 1.296
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Table A6.17. County WEST
COUCIL EXECUTIVE 
n=2
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
EXP1 71465 42170 1.778E+9 41646 101284 .590
ne 916.195 500 250002 563 1270 .546
Incc 18.398 3 11 16.078 20.717 .178
A icf 67731 29582 8.75 IE+8 46813 88648 .437
2.92E-6 1.598E-6 2.554E-12 1.79E-6 4.05E-6 .547
nm 25.892 10 101 18.779 33.005 .389
A id ” 1601 550 302642 1212 1990 .344
£ .000131 8.906E-5 7.93 IE-8 6.77E-5 .000194 .682
DEC .6453 .0325 .0011 .6224 .6683 .054
FRAG1 .413 .1787 .0319 .2866 .5393 .433
tt total gov 7 103 66 4418 56 150 .645
TXCO lf .5578 .1323 .0175 .4642 .6514 .237
E X C O lf .664 .1105 .0122 .5859 .7421 .166
EXP” 4078 325 105341 3848 4307 .080
Table A6.18. County WEST
COUNCIL COMMISSION 
n =ll
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max C oeff
Variation
EXP1 16736 13894 1.93 IE+8 3307 51367 .830
n‘ 257.251 168 28354 55.332 619.066 .655
Ince 19.174 2.368 5.606 15.805 23.861 .124
A icf 19581 13153 1.73E+8 4220 46941 .672
S'c 6.53E-5 6.348E-5 4.03E-9 6.71E-6 .000196 .972
nm 28.495 13.155 173.059 10.394 53.006 .462
A id ” 1699 1495 2234167 439 4834 .880
C .000448 .000369 1.36E-7 6.25E-5 .001356 .823
DEC .5959 .0463 .0021 .5495 .6683 .078
FR.4G .4070 .1007 .0101 .2866 .5393 .247
tttotal gov 7 65 30 906 27 112 .466
TXC O lf .7107 .196 .0384 .4385 .9275 .276
E X C O lf .595 .0925 .0086 .4838 .8187 .156
EXP” 5315 3097 9591850 1453 11346 .583
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Table A6.I9. County MIDWEST
COUNCIL ADMINISTRATOR 
n=26
Variable
(SIOOO)
Mean S td  Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X P 18325 16023 2.567E+8 3090 61147 .874
nc 390.292 348 121405 74.624 1498.4 .893
Ince 19.825 2.897 8.392 16.119 27.509 .146
A icf 49863 66619 4.438E+9 3203 278792 1.336
s t 3.699E-5 2.89E-5 8.35 IE-10 5.7E-6 .000113 .781
nm 34.480 33 1119 10.108 161.134 .970
A id” 3645 5544 3.074E+7 249 24103 1.521
K. .000357 .000217 4.709E-8 3.29E-5 .000833 .608
DEC .6207 .0737 .0054 .5160 .7745 .119
FRAG1 .3416 .1401 .0196 .1638 .6648 .410
U total g o v ’t 63 34 1155 32 163 .540
t x c o it .7871 .1739 .0302 .5067 .9896 .221
EXCO P .6522 .1122 .0126 .3522 .8464 .172
EXP” 5662 5714 3.266E+7 855 27678 1.009
Table A6.20. County MIDWEST
COUNCIL EXECUTIVE 
n=6
Variable
(SIOOO)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff
Variation
E X P 75248 56389 3.18E+9 13734 170702 .749
ne 1501.165 1866 3481908 173.132 5253.628 1.24
Ince 20.432 3 9 16.887 25.323 .149
A id 107745 90805 8.245E+9 21796 229994 .843
1
1.32E-5 1.124E-5 1.262E-10 1.86E-6 2.74E-5 .851
n 34.359 26 682 11.022 85.725 .760
A id” 5729 10616 1.127E+8 731 27278 1.853
4 .000418 .000197 3.879E-8 8.62E-5 .00642 .471
DEC .6610 .1041 .0108 .538 .7745 .158
F RAG .2885 .117 .0137 .1638 .4883 .405
#total g o v’t 147 186 34527 38 516 1.261
TXCOP .7203 .2737 .0749 .4042 .9924 .380
EXC O P .6285 .1319 .0174 .4429 .8400 .210
EXP” 8568 10037 1.007E+8 1545 28325 1.172
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Table A6.21. County MIDWEST
COUNCIL COMMISSION 
n=25
Variable
(51000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X P 13660 29267 8.565E+8 1713 151339 2.143
ne 272.797 451 203269 53.84 2337.891 1.653
Incc 20.217 3.315 10.986 11.698 25.827 .164
Aicf 21401 <13959 1.932E+9 1521 220210 2.054
A 9.449E-5 .000122 1.484E-8 6.82E-7 .000623 1.289
nm 45.164 64 4149 11.563 313.939 1.426
A ic f 4663 9858 9.718E+7 338 46025 2.114
s em .000402 .000268 7.199E-8 2.24E-5 .000896 .667
DEC .6890 .0920 .0085 .5160 .7745 .134
F RAG .4518 .2305 .0531 .1638 .8572 .510
H total gov't 65 40 1618 18 182 .618
TXCOIf .7426 .2109 .0445 .4482 .9905 .284
EXC O lf .6179 .1437 .0207 .3645 .9018 .233
EXP” 8133 14116 1.993E+8 1076 67870 1.736
Table A6.22. County SOUTH
COUNCIL ADMINISTRATOR 
n=31
Variable
(SIOOO)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff
Variation
E X P 24902 42515 1.808E+9 752 205524 1.707
ne 319.232 349 121544 21.2 1625.724 1.092
Incc 16.638 3 9 13.404 30.011 .184
A icf 56680 75367 5.68E+9 1701 382578 1.330
* .000152 .000484 2.342E-7 1.3E-6 .00261 3.176
nm 45.661 63 4002 10.073 315.473 1.385
A ic f 6011 8575 7.352E+7 306 31570 1.427
£ .000471 .001142 1.304E-6 8.03E-6 .00637 2.425
DEC .4667 .1433 .0205 .3279 .9796 .307
F R A G .6233 .3119 .0973 .0756 1.0691 .500
ntotal gov "t 18 16 263 2 81 .899
TXCO lf .6979 .1366 .0186 .4519 .9898 .196
EXC O lf .6708 .205 .042 .2797 .9487 .306
E X P 8962 13412 1.799E+8 1054 56213 1.496
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Table A6.23. County SOUTH
COUNCIL EXECUTIVE 
n=7
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff.
Variation
E X P 53076 38216 1.46E+9 2138 98927 .720
nc 434.576 267 71234 49.499 777.113 .614
Ince 20.34 6 31 11.687 28.987 .274
Aief 95822 84237 7.096E+9 2946 239264 .879
s i .000120 .000246 6.038E-8 1.17E-5 .000675 2.044
nm 24.95 10 113 11.533 43.811 A l l
A id ” 1909 1777 3157031 489 5643 .931
s ‘m .0007 .000588 3.45 IE-7 .000145 .00168 .839
DEC 6744 .1102 .0121 .5504 .7864 .163
FRAG? .3155 .1536 .0236 .1846 .6368 .487
fttotal gov't 22 12 133 6 35 .531
TXC O lf .5291 .1702 .029 .4053 .9037 .322
E X C O lf .6983 .0942 .0089 .551 .8126 .135
EXP” 3622 1925 3707174 1457 6290 .532
Table A6.24. County SOUTH
COUNCIL COMMISSION 
n=33
Variable
($1000)
Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Max Coeff
Variation
E X F 17118 38839 1.508E+9 860 214029 2.269
nc 323.555 508 257946 36.446 2409.547 1.570
In d 17.928 3.144 9.885 12.489 25.591 .175
Aicf 9553 13791 1.902E+8 188 55952 1.444
s i 8.452E-5 .0001 1.001E-8 1.15E-6 .000358 1.184
nm 67.128 150 22389 10.814 786.023 2.229
A id ” 5683 16384 2.684E+8 75 87842 2.883
s i .000394 .000393 1.541E-7 1.09E-5 .00142 .996
DEC .7579 .129 .0166 .4572 .9302 .170
FRAG* .5421 .2627 .0690 .2581 .9406 .485
titotal gov't 49 68 4659 7 402 1.390
TXC O lf .7479 .1857 .0345 .3555 .9917 .248
E X C O lf .6017 .1665 .0277 .2381 .18824 .277
EXP” 11094 24212 5.877E+8 810 111725 2.185
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Table A6.26. County Pooled Regressions—Dummy for CA and CC
Sample:
Model:
Constant
West
4
2.729*
1.048
.015
Midwest
1
-1.065
1.150
.359
In n f -.495 1.384**
.335 .277
.151 .000
In (SgAc) .128 .133
.094 .067
.081 .051
In s i -.122 -.309**
.079 .100
.133 .003
In ne -.165 -.370**
.095 .112
.093 .002
Innm -.159
.130
.232
In s im .011
.071
.874
lnA m .146
.118
.224
ln(EXP”/nm) .462
.235
.059
C4 -.088 -.362**
.168 .134
.604 .009
CC -.322* -.399*
.121 .153
.013 .012
Adj. R1 .446 .278
F 3.976** 4.597**
d.f. 27 50
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p <
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Table A6.25. Municipal—REGIONALLY POOLED—Dummy Variable for Council-Manager
Governments
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 8
Constant 3.269** 3.251** 3.128** 3.079** 3.058** 3.077** 2.852**
.292 .294 .355 .309 .373 .311 .410
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
In mm .223** .227** .227** .156* .238** .160* .182*
.067 .067 .069 .071 .071 .071 .076
.001 .001 .001 .030 .001 .024 .017
In (sZ A m) .160** .155** .184** .147** .179** .148** .166**
.025 .026 .029 .026 .028 .026 .027
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
-.247** -.241** -.275** -.241** -.269** -.243** -.267**
.034 .035 .040 .040 .039 .040 .045
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Inn" -.163** -.156** -.198** -.161** -.192** -.162* -.190**
.040 .041 .047 .046 .046 .046 .051
.000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000
Inne .044 .052 .036
.031 .034 .035
.156 .121 .311
In s ” • .019 .020 .024
.023 .022 .023
.405 .370 .300
ln A c -.013 -.020 -.007
,017 .022 .023
.439 .358 .752
(table con’d)
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Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 8
InDEC -.049 -.074 -.040 -.044
.063 .071 .076 .079
.433 .293 .600 .579
InFRAGT -.013 -.022 .007 -.002
.042 .043 .042 .044
.745 .618 .869 .965
InTXCON” -.109 -.123 -.123
.061 .066 .070
.075 .063 .078
InEXCObT .024 .021 .015
.023 .024 .024
.297 .386 .546
ln(EXFm c) .117** .116** .116**
.030 .031 .032
.000 .000 .000
M W -.297** -.284** -.262** -.247** -.238** -.248** -.201**
.042 .047 .046 .047 .056 .050 .060
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001
S -.249** -.246** -.213** -.218** -.205** -.221** -.177**
.049 .049 .052 .053 .052 .054 .059
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .003
CM .017 .017 .030 .018 .029 .017 .028
.034 .034 .035 .034 .035 .033 .034
.607 .623 .390 .596 .401 .617 .415
Flvpaper: 40.167** 39.181** 36.317**
Adj. R 1 .280 .277 .284 .293 .283 .290 .294
F 29.71** 23.10** 23.81** 20.51** 19.55** 17.31** 15.40**
d.f. 511 509 509 507 507 505 503
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p  < .05. ** p c .O l .
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Table A6.26. Municipal-WEST-Dummy Variable Tor Council-Manager Governments
Model: 1 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant 3.275** 3.436** 3.229** 3.616** 3.221** 3.563** 3.581**
.679 .845 .819 .888 .799 .938 .919
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
In rnm .216 .159 .121 .115 .089 .061 .022
.157 .174 .148 .187 .152 .173 .180
.171 .364 .413 .539 .562 .723 .902
In ( C A m) .264** .263** .213** .275** .214* .216* .216*
.077 .078 .081 .078 .083 .088 .088
.001 .001 .010 .001 .011 .015 .016
InsZ -.303** -.310** -.254** -.319** -.247** -.268** -.261**
.075 .074 .085 .073 .085 .083 .083
.000 .000 .003 .000 .005 .002 .002
ln n m -.258** -.266** -.228* -.273** -.218* -.237* -.226*
.094 .098 .106 .096 .106 .108 .108
.007 .008 .034 .005 .042 .030 .039
In ne .072 .059 .075 .060
.076 .081 .076 .082
.347 .467 .329 .464
In s? .002 -.002 .006 .002
.024 .024 .026 .026
.929 .945 .808 .933
ln A e -.014 -.008 -.014 -.007
.062 .066 .064 .069
.825 .901 .823 .920
(table con’d)
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Model: 1 3 4 5 6 7 8
InDEC .159 .183 .187
.138 .174 .169
.251 .297 .272
InFRAC” .044 .037 .043
.095 .101 .097
.643 .714 .657
InTXCON” -.148 -.147 -.079 -.063
.191 .192 .220 .221
.440 .446 .720 .775
InEXCOlT .062 .067 .063 .065
.062 .063 .061 .060
.323 .288 .304 .283
ln(EXF/nc) .076 .122 .049 .093
.144 .152 .132 .139
.596 .424 .709 .505
C hf -.046 -.035 -.065 -.016 -.053 -.049 -.037
.122 .115 .120 .115 .118 .119 .116
.707 .764 .589 .893 .657 .684 .753
Flvpaper: 9.311** 9.789** 7.718** 7.756**
Adj. R2 .161 .165 .155 .158 .148 .155 .148
F  5.63** 4.43** 3.47** 3.52** 2.91** 3.02** 2.61**
d.f. 116 114 112 112 110 110 108
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p c .O l .
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Table A6.31. Municipal—REGIONALLY POOLED-Commission
Model: I 2 3
Constant 6.561** 8.184* -13.885
.643 1.194 10.452
.001 .021 .315
In m” -.617 -.481 2.015
.259 .217 1.397
.076 .157 .286
In ( s ”A”J -.015 -.107 .857
.059 .100 .473
.815 .397 .211
ins ; -.050 .225 -1.311
.056 .173 .636
.423 .324 .176
Inn” .041 .362 -1.017
.081 .195 .535
.640 .204 .197
InDEC 1.321
.488
.114
In FRAG” -.291
.347
.490
InTXCON” -3.050
1.495
.178
InEXCON” -1.244
.629
.187
M V -.205 -.649 1.111
.130 .243 .647
.190 .116 .228
S -.509** -.974 -.858*
.079 .291 .147
.003 .079 .028
Flypaper: 27.439
Adj. RT .627 .576 .473
F 3.80 2.70 2.12
d.f. 4 2 2
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
InDEC -.270 -.223 -.330 -.309
.284 .255 .216 .207
.349 .390 .140 .151
InFRAG' .106 .080 .082 .062
.100 .108 .090 .093
.299 .467 .372 .508
InTXCOtf -.425 -.257 -.364 -.208
.252 .226 .219 .209
.102 .266 .109 .330
InEXCON* .018 .157 .022 .221
.596 .492 .516 .466
.976 .753 .966 .641
ln(EXPm/nm) .458 .415 .399 .358
.251 .240 .264 .260
.080 .097 .143 .182
CA .330* .315* .361* .235 .335** .192 .254 .202
.133 .118 .137 .142 .118 .143 .152 .143
.019 .013 .014 .109 .009 .194 .107 .173
Flypaper: 8.11 5.240 9.170 4.549
Adj.R* .356 .388 .371 .455 .362 .489 .457 .460
F 4.88** 4.17** 3.95** 4.25** 3.20** 4.04** 3.67** 3.30**
d.f. 30 28 28 26 26 24 24 22
Notes: While’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .03. ♦♦ p < .01.
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Table A6.39. County—MIDWEST—Dummy Variable for Coiincil-Administrator Governments
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant -1.630 -1.353 -1.113 -2.289 -.937 -1.970 -1.788 -1.555
1.309 1.301 1.439 1.762 1.451 1.731 1.737 1.658
.220 .304 .443 .201 .522 .262 .310 .354
In n f 1.438** 1.350** 1.351** 1.416** 1.285** 1.305** 1.250** 1.168**
.317 .326 .346 .348 .351 .354 .376 .362
.000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .001 .002 .003
In (s°cA e) .108 .148 .084 .115 .113 .166 .108 .150
.069 .092 .068 .072 .089 .093 .070 .087
.127 .116 .225 .119 .214 .083 .133 .092
In s i -.289* -.322* -.245* -.271* -.269* -.322* -.230 -.275*
.115 .124 .114 .113 .129 .123 .115 .125
.016 .013 .038 .021 .044 .012 .053 .034
In ne -.334* -.381* -.292* -.305* -.325* -.369* -.280* -.334*
.136 .145 .135 .132 .147 .145 .129 .140
.018 .012 .036 .026 .033 .015 .036 .022
In nm .029 .048 .150 .161
.184 .191 .173 .177
.877 .803 .390 .368
ln s cm .012 .014 -.035 -.030
.134 .132 .130 .130
.930 .915 .791 .816
ln A m -.002 -.028 -.142 -.159
.115 .120 .122 .126
.989 .818 .252 .217
(table con’d)
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Table A6.40. County—SOUTH—Dummy Variable for Council-Administrator Governments
Model: 4 7
Constant -.533 -.640
1.065 1.147
.619 .579
In n f .092 .161
.323 .375
.777 .669
In ( s 'A ‘) -.098 -.121
.068 .091
.154 .188
Ins* -.217 -.199
.139 .139
.123 .157
ln n e -.053 -.032
.165 .165
.749 .847
ln n m .068 .066
.183 .183
.710 .721
l* sem .447** .451**.
.148 .151
.004 .004
In A1” .048 .060
.087 .095
.584 .533
tnTXCOtf -.185
.360
.609
InEXCON' -.007
.245
.976
ln(EXP”/nm) 1.012** .979**
.249 .259
.000 .000
CA .081 .118
.151 .180
.594 .515
Flypaper: -30.133
A d j .# .274 .250
F 3.64** 2.91**
d.f. 54 52
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table A6.41. County-■REGIONALLY POOLED-Council Executive
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Constant .994 .346 .651 .008 -.612 .476 -2.327
.807 .372 1.043 1.598 .558 1.047 1.752
.253 .389 .555 .996 .335 .694 .315
In me 1.504* 1.355** 1.768** 1.792* 1.585** 2.001* 2.129*
.461 .259 .471 0.453 .196 .249 .377
.012 .002 .009 .017 .001 .015 .030
In ( s eA c) .442* .143 .473* .281 .215* .005 .445
.190 .115 .176 .155 .074 .116 .164
.049 .258 .036 .145 .044 .972 .113
In s i -.006 .006 .081 -.261 -.054 -.609 .079
.189 .080 .219 .337 .069 .376 .308
.977 .944 .725 .481 .478 .247 .820
ln n e -.048 .005 .090 -.387 -.036 -.692 .077
.183 .063 .246 .440 .070 .471 .422
.802 .939 .727 .430 .632 .280 .873
Inn" .583 .768 .158
.417 .546 .427
.234 .295 .747
lns'm .438 .644 .167
.274 .315 .258
.185 .177 .585
ln A m -.155 -.160 -.047
.197 .194 .198
.476 .495 .833
(table con’d)
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Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
InDEC -1.508** -1.323** -.807
.385 .251 .480
.008 .006 .235
InFRAGF .330* .456** .731
.110 .092 .209
.024 .008 .073
InTXCONc .388 .154 .507
.297 .116 .204
.239 .255 .131
InEXCON* -.110 -.524 -.589
.505 .231 .354
.835 .086 .238
ln(EXPm/nm) .415 -.040 .624
.221 .123 .140
.134 .776 .047
mv -.963* -.418* -1.229* -1.053 -.487* -.175 -1.577
.294 .118 .365 .459 .121 .306 .430
.011 .012 .015 .084 .016 .626 .067
s -.926 -.032 -1.075* -.789 -.038 .328 -1.148
.424 .195 .427 .461 .155 .345 .397
.060 .876 .045 .162 .817 .442 .102
Flvpaper: 14.117* 5.649* 12.828
Adj. /?*’ .614 .858 .548 .493 .849 .831 .288
F 4.72* 11.54** 3.12 2.36 8.87* 6.72 1.47
d.f. 8 6 6 4 4 2 2
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table A6.44. County—WEST Region—Council Commission
Model: 1 2 3 4 5
Constant 2.407 4.112 2.374 3.148 -.199
2.431 5.795 4.012 2.055 2.982
.361 .517 .586 .265 .953
In mc -.435 -1.289 -.353 -1.217 -.014
.784 .892 1.234 .687 .549
.599 .222 .789 .219 .982
In ( SgAe) .309 .156 .290 .013 .765
.203 .181 .490 .170 .190
.180 .438 .585 .947 .056
In s i -.452* -.343 -.433 .090 -.720
.179 .377 .334 .315 .200
.045 .415 .265 .802 .069
In nc -.280 .098 -.271 .106 -.602
.269 .444 .557 .363 .257
.338 .836 .652 .797 .144
Innm -.278
.422
.578
ln sem -.130
.156
.492
lnA m .252
.319
.513
(table con’d)
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Model: 1 2 3 4 5
InDEC -1.418
3.241
.684
-2.221
1.521
.282
InFRACT .995
.526
.132
1.382*
.231
.027
InTXCOlf -.045
.546
.938
-1.379*
.285
.040
InEXCON* .176
.984
.866
-.394
.379
.408
ln(EXP”/nm) .566
.528
.396
Flvpaper: 15.099 38.832*
Adj. R3 .180 .499 -.220 -.022 .697
F 1.55 2.66 .70 .97 3.87
d.f. 6 4 4 2 2
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. ** p <
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Table A6.46. County—MIDWEST Region—Council Commission
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant -.0002 .228 -.476 .104 -.207 .440 1.515 2.309
1.632 1.926 1.679 2.998 1.889 2.844 2.491 2.025
.999 .907 .780 .973 .914 .879 .553 .276
lnm c 1.032+ .964 1.144+ .066 1.072+ -.213 -.170 -.707
.412 .493 .409 .728 .448 .681 .690 .523
.021 .066 .012 .928 .029 .759 .809 .201
ln ( s cA c) .012 -.057 .008 .131 -.071 .188 .139 .244+
.084 .090 .086 .081 .093 .091 .077 .085
.885 .533 .928 .123 .455 .057 .093 .014
Ins" -.130 -.034 -.150 -.115 -.043 -.157 -.162 -.240+
.123 .142 .131 .091 .153 .097 .091 .101
.303 .814 .264 .223 .782 .128 .095 .035
In ne -.123 -.017 -.174 -.033 -.062 -.001 -.110 -.070
.159 .193 .173 .119 .203 .159 .121 .152
.450 .933 .328 .782 .764 .994 .379 .653
in nm .025 .067 .174 .281
.224 .234 .205 .174
.913 .779 .411 .131
b,s m -.091 -.039 -.029 .054
.204 .204 .163 .149
.662 .851 .859 .723
ln A m -.249 -.328+ -.392++ -.569++
.119 .133 .125 .114
.052 .027 .007 .000
(table con'd)
Reproduced 
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Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
InDEC -.773 -.848* .233 .444
.464 .396 .606 .497
.113 .048 .706 .389
InFRAGc -.034 -.044 .154 .257
.140 .118 .163 .128
.814 .715 .361 .068
InTXCON* .150 .191 .479* .597**
.238 .222 .215 .178
.537 .402 .043 .006
InEXCON -.493 -.529* -.529* -.578
.262 .240 .234 .197
.076 .043 .040 .013
ln(EXFm/nm) .723** .939** .763** 1.163**
.196 .271 .222 .272
.002 .004 .004 .001
Flypaper: -.326 -8.508 14.648* 26.099**
Adj. R2 .035 .024 .049 .108 .061 .025 .211 .213
F  1.22 1.10 1.21 1.36 1.19 1.06 1.64 1.54
d.f. 20 18 18 16 16 14 14 12
Notes: White’s errors follow estimates. Probability values follow errors. * p < .05. *♦ p < .01.
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Table A6.48. County—SOUTH Region—Council Commission
Model: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Constant -.390 -.977 .417 -3.093 .931 -3.072* -2.053 -.999
1.268 1.468 1.421 1.544 1.296 1.375 1.727 1.517
.761 .511 .772 .057 .479 .036 .247 .518
in mc .912* .975* .792 .618 .599 .604 .447 .382
.424 .424 .465 .365 .413 .331 .422 .355
.040 .030 .100 .103 .160 .082 .301 .295
In ( s cA c) .198** .113 .191* .143* .109 .082 .173* .096
.063 .059 .085 .069 .071 .072 .076 .085
.004 .067 .033 .050 .139 .266 .033 .269
Ins* -.359* -.383* -.364* -.243 -.323** -.402* -.303* -.347*
.160 .141 .140 .155 .102 .146 .134 .132
.033 .012 .015 .129 .004 on .033 .016
In ne -.356 -.347* -.384* -.158 -.341* -.270 -.262 -.307*
.185 .153 .175 .166 .134 .132 .148 .123
.065 .032 .038 .351 .018 .053 .090 .021
ln n m -.191 -.044 -.153 -.031
.114 .128 .112 .122
.107 .734 .185 .803
I " * *
-.008 .141 .017 .109
.162 .163 .158 .167
.961 .397 .917 .520
ln A m -.024 -.043 -.016 -.012
.073 .079 .060 .061
.740 .593 .790 .847
(table con’d)
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